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vAbstract
This study argues that Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is a distinct literary genre
generated from and transformative of a certain stage in post-colonial Australian history.
Such writing forms part of a larger process by which Aboriginal peoples work-through
post-colonial trauma to establish Aboriginal identity in political and therapeutic contexts.
As a therapeutic and political project concerned with establishing Aboriginal agency, it is
part of the process of reclaiming Aboriginal identity through the present-centred
performativity of Aboriginal identity.
From discussing key theoretical issues of autobiography, this study moves into the
broader field of life-writing in general and Aboriginal life-writing in particular.  This
move provides a starting point for exploring the ways in which Aboriginal testimonial
texts highlight the excesses, deficits, utility and creativity of contemporary theory;
emphasise the co-extensivity of society and individuals to a greater degree than
autobiography; are responsive to multi-disciplinary approaches as a consequence of their
multi-dimensionality; reveal complex operations of traumatic material in the construction
of texts and subjects; and provide insights into literatures of political resistance and post-
colonial Australian history.
It examines a range of contemporary cultural theory for tools to explore the
political and therapeutic dimensions of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing.  This provides
the opportunity to test the effectiveness of such theories for articulating the political and
therapeutic processes involved in establishing Aboriginal agency.  This, in turn, provides
the opportunity to consider how Aboriginal testimonial life-writing works to expand the
interpretative scope of contemporary cultural theory.
This study does not seek to reconcile post-structuralist and post-colonialist views
on agency, nor to reinstate Cartesian-like subjects, but rather seeks an understanding of
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the liminality of a subjectivity that is neither “isolatable, constitutive and self-identical”
(Smith 56) nor unlocatable and deferred, and a form of representation that is neither “an
antirepresentational antihumanism” nor a “humanist [defence] of representation” (Arac
qtd. in Colás 163).  Such a strategy takes a position between the post-structuralist ethical
imperative to resist closure and the equally important post-colonial imperative to specify
objects of colonial trauma and Aboriginal resistance to dispossession.
The convergence of testimonial life-writing as a form of political resistance with
testimonial life-writing as a form of writing-through post-colonial trauma encourages a
collaboration between post-colonial and psychoanalytic theory.  Both work towards a
reinscription and retrieval of identity, which involves avoiding restrictive totalisations of
identity and also the crippling of identity in epistemological aporia.
To contextualise this interest I examine the two major sites for theoretical
discussion of testimonial writing: Latin American Studies and Holocaust Studies.  The
former focuses on testimonial writing as a form of resistance literature that seeks redress
for injustices and advocates the rights of marginalised communities.  Holocaust Studies
primarily employs a therapeutic framework for discussing testimonial life-writing and
focuses on issues concerning memory and history, subjectivity and traumatic experience.
I set out to show how psychoanalytic theory’s interest in the role of traumatic memories
in identity formation is compatible with post-colonial theory’s interest in the reinscription
of marginalised identities following colonial dispossession.
With this in mind, I am interested in the following questions: how do the different
emphases of these two discourses (Latin American testimonio and Holocaust Studies)
undermine and reinforce one another?  How does the project of expressing the impact and
effects of traumatic experiences conflict with the need to set the official record straight in
acts of discursive resistance?  How does traumatic material impede the capacity to resist?
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And, how does the need to resist drive the process of working-through trauma?  To be
more culturally and historically specific: how do those who write on Aboriginal cultural
dispossession and survival deal with the tensions between testimonial literature as a form
of resistance and as a form of working-through trauma.  And, how do these tensions
affect the project of “reculturation” that seeks to counteract the effects colonial
dispossession?
A theoretical approach is pursued that simultaneously affirms dual directions:
claims the privileges of essentialism and of non-essentialism; reinforces traditional
Aboriginality and works towards its processual enrichment; and establishes and
deconstructs identity.  However, this dual affirmation is balanced by a dual resistance to
absolutism and radical relativism, complete redemptive totalisation and complete impasse
enforcement, and the complete deconstruction and complete establishment of identity.
Maintaining this tension preserves the dynamism of dialectical interchange by not
asserting the precedence of one dialectical pole over another.  Opposite but ultimately
complementary strategies that assert the precedence of one dialectical pole over another
fail to account for the complexities involved in the movement between traumatic memory
and narrative memory, opacity and transparency, between what can be phrased now and
what remains to be phrased, and the testifier and his or her community.
Subjectivity is a continuum of identifications and alterities, re-territorialisations
and de-territorialisations, and is not something eternally deferred in the opacity of self-
representation or timelessly present in its transparency.  Only through acknowledging that
agency, and the narratives that represent and constitute it, is generated by maintaining
dialectical tensions can we develop a model of representation subtle enough to register
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1S. R. J. Gibbons
Introduction
Aboriginal Lives Writing Through Post-Colonial Trauma
This study argues that Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is a distinct literary genre
formed from, and transformative of, a particular stage in post-colonial Australian history.
At its core, it is a genre concerned with registering Aboriginal agency.  This goal is
advanced through two interconnected and equally important strategies: firstly, the
presentation of Aboriginal political will; and secondly, the working-through of traumatic
experiences resulting from colonial dispossession.1  These strategies form the primary
driving forces of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing and manifest themselves in a variety
of writing techniques shared by, and distinctive of, many Aboriginal authors.
Because this study seeks to elucidate the multi-dimensionality of Aboriginal
testimonial life-writing, it chooses to bring together a number of fields of contemporary
cultural theory to assist in the clearer articulation of the various processes involved in the
establishment of Aboriginal agency in testimonial life-writing.  These theoretical fields
include theories of autobiography, theories of resistance literature, theories of trauma,
theories of recognition, and schizo-analytic theory.  While each chapter focuses on one of
these theoretical frameworks, post-colonial interest in the establishment of Aboriginal
agency remains the central focus.  In this manner, the study sets out to demonstrate some
ways in which Aboriginal testimonial life-writing and contemporary theory can inform
one another.  Because this study uses contemporary cultural theory eclectically to explore
the multidimensionality of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing, it may be of use to those
                                                 
1 Working-through is written with a hypen to mark its special use in psychoanalytic theory.  Dominick
LaCapra writes: “[w]orking-through [. . .] involve[s] a mode of repetition offering a measure of critical
purchase on problems and responsible control in action which would permit desirable change.  Laplanche
and Pontalis also indicate how working-through is not a purely intellectual process but requires a form of
work involving not only affect but the entire personality.  Indeed, for them ‘working-through might be
defined as that process which is liable to halt the repetitive insistence characteristic of unconscious
formations by bringing these into relation with the subject’s personality as a whole’” (Representing the
Holocaust 209).
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interested in the political and/or psychotherapeutic aspects of Aboriginal writing as well
as to a literary studies audience.
This study is concerned to retain the complex interrelationships between the
literary, psychological and political dimensions of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing.  To
separate them — conceptually or analytically — would preclude the registering of the
synergetic relationship between post-colonial resistance, trauma and literary
representation.  The processes involved in establishing Aboriginal agency in a therapeutic
sense are inseparable from the establishment of Aboriginal agency in the political and
narrative senses.  Employing the several theoretical frameworks identified above works to
emphasise the connections between the individual, political and therapeutic domains
involved in presenting Aboriginal agency.  It also effectively elicits the tensions and
concordances involved in advancing the joint projects of working-through post-colonial
trauma and the establishment of Aboriginal agency.  Psychoanalytic theory needs to get
off the couch so to speak and realise its political and collective significance.
Reciprocally, the conceptual tools of psychoanalytic theory that are so useful for
articulating post-colonial trauma can help to more fully realise the interpretive power of
theories of post-colonial resistance.
By employing a wide range of contemporary theory and testimonial narratives,
such as Latin American testimonio and Holocaust narratives, to examine Aboriginal life-
writing, this study brings together diverse cultural and historical contexts of trauma and
political resistance.  Nevertheless, the primary focus is always on Aboriginal testimonial
life-writing.  While acknowledging the importance of articulating incommensurable
differences, this study argues that despite such differences there are processes involved in
dealing with trauma and injustice that have cross-cultural significance.  The most
important of these are firstly, the desire to address injustice (although the injustices differ)
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and, secondly, the project of recovering from traumatic experiences.  Recovery is used
here to encapsulate its historical, therapeutic and legal senses — “to bring back”, “to
cure”, “a verdict giving right to the recovery of debts” 2 — because the work of recovery
in working-through traumatic histories necessarily involves negotiating specific
historical, therapeutic and political content.  Judicial, political and therapeutic practices
and concepts operate across different political and cultural domains by virtue of the fact
that they are present as organising determinants of those domains.  It is therefore possible
to pursue cross-cultural comparisons.
The current and growing interest in and practice of testimony is witnessed in
many different countries in projects aimed at recovering and memorialising unheard and
unread national histories.  Some instances include the growth of memorials to the
Holocaust, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and Australia’s
National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children
from their Families.  There are many other instances besides.  Nation-states, diasporic
and dispossessed cultures employ testimony as a means of addressing and contesting
unresolved and often traumatic historical material.  From testimony’s antecedents in
small-scale political and personal expressions of marginalised identities, it has been
mobilised as a strategy for large-scale nation-building with both progressive and
conservative manifestations.  Its growth as a practice for establishing and recording
individual and collective identity is providing previously unheard, heterogeneous
accounts of history for the reading public.
It is also important to note that the testimonial mode can be deployed to efface
heterogeneity and provide simplistic redemptive totalisations of national identity.  As a
mode of writing, it has no inherent political allegiances.  It can be used by those who wish
                                                 
2 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
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to deny the same traumatic historical events that others seek to have acknowledged
through it.  Nevertheless, I argue that those who use the testimonial mode to affirm
hegemonic history and further render unheard subaltern histories aggravate historical sites
of trauma and cultivate injustices.  Testimony may have no inherent political allegiance as
a mode of writing, but this study sets out to demonstrate that when mobilised in the form
of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing it does have an allegiance: to the articulation and
advancement of Aboriginal cultural identity and social justice.  Furthermore, as argued in
Chapter Two, its very formation as a genre is characterised by being a medium for the
articulation of subaltern experience.  This is why most texts written in the testimonial
mode are written by those who have been dispossessed by a dominant power.  However,
this history does not mean that testimony cannot be employed as a mode of writing by
which historical trauma is mobilised to further neo-colonialist practices.
From discussing key theoretical issues of autobiography in Chapter One, this
study moves out into the broader field of life-writing in general and Aboriginal life-
writing in particular in Chapter Two.  This move provides a starting point from which to
explore other issues such as the ways in which testimonial texts highlight the excesses,
deficits, utility and creativity of contemporary theory; emphasise the co-extensivity of
society and individuals to a greater degree than autobiography; are responsive to multi-
disciplinary approaches as a consequence of their multi-dimensionality; reveal complex
operations of traumatic material in the construction of texts and subjects; and provide
insights into literatures of political resistance and post-colonial Australian history.
Throughout the study, and with different emphases according to the theoretical
framework being examined, I set out to demonstrate that theoretical positions that assert
either full incommensurability or full commensurability between different instances of
historical trauma are short-sighted.  This point forms part of the overall theoretical
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position of this study that argues for resisting an either/or logic with regard to dialectical
oppositions in order to preserve a vitalising tension between them that maintains
theoretical rigour and protects possibilities for establishing agency.  I argue that the
strategies of reinforcing impasses or escaping into redemptive totalisations in discussions
about Australia’s identity and reconciliation have serious consequences for establishing
Aboriginality and an ethical citizenry.  To choose either strategy is to risk destructively
impacting upon the establishment and volition of Aboriginal agency and prolonging post-
colonial trauma.  I argue that there is an ethical obligation to conceptualise identity and
Aboriginality in a way that acknowledges their continual processual movements and does
not collapse them into simplistic oppositions.  Thus, throughout the study, but mainly in
Chapters Three, Four and Five (and especially in Chapter Five) I set out theoretical
alternatives to ‘either/or’ approaches and argue for the simultaneous affirmation of small,
mobile dialectical oppositions and for the rejection of absolutist dialectical oppositions.
This strategy focuses primarily on the dialectics involved in working-through traumatic
experience and the recognitive structures of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations.  I
contend that this approach not only improves vocabularies, imaginaries and conversations
for working-through theory, but also works to refine the dialectical tensions involved in
discussions on Aboriginality and national identity.  This approach forms the overall
theoretical position of this study and each chapter focuses on specific tensions relevant to
the study of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing.
Chapter One draws out tensions between post-structural and post-colonial theory
within a discussion of realist and anti-realist strategies for reading testimonial life-
writing.  It discusses the notion that there are forms of subjectivity presented in much
traditional autobiographical writing that are dislocated and abstracted from specific
material and symbolic forces, and that these are the basis of the proto-autobiographical
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desire of readers to identify with authors.  It outlines why such masterful, abstracted
forms of subjectivity are illusory and yet still persist to shape the imaginaries of authors
and readers.  It then moves on to discuss the main theoretical challenges to this traditional
subject and to introduce new ways of conceptualising the relationships between
representation, authors and readers through a reading of Aboriginal testimonial life-
writing.
Chapter Two sets out to demonstrate that theorisations of Latin American
testimonio and Holocaust Studies may be used productively together for examining the
political and therapeutic aspects of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing.  Aboriginal
testimonial life-writing, like the Latin American genre of testimonio, is characterised by
an emphasis on the political dimensions of life-writing: testimonio is a culturally and
historically specific instance of political testimonial narrative.  Holocaust Studies
undertakes analyses that, while not less political, are more focused on the individual’s
psychological responses to working-through trauma.  It deals with survivors’ testimonial
accounts of the Holocaust and is closely associated with psychoanalytic conceptual
frameworks.  This study argues that Latin American testimonio theory and Holocaust
Studies can be jointly developed to better articulate the complexity of post-colonial
Australian conditions and the chapter builds on the core therapeutic and political concerns
of each to do so.  By introducing developments in psychoanalytic theory in the form of
contemporary trauma theory (discussed further in Chapter Three) and schizo-analytic
theory (discussed further in Chapter Five), Chapter Two aims to extend the scope of the
therapeutic concerns taken up in Holocaust Studies.  In addition, the concerns of
testimonio resistance theory are taken up again in Chapter Four by analysing theories of
recognition, which, it is argued, are necessary for showing how author/reader relations
can form a basis for effective political dialogue.
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Chapter Two also analyses different aspects of the discursive features of the
testimonial mode.  It argues that testimonial life-writing functions in a realist mode like
traditional autobiography, although with important differences.  Testimonial texts exhibit
present-centred and urgent oral and written demands for justice.  An analysis is therefore
undertaken of the multiple narrative techniques that are employed to express those
demands and of the way in which these techniques differ from and/or simulate other
closely associated genres like autobiography, diaries, memoirs and historical modes of
research.  Later, Chapter Four extends this examination by analysing some of the ways in
which testimony’s discursive features perform Aboriginality in order to confront non-
Aboriginal Australians with the traumatic legacy of Australia’s colonial practices.
Chapter Three explores how the convergence of testimonial life-writing as a form
of political resistance with testimonial life-writing as a form of writing-through post-
colonial trauma encourages an alliance between post-colonial critical theory and
psychoanalytic theory.  It employs trauma theory to demonstrate the ways in which post-
colonial trauma complicates the process of establishing and performing Aboriginal
agency.  Rather than employing notions such as the Oedipal or Elektra complexes or any
other Freudian archetypes as a way of understanding Aboriginal life-writing, this study
makes use of the more mobile concepts found in trauma theory, such as working-through,
acting-out, resistance, denial, repression, and to a lesser extent, a reformed version of the
concepts of the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic, with the intention of providing
more specific analyses than psychoanalytic complexes allow.  It outlines the foundations
of psychoanalytic literary theory and argues for their development with the goal of
increasing such theory’s ability to articulate the specificity of post-colonial Australian
conditions.  This work is later developed in Chapter Five in which schizo-analysis is
taken as an example of an enhanced psychoanalytic model capable of addressing the
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specificity of post-colonial conditions.  Like other chapters, Chapter Three holds a
theoretical position that does not affirm one dialectical pole over its other and, thus,
neither affirms trauma as an absolute impasse experience nor as an experience that should
be incorporated into redemptive totalisations of identity.
Chapter Four employs theories of recognition to develop a better understanding of
how Aboriginal testifiers and non-Aboriginal readers may and do engage with one
another.  It argues for maintaining racial difference as a crucial component in establishing
Aboriginal agency.  Whereas in Chapter Two analysis centres on the co-extensivity
between Aboriginal testimonial authors and the wider Aboriginal community, Chapter
Four investigates the ways in which Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal identity positions
mutually produce each other in the act of writing and reading testimonial life-writing.  It
argues that Aboriginal testimonial life-writing provides an opportunity to establish
recognitive structures through which Australia can acknowledge depths of its colonial
past that have been strategically ignored and thereby develop an ethical citizenry that can
work against neo-colonialist practices.  It argues that an ethical citizenry enriches its
culture by maintaining complex systems of inter- and intra-racial identification and
difference, connection and separation.
Chapter Five works to provide a theoretical extension of the preceding chapters’
concerns and argues that schizo-analytic theory provides tools for developing
vocabularies and imaginaries capable of articulating the specificity of post-colonial
trauma and Aboriginal responses to it.  Later in the chapter, an analysis is undertaken of
an Aboriginal-specific therapeutic program that employs both traditional Aboriginal
healing practices and contemporary therapeutic concepts for working-through post-
colonial trauma.  It discusses the tensions involved in using traditional Aboriginal and
modern healing practices and treats them as indicative of the complexities involved in the
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present-centred establishment of twenty-first-century Aboriginal identity.  This discussion
leads into a theoretical overview of, and concluding comments on, the central concerns of
the study.
Aboriginal Studies in general and Aboriginal testimonial life-writing in particular
have great value as multi-disciplinary fields of study and I intend that this study will
contribute to their processual enrichment.  As primarily Australian fields of scholarship,
their development will strengthen Australia’s unique identity and pay desirable symbolic
and material dividends.  In contrast, post-colonial theory, as an international field of
research, is not bound to the Australian context and derives its theoretical tools from a
broad range of disciplines and applies them to a broader range of contexts.  Post-colonial
theory is enriched by Aboriginal life-writing and theory because the nexus of the
therapeutic and political found in Aboriginal life-writing strengthens the links between
psychoanalytic and resistance theory.  The exchange between international post-colonial
theory and Aboriginal life-writing originating at this stage in Australian history can
inform both practices.  It is the intention of this study to demonstrate the importance of
testing contemporary theory against the needs of Aboriginal authors and their project of
establishing and reinforcing Aboriginal identity.
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Chapter 1
Aboriginal Testimonial Life-Writing, Post-Colonial Theory and the
Realist/Anti-Realist Debate
This chapter sets out problematics associated with the study of Aboriginal autobiography
and introduces the theoretical framework through which those problematics are explored.
This study may seem eclectic in its use of theoretical tools from post-colonialism, post-
structuralism and psychoanalytic theory.  However, these are drawn together here by way
of their shared interest in the relation between subjectivity and representation, an interest
shared by, and of primary importance to, the study of autobiography.  The boundaries
separating these theoretical schools are not readily defined and their conceptualisations of
subjectivity and representation inform one another.  As I show below, post-colonial
scholarship employs post-structuralist techniques in dismantling colonialist discourse,
while simultaneously highlighting ethical considerations associated with post-
structuralism’s deconstruction of agency.  Both post-colonialism and post-structuralism
have borrowed from and are informed by psychoanalytic theory: Frantz Fanon’s synthesis
of psychoanalytic and post-colonial concerns is a good example.  Derrida, Lacan, Deleuze
and Guattari, all eminent in post-structuralist scholarship, employ and critique
psychoanalytic concepts.  Reciprocally, psychoanalytic theory has had to reassess its
overly deterministic and uniform understanding of subjectivity as a result of post-colonial
and post-structuralist critiques of master narratives.  While this study is primarily
concerned with the way in which psychoanalytic concepts are useful for understanding
the process of working-through trauma in life-writing, it is also concerned with how
psychoanalytic concepts are useful for thinking through the realist problematic in post-
colonial writing.  The need to recover from the destructive impact of colonialism requires
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questioning the ethicality of post-structuralism’s emphasis on deconstructing and
dismantling agency.
Stephen Slemon describes the tensions between post-structuralist and post-
colonialist thought thus:
an interested post-colonial critical practice would want to allow for the
positive production of oppositional truth-claims in these [post-colonial]
texts.  It would retain for post-colonial writing, that is, a mimetic or
referential purchase to textuality, and it would recognize in this referential
drive the operations of a crucial strategy for survival in marginalized social
groups.
This referential assumption would appear to make what I am
calling a post-colonial criticism radically fractured and contradictory, for
such a criticism would draw on post-structuralism’s suspension of the
referent in order to read the social ‘text’ of colonialist power and at the
same time would reinstall the referent in the service of colonized and post-
colonial societies.  The especial valency of textuality within colonialist
discourse, however, means that the ‘referent’ simply cannot be totalized;
for if the question of representation really is grounded in a ‘crisis’ within
post-modern Western society under late capitalism, in post-colonial critical
discourse it necessarily bifurcates under a dual agenda: which is to
continue the resistance to (neo) colonialism through a deconstructive
reading of its rhetoric and to retrieve and reinscribe those post-colonial
social traditions that in literature issue forth on a thematic level, and within
a realist problematic, as principles of cultural identity and survival.  (5)
Slemon identifies the way post-structuralist criticism can direct attention to the violent
operations of colonialist discourses (and discourses in general), but also importantly
identifies the potential violence that post-structuralism can bring about through the
deconstruction of agency.  At worst, such deconstructive dismantling of the agent can aid
neo-colonialist practices through undermining the emergence and registration of
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historically suppressed voices.3  Post-structuralism’s dismantling of the subject, and the
use by post-colonial critics of deconstructive criticism in the critique of colonialist
practices, has necessarily confronted the ethical consequences of disabling emerging post-
colonial voices.  It is ethically problematic because such deconstruction can further
dispossess agents already dispossessed by colonialism.  There may even be something
ethically remiss in the move to more sophisticated models of analysing subjectivity when
the violent projections effected by ‘old’ models continue to have effects; a form of what
has been termed ‘strategic ignorance’.
Racist and neo-colonial discourses continue to operate and may be just as
effectively (if differently) contested through recourse to notions of humanity, morality
and justice as through the deconstruction of these concepts.  Indeed, the legacy of colonial
impact is worked-through in all the Aboriginal life-writing examined in this study with
recourse to values such as humaneness, justice, freedom and self-determination.  Because
of this emphasis in Aboriginal life-writing, it is fitting to further explore ways in which
the history of colonial dispossession is challenged in more humanist terms.  The turn to
the ethical consequences of deconstructive criticism is not unexpected because there
always has been an ethicality implicit to deconstruction.  As David Parker notes:
even the most linguistically focused recovery of the marginalised Other of
a logocentric philosophical or literary text at least implicitly links itself
with the defence of those who have been Other to Western imperialism, to
patriarchy or to bourgeois interests. [. . .] It is hard to see how a concern
with such evils as ‘subordination and domination’ is not at least implicitly
oriented towards a conception of a good life centring around goods such as
freedom, self-expression, and self-realisation.  (3)
                                                 
3 Annamaria Carusi writes: “[i]f one takes only these aspects of post-structuralism and post-modernism into
account, it is small wonder that Habermas has relegated them to the realms of neo-conservatism” (101).
The potential suppression of already marginalised cultural identities is a risk of some post-structuralist
readings, nevertheless, post-structuralism also offers important strategies for post-colonial studies.
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Yet, such ‘goods’ take a particular character in a deconstructive context: “recently
deconstruction has begun to present its way of reading texts, its rigorous resistance to
closure, as an ethical imperative.  Viewed in this way, the ethical imperative is a dynamic
within language itself to which deconstructive reading is alone properly
responsive” (7-8).
Deconstructive method is problematised in reading Aboriginal life-writing
because of such writing’s post-colonial agenda, which centres around consolidating
Aboriginal identity.  Deconstruction’s ethical imperative to resist closure is also
problematised in a post-colonial context.  Post-colonial theory, in the sense of a retrieval
of the “principles of cultural identity and survival” (Slemon 5), demands accepting that
some historical events are facts, such as the destructive effects of colonial impact on
Indigenous peoples.  The acknowledgment of such facts provides a basis for securing
redress for past injustices and for the process of working-through traumatic histories.  The
imperative to attain a sense of narrative and affective control over the traumatic legacies
of colonial impact demands something like the resistance found in some psychoanalytic
theory, such as that of Dominick LaCapra, to the repetitive reinstatement of semantic
aporia, that is, it demands something like closure as an act of object-specification.
The desire and necessity to work-through post-colonial trauma found in much
Indigenous life-writing invites the use of psychoanalytic concepts to deal with the tension
between post-structuralist deferral and psychoanalytic closure.  Concerning closure, Saul
Friedlander writes: “In a sense, what is suggested here is the simultaneous acceptance of
two contradictory moves: the search for ever-closer historical linkages and the avoidance
of a naive historical positivism leading to simplistic and self-assured historical narrations
and closure” (qtd. in LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust 212).  That which might be
retrieved in “the search for ever-closer historical linkages” is not an uncorrupted originary
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subject or Aboriginality, a search that results in a simplistic historical closure.  Rather,
such a search aims to provide a better understanding of the multiple ways in which
colonialism has destructively impacted on Aboriginal peoples, as well as the multiple
ways people have responded to it.  This strategy draws on the post-structuralist ethical
imperative to resist closure and the equally important post-colonial ethical imperative to
specify objects of colonial trauma and practices of Aboriginal resistance to dispossession.
It is important to follow the post-structuralist imperative to resist closure because
doing so avoids redemptive narratives that too easily cover the continuing traumatic
effects of colonial impact, while also foreclosing possible expressions of post-colonial
resistance.  Yet, while closure can mean a fossilisation of identity or historical
possibilities, it can also be used in another sense to mean the specification of objects to be
worked-through.  As LaCapra writes:
Any process of mourning, it seems, would require some degree of
specification of the object [. . . and] one might still contend that a readiness
— or a recovered readiness — could counteract trauma and function as an
antidote to the extent that anxiety did not remain altogether diffuse but was
related to objects that could be illuminated by historical understanding and
subject to informed judgment, even if never susceptible to total mastery or
fully adequate representation.  Some combination of critical historical
investigation, ethicopolitical judgment, and social ritual would increase
this possibility [. . .].  (Representing the Holocaust 215)
The task of working through what LaCapra calls ‘anxiety’, but which in the case of
Aboriginal life-writing may also be termed ‘mourning’, via a specification of “objects
that could be illuminated by historical understanding” (215), is precisely what many of
the Aboriginal life-stories examined in this study do by means of retrieving and
reinscribing Aboriginal lives, family and cultural history in the context of colonial
relations, racism and dispossession.
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To explore the above issues, this study primarily draws from three intersecting
theoretical fields: post-structuralism, post-colonialism, and psychoanalytic theory.  The
desire to have these discourses intersect arises from the need to counter the all-too-easy
closures of redemptive national discourses (a form of post-colonial reactionism) while
maintaining the need for historical object-specification.  It is a form of historicism that
curbs radical relativism (a particular deployment of post-structuralist thought), and allows
for historical and ethicopolitical judgements that do not fall into overly-simplistic
redemptive narratives.  Furthermore, in the case of post-colonial Aboriginal life-writing,
the use of psychoanalytic concepts — for example, psychological trauma, acting-out,
working-through, object-specification, and repression — aids the post-colonial project of
retrieving and reinscribing located, embodied histories.  Such concepts can act as a
corrective to a tendency in some post-structuralist thought to enact “an (an)aesthetics of
the sublime that indiscriminately valorizes the un(re)presentable or the experimentally
transgressive without posing the problem of the actual and desirable relations between
normative limits and transgression” (223).  One such transgression of desirable limits is
the denial of the damaging impact of colonial dispossession.  The correspondence
between post-structural radical difference and notions of the sublime, the unrepresentable,
the abject and the Other, is an issue that will be explored in more detail throughout this
study.  The point here is that the intersection of post-colonial, post-structuralist and
psychoanalytic thought can act as a corrective to the excesses and deficits of each in
territory where each has a stake.  That territory is Aboriginal testimonial life-writing in
which post-colonial subjectivities are registered and negotiated.
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Realism
Debates surrounding post-colonial literature and the tensions between post-structuralism
and post-colonialism are productively approached through the fallacious but heuristically
powerful distinction between realism and anti-realism.  Slemon’s recommendation “to
retrieve and reinscribe those post-colonial social traditions that in literature issue forth on
a thematic level, and within a realist problematic, as principles of cultural identity and
survival” (5), invites the following question for this reader: what is the role of literary
realism in effectively communicating the voices of historically suppressed cultures?
Realism is characterised by post-structural anti-realists as part of a web of concepts that
are implicated in supporting repressive ideologies and concepts such as Identity,
Presence, Truth and History.  Realist texts are criticised by anti-realists for not
acknowledging their constructedness and also for perpetuating, amongst other things, the
myth of the sovereign subject.  The important question to be asked of the argument that
realism necessarily supports ideology is why, according to such a position, any successful
criticism of ideology (such as a criticism of colonialist discourse) must take the form of a
meta-critique or meta-narrative, that is, a self-reflexive critique of its own or target
discourse’s constructedness.  Diana Brydon and Helen Tiffin quote Benita Parry on this
topic: “How then do these deconstructions of colonialism’s signifying system act more
radically to disrupt the hegemonic discourse than does Fanon’s method of exposing
through defamiliarization, the taxonomy of colonialist knowledge in order to break its
hold over the oppressed?” (26).  They then answer her question in this way:
Each approach has its strengths, and each can be helpful, but we would be
wise to avoid embracing thinking that might continue imperialism’s
silencing of the many different perspectives of the colonised.  That is why
this study focuses on post-colonial texts instead of colonialist ones, and
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places them in cross-cultural postcolonial comparative contexts, instead of
in exclusive relation to an imperialist tradition.  (26)
This study shares that focus.  Slemon notes that the realist problematic is tied to cultural
identity and survival and the same connection is found as an implicit assumption and
practice in Aboriginal testimonial life-writing.  All the Aboriginal life-writers examined
in this study present their case in a literary realist mode with the associated concepts of
identity, presence, truth and history.  By changing the proper nouns (Identity, Presence,
Truth and History) to common nouns I intend to register the move from abstract concepts
to historically specific instances of those concepts.
The process of cultural survival as presented in Aboriginal testimonial life-writing
places strong emphasis on the importance of accepting non-metaphorical facts, such as
the distinctiveness of Aboriginal culture, identity and history.  The central importance of
non-metaphorical facts for establishing identity is also shared by trauma theory dealing
with Holocaust survival, which views the establishment of such facts as a vital stage in
gaining narrative and affective control over traumatic experience.4  Such non-
metaphorical facts in the context of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing include the
acceptance that colonial practices were damaging to Aboriginal peoples and that the
effects (and causes) of that damage persist.  Innumerable interpretations of the
significance of these non-metaphorical facts can be developed (ideally with an ethical
awareness of what different explorations might mean), but these facts always play a key
role as the basis upon which the testimonial life-stories are developed.  The Aboriginal
life-stories examined in this study all deal with the legacy of colonial impact differently:
one may forcefully reject and condemn colonial culture (Ruby Langford Ginibi); and
                                                 
4 It is interesting to note here that first generation Holocaust survivors who testified to their experiences of
the Holocaust do so in strongly non-metaphorical language.  In contrast, their children and grandchildren
produce more complicated literary narratives that explore the complexities of language and subjectivity.
The concept of non-metaphorical facts is explored in greater detail in Chapter Three.
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another may present a more ambivalent position that criticises colonial cultural
dominance through Christian values introduced by colonialism  (Margaret Tucker).
There is no homogeneous Aboriginal experience and response to colonialism, but rather
heterogeneous experiences and responses.  However, what these life-stories do share is an
awareness of the fact of the traumatic effects of colonial impact.
To begin a detailed exploration of the realist problematic surrounding the retrieval
and reinscription of cultural identity, this section examines a founding critique of realism.
In doing so, a link is made to the neo-Marxist critic Louis Althusser because his model of
subjectivity and historicism has had a strong influence upon the realist/anti-realist debate
in literary and cultural theory.  A comprehensive analysis of Althusser’s work is not
undertaken and my focus is solely on his work on the interpellation of the subject by the
State.  Interpellation is viewed as a useful concept for beginning to explore the ways in
which Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal, author/reader relations are constructed in post-colonial
states and writing.  Moreover, with regard to historicism and subjectivity, Althusser’s
model has strong links with post-structuralist formulations of subjectivity.  Annamaria
Carusi, writing on the relationship between post-colonialism and post-structuralism, asks:
“[w]hat does this commitment to the subaltern as the subject of his/her history imply?
Firstly, it forces us to re-evaluate the historicism of post-structuralist thought, an
important element in the work of Althusser, Barthes, Kristeva and Foucault” (104).
Carusi, in addition to connecting Althusser and post-structuralist thought, is asking in
what ways does subaltern history, as practised by the subaltern, differ from post-
structuralist historicism.  Carusi suggests an answer: “it is possible to foresee an
appropriation of post-modernist strategies, in addition to and perhaps in the same place as
various forms of realism, in [South African] black literature, which could be strategically
useful to this literature and also mobilize post-modernism as a politically effective tool”
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(105).  Later in this study, I explore ways in which post-structuralist strategies are useful
for the reinscription of cultural memory and for opening up possibilities for post-colonial
agency.  However, at this point, I want to address how literary realism can also be
effective in this way and how post-structuralist and anti-realist claims to the contrary are
not conclusive.  An important question for this study is, what are the issues involved in
contesting subaltern identity through subaltern history as carried out by the subaltern in a
literary realist form?
Althusser’s formulation of literature as presented in “Ideology and Ideological
State Apparatuses” identifies ‘Literature’ as an Ideological State Apparatus (ISA).
Ideological state apparatuses are devices by which the means of production are
reproduced and include such cultural institutions as Literature, Family and Sport.
According to Althusser, such institutions and their associated practices are in collusion
with Repressive State Apparatuses (RSAs), such as the army, police, and law, but rather
than operating through the threat of violence ISAs operate via ideology.  Raymond Tallis
writes, “[i]deology in this extended sense is that in virtue of which one account of, or one
part of, reality becomes reality tout court; or a historically derived reality presents itself
as eternal and extra-human, as given rather than made, as objectively sensed rather than
intersubjectively constructed” (In Defence of Realism 46).  As presented in Althusser’s
model, the problem with ideology is that it effaces the constructedness of reality and the
interestedness of social institutions in maintaining particular power relations between
subjects and the State as natural.  The two institutions of interest for this study that
function as ISAs are literature and subjectivity, more specifically, literature in its realist
mode.
Catherine Belsey’s use of Althusser’s formulation is a familiar but still useful
starting point for exploring the relationship between subjects and the literary realist mode.
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She argues that realism is a term used to distinguish “between those forms which tend to
efface their own textuality, their existence as discourse, and those which explicitly draw
attention to it.  Realism offers itself as transparent” (51).  Realism insists that it accurately
represents the world outside the text and consequently that there is a reality outside of
texts and language.  Tallis provides a clear explanation of the anti-realist position to
frame his defence of realism.  On the connections and collusion between realism and
ideology, he writes:
the realistic novel, by working with ‘the given’, by taking for granted what
is usually taken for granted, by replicating, or attempting to replicate,
reality without really questioning it, collaborates in the work of ideology:
the naturalization of the social, the eternization of the historically derived,
the installation of but one version of reality as reality itself.  For realistic
novels are realistic — or seem realistic to their readers — precisely
because they do not question what is customarily taken for granted.  (In
Defence of Realism 50)
The problem anti-realists have with realism is that it effaces the multi-perspectival
‘nature’ of the world and instead asserts a monologic version of what is ‘real’.  In this
way, it enshrines a version of reality that privileges some subjects, behaviours,
institutions and discourses over others without plausible justifications for why such
structures should be privileged.  Realism, in colluding with ideology, “‘privileges’ one
version of reality over all others and suppresses any suspicion that things might be
ordered or perceived differently” (46), and is “so potent and inescapable because it is
invisible; because it does not consist of a set of ideas that can be debated, tested, opposed
but is implicit in practices” (49).  For anyone doubting the pervasiveness and near
invisibility of ideological practices, Terry Eagleton reminds us that
[s]tatements of fact are after all statements, which presumes a number of
questionable judgements: that those statements are worth making, perhaps
more worth making than certain others, that I am the sort of person entitled
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to make them and perhaps able to guarantee their truth, that you are the
kind of person worth making them to, that something useful is
accomplished by making them, and so on.  (qtd. in Tallis, In Defence of
Realism 26)
Indeed, any act of communication participates in some or all of these assumptions.  What
Eagleton is alerting us to is that things that seem ‘obvious’ and ‘natural’, for example,
‘facts’, are contextually derived and historically determined.
That these assumptions are necessarily ideologically inflected is a question I will
return to later in a discussion of literary realism’s potential to question such ideological
assumptions.  As Tallis notes, there is a risk in the anti-realist argument of equating
intelligibility with ideology “[i]nsofar as anything makes sense, the individual for whom
it makes sense implicitly acquiesces in ideology” and, due to the entirely negative casting
of ideology, creates a condition where “[a]ll recognition is misrecognition; all knowledge
is ignorance” (83); and all apprehension is misapprehension.  Tallis writes:
The myth that it [realism] describes reality dispassionately and objectively
only embeds the realist enterprise more deeply in the reality it mistakenly
believes itself to be outside of.  Its pretence to be outside of reality, when it
is in fact inside, makes it ideologically more potent, a more effective
weapon in the hands of those who have already won the ideological
struggle.  (50)
Realism is a practice that mistakenly assumes itself to be outside of reality and thereby
capable of objectively describing it.  Belsey’s position maintains that while realism can
achieve much, it can never hold such a privileged position:
of course realism can show contradictions within society — especially
between the rhetoric of the ruling classes and the needs and experiences of
those whom they govern and whose welfare they pretend to have at heart.
But it cannot acknowledge that reality is irreducibly polycentric.  A
realistic novel can highlight contradiction within capitalist society but it
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does not accept its inevitability: contradiction is there but it is not
‘foregrounded’.  (Tallis, In Defence of Realism 52-53)
The argument that realism’s location inside an ideologically created reality disables it
from contesting particular versions of reality is not self-evident, and I will address this
argument in more detail below.  Likewise, to argue that reality is irreducibly polycentric
overlooks that there probably are very few Aboriginal people who consider the violence
of colonial dispossession to be a positive experience; some identities have privileged
access to realities that are more polycentric than others.
Such anti-realist arguments developed from the widespread adoption and
adaptation of Saussurean linguistics.  Saussurean linguistics challenged the claim that
language could refer to the ‘real’ world with the argument that signs generate their
meaning by virtue of their position in a signifying system.  In the Saussurean account
language is not a nomenclature, a way of naming things which already
exist, but a system of differences with no positive terms.  He argued that
far from providing a set of labels for entities which exist independently in
the world, language precedes the existence of independent entities, making
the world intelligible by differentiating between concepts.  (Belsey 38)
In response to this argument, post-Saussurean anti-realist critics developed the literary
category ‘classic realism’ to identify writing that creates an illusion of reality.  In this way
realism could continue to be used productively as a genre category without maintaining
that it ‘really’ represented the world.  Hence the term classic realism is employed to
designate that writing which creates a ‘reality effect’ and “sustain[s] the illusion that they
[texts] ‘show things as they really are’” (Tallis, In Defence of Realism 51-52 fn. 11).
In this sense, classic realism is such a broad category that it can refer to any text
that does not self-reflexively acknowledge its own constructedness, that is, meta-narrate
its own process of construction.  This broadness of the term means that it is equally
appropriate to employ it for describing science-fiction, or a fantasy about dwarves and
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elves, for example, The Lord of the Rings, as it is for a literary study of the British
working class in the mid-nineteenth century or of Australia’s Indigenous peoples’
experience of colonialism, because “[t]he plausibility of the individual signifieds is far
less important to the reading process than the familiarity of the connections between the
signifiers” (Belsey 52).  Such a position contends that the structure of the classic realist
text is more important than the particular ‘signifieds’ employed in it.
Two of classic realism’s most important structural elements are the concern with
rendering the subject of the story wholly transparent and resolving any narrative
ambiguities and tensions by the story’s conclusion.  By resolving the conflict they
explore, classic realist texts ultimately reinforce the power of human agency to order the
world and, in particular, the power of the author to comprehend and thereby control the
world.  Classic realism reinforces the sovereignty of the author/subject over the world
while simultaneously effacing the powerful historical and social determinations of
subjectivities and authors by the world.  Such insights into the operations of classic
realism provide the prescription for a criticism that aims to “establish the unspoken
[ideology] in the text, to decentre it in order to produce a real knowledge of history”
(136).  However, there is an ethical tension involved in reading texts this way because the
decentring of the text, and by extension the author, risks further marginalising those
already marginalised by dominant ideologies, such as colonialist ideology.  The problem
with such criticism is that its effort to decentre oppressive ideologies itself becomes
oppressive when it further decentres subjects already historically marginalised.
Another potential problem with anti-realism (defined in reaction to a false notion
of realism) is that its promise of multi-perspectival readings that deconstruct ideology
contradictively risks imposing strict limits on alternative reading strategies.  Regarding
classic realism, Tallis writes:
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‘Classic realism’ proves to be very broad indeed.  [. . .] The term is a
rather blunt instrument used for castigating all texts that aim to produce
the ‘reality effect’, to sustain the illusion that they ‘show things as they
really are’.  As Terry Lovell has pointed out [. . .] a hostile attitude to
realism so broadly defined leaves fiction very little to do other than to
reflect, somewhat narcissistically upon its own processes of signification.
Hardly the recipe for the popular texts that will ignite the revolution.  (In
Defence of Realism 51-52 fn. 11)
A literary critical position that maintains that for writing to be an important representation
of reality it must concern itself with its own process of production is a form of literary
bullying.  Such anti-realist criticism “condemn[s] realism, not because it fails to escape
ideology (no intelligible text could) but because it does not attempt to undo its own
ideology from within by a cold-blooded self-contradiction that denies the reader a fixed
view point from which it makes sense” (85).  While self-reflexive and against-the-grain
readings are important, they are not the only valuable method through which to read texts
or effective tactic for resistance writing, and to maintain that this is the case is to risk
excluding other important critical reading strategies.  In the case of the Aboriginal
testimonial life-writing examined throughout this study, there is an ethical appeal made to
readers to not read against-the-grain texts whose aim is the retrieval and reinscription of a
threatened community and subjectivity.  To do so would further render inaudible
historically unheard voices.  This is not to dismiss such critical readings but only to say
that their imperative that “insists on finding the plurality, however ‘parsimonious’, of the
text and refuses the pseudo-dominance constructed as the ‘obvious’ position of its
intelligibility by the forms of classic realism” (Belsey 129) is problematic.  Why must a
reading strategy always undermine the ‘obvious’ position and, consequently, what is at
stake in claiming the right to describe the obvious position as false?  Later, in my
discussion of writing-through trauma, I argue that one of the consequences of responding
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to testimony to trauma as false is to risk exacerbating that trauma.  Consider the dangers
of such a response to the testimony provided for South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and Australia’s National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families.5
Similar considerations regarding the ethics of realist and anti-realist responses to
testimony are relevant to reading Aboriginal life-writing.  Aboriginal life-stories
published over the past thirty years testify to the same traumatic history of colonial
dispossession at the centre of The Bringing them Home Report.  They present subjects
whose access to the ‘irreducibly polycentric’ nature of reality has been circumscribed by
their position as the colonised in the colonialist symbolic.  Because colonised subjects
have historically been less privileged in their access to the polycentrism of reality, literary
realism with its greater monocentric approach (or at least dialogical approach in its
presentation of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations) is suitable for portraying that
circumscribed reality.  These life-stories, like the testimony in The Bringing them Home
Report, do not employ anti-realist, self-reflexive meta-analyses of the production of the
subject as text, but rather appeal to the reader to accept the testimony to the reality of the
life-story as true.  This type of life-writing functions in the realist mode because it
“purports to present the truth of a self as grasped by itself” (Lloyd 170).  In this way,
realist life-writing is a genre aligned with particular ways of understanding and practicing
the self that, in the case of Aboriginal authors, are shaped by the forces of subaltern
history.  In addition, such life-writing aims to establish an ‘autobiographical pact’ to
circumscribe the reader’s response within a realist framework.  Underpinning this aim
and the realist framework, as stated in the introduction to this study and argued in detail
in Chapters Two and Three, are the primary driving forces of Aboriginal testimonial life-
                                                 
5 Subsequently, this publication will be referred to as The Bringing them Home Report.
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writing, that is, articulating Aboriginal authors’ political will and working-through
traumatic histories.  To achieve this goal also involves specific forms of negotiation
between author and reader, which are discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
The broader realist/anti-realist debates are important for reading testimonial life-
writing and that writing in turn complicates and enriches those debates.  What may be at
stake in realist/anti-realist positions is the very possibility for Aboriginal writers to
establish agency in a context where their agency has already been undermined by the
traumatic legacy of colonial dispossession.  And yet, as discussed at the end of this
chapter, there are theoretical tools for understanding such life-writing that fall outside
both the realist and anti-realist positions.  However, at this point, it is enough to note that
there is a correspondence between genres and subject positions.
Imaginary Subjects and Realism
Integral to the critique of realist literature is the critique of the subject as natural.  The
primary reason for this critique is that the ‘natural’ subject is seen as complicit with a
unified and monologic perspective of ‘reality’, that is, as complicit with the classic realist
mode.  The subject as author is arguably the most important element in a classic realist
text for reinforcing the illusion that it conveys a true representation of reality because the
author functions as the authority that underscores the realist text’s claim to truth.  Classic
realist writing establishes a transcendent, abstracted subject position, often shared by
author and reader due to the tendency for authors and readers to identify with the
monologic perspective of the text, which works against the heterogeneity of possible
views by which the text might be intelligible:
the conventional tenses of classic realism tend to align the position of the
reader with that of the omniscient narrator who is looking back on a series
of past events.  Thus, while each episode seems to be happening ‘now’ as
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we read, and the reader is given clear indications of what is already past in
relation to this ‘now’, nonetheless each apparently present episode is
contained in a single, intelligible and all-embracing vision of what from
the point of view of the subject of the enunciation is past and completed.
(Belsey 77-78)
Such a subject, temporally and spatially transcendent with an all-embracing vision,
effaces the fact that it is historically located, interested and partial.  Like the literary
realist text — indeed the locus of the perception guaranteeing realism’s claim to faithful
representation — the classic realist subject as author effaces perspectivism and presents a
monological perspective.6  The link between the classic realist text and the transcendent
and abstracted subject operates in the same way as ideology and realism operate in
Althusser’s formulation of ideology, in that realism supports ideology because it aims to
render a particular social construction as natural.  Similarly, such an ideology, or ideology
in general, supports the above form of subjectivity, and symbiotically relies on it to
sustain itself.  In Althusser’s criticism, there is a confluence between ideology, realism
and subjectivity.  As Tallis writes, “[f]or Althusser, the acquisition of a sense of self and
of a world picture are inextricably entwined with acquiescence in the political status quo.
The very process of becoming a subject in the metaphysical sense entails subjecting
oneself to ‘the Subject’ and involuntarily supporting a repressive state” (In Defence of
Realism 80).  Tallis then registers his scepticism towards this formulation of the subject:
“It seems extraordinary that being co-present with others — indeed, being ‘worlded’ and
even ‘selved’ — should have such a specific and readily defined character” (80).  An
important point is identified here within the overall problematic of realism and its
                                                 
6 As I discuss in more detail in later chapters, the engagement of the testifier in Aboriginal testimonial texts
in the present-centred activities of political resistance, working-through post-colonial trauma and
negotiating Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations, emphasises their perspectivism and historical locatedness
and means that they are, therefore, less abstracted.  While the classic realist subject emphasises an all-
embracing transcendent vision, the testimonial texts discussed in this study emphasise situational
transcendence, that is, they are concerned with transcending/reconfiguring post-colonial conditions through
trauma work and political resistance.
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inherent incompatibility with deconstructive practice, that is, the tension between
abstracted models of subjectivity and more specific and context-orientated models.
This study originally began with the intention to show how the Cartesian subject,
characterised by a mind/body split, formed the substratum of traditional autobiographical
agency.  This proposition was to provide a point of departure for exploring alternative
subjectivities in autobiographical-like writing, specifically testimonial life-writing.  This
is because the authorial subject presented in classic realist texts resembles the Cartesian
subject.  The Cartesian subject is predicated on a split between the mind and body in
which the self is considered to reside in a mind that is transcendent of the particular
bodily and historical circumstances of the person.  It is this type of sovereign subject that
Althusser denaturalises by demonstrating that it is constructed through ISAs, that is, by
showing that it is generated by and dependent on particular social and historical forces.
While Althusser, among other theorists, denaturalises the Cartesian subject, it still retains
significant influence.  For example, as I contend below, Cartesian-like forms of
subjectivity characterise the form of agency presented in classic realist autobiographical
writing.  However, for all the theorists of autobiography who view the Cartesian model of
subjectivity as a significant and dominant mode of subjectivity in the practice of
traditional autobiography, and use it as a point of departure from which to study other
subjectivities, there are others who consider the Cartesian subject to be a ghost-like
figure, a merely heuristic foil.  Theorists in the latter camp argue that the Cartesian
subject is a fictional construct with little relevance for exploring real autobiographical
persons.  It is necessary to clarify how abstract notions of the subject, such as those
deriving from Althusser and Descartes, relate to the practice of life-writing.
Paul John Eakin, borrowing from Vincent Descombes, helps clarify how the
notion of the Cartesian subject is used in this study.  Eakin argues that Descartes’s
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Cartesian “subject is not a person; Descartes is not the Cartesian subject; protagonist-
narrator-author figures endowed with proper names are not subjects — not in the strict
philosophical sense” (How Our Lives 8).  This philosophical sense of the subject as
opposed to a person is described by Eakin thus:
the ‘I’ that opens the passage, the autobiographical narrator of Descartes’s
intellectual autobiography, introduces a second ‘I,’ set off in quotation
marks, the sign of Descartes’s existence as ‘thinking substance’ distinct
from the body.  Splitting the first person in this way, Descartes establishes
‘the philosophical notion of a subject distinct from the person.’  (7)
Following Descombes, Eakin argues that the philosophical subject cannot be equated
with a person and criticises theorists who conflate the two, who “tak[e] the metaphysical
subject as identical to the ‘I’ of autobiographical discourse” (8 fn. 6).  Those who
maintain that the metaphysical subject and the autobiographical subject are the same risk
analysing phantoms with little relevance to embodied historical persons.
Does this critique of the metaphysical subject mean that “[b]ecause some version
of this ‘possibility’ [of an ‘I’] characteristically underwrites any form of life writing, [we
should] apply this deconstruction of the subject to autobiography and write its obituary?”
(6).  For theorists such as Eakin, who are concerned with countering the erasure of the
subject’s historical specificity, the Cartesian subject is a phantom.  But rather than
extending this phantom-like quality to all claims to self-presence, which such theorists
see as a risk of radical deployments of deconstruction, they instead pursue other models
of the autobiographical subject that they see as more relevant to embodied subjects and
the life-writing that attests to them.  This is because “[t]he death of the author [. . .] is
simply the death of one, rather odd, conception of the author [. . .]” (Tallis, In Defence of
Realism 75).
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This study takes a different approach to the above two positions on the Cartesian
subject.  While it employs techniques from deconstructive criticism, especially in regard
to constructions of the self that rely on violent forms of othering, and is sympathetic with
Eakin’s and others’ attempts to find models of the autobiographical subject that better
reflect embodied selves, it maintains that there are elements of the notion of the Cartesian
subject that are relevant to the study of autobiographical subjects because these elements
form a significant part of what Moira Gatens calls the ‘social imaginary’ (defined below,
page 33).
The Cartesian and Althusserian abstracted models of the subject remain relevant
for literary and cultural theory (and for social imaginaries) because they are useful for
thinking through important issues surrounding selfhood and language.  In the case of
Althusser’s model, some important issues are: how is the subject determined by political
and ideological structures; what does this determination say about free-will and agency;
what possible strategies exist for subjects to subvert ideological structures; and, how are
different subjects, for instance, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal subjects, interpellated by
the state differently?  Of the Cartesian subject position, we might ask what is the
relationship between language and identity formation; is the source of the acquisition of a
sense of self linguistic or is the source of the self found in extra-linguistic, affective
structures; if linguistic and affective structures are equally important, how so; what does
the Cartesian projection of the subject outside of language hope to gain and what does it
relinquish; is there a continuing presence of a Cartesian-like subjectivity in traditional
forms of life-writing; are there implicit reconfigurations and rejections of this Cartesian-
like subjectivity in recent life-writing; and, overall, how is the Cartesian subject a
convenient starting point for exploring the self and writing that attests to that self?  No
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attempt to fully answer these questions will be made here but they will act as guiding
considerations throughout the study.
Because this study is concerned with registering historically located and specific
subjects, it is important to note that the Cartesian subject is similar to Althusser’s
formulation of the subject to the extent that both present an extremely abstracted subject
and make claim to the universal relevance of that subject.  However, the difficulties
associated with the claim to universality operate differently in both accounts.  As stated,
the problem with the Cartesian subject is that it is not really a subject at all in that
“Descartes establishes ‘the philosophical notion of a subject distinct from the person’”
(Descombes qtd. in Eakin, How Our Lives 7).  In contrast, the potential problem with the
Althusserian subject and its relation to the state is that it may not adequately register that
the subject functions variously in specific historical contexts.  While Althusser’s
formulation of the subject is important for this study because it provides useful concepts
for understanding how subjectivity functions in society, it remains an abstracted
formulation until it is made to take into account the diverse ways subjects are
interpellated by the state, for instance, the way Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal subjects
respond to the interpellation of the state differently.
As noted, it can be argued that the Cartesian subject does not exist other than as
structuring narrative fantasy/fiction.  Nonetheless, such narrative ‘fictions’ have real
effects and histories because “narrative is a phenomenon which extends considerably
beyond the scope of literature; it is one of the essential constituents of our understanding
of reality” (Butor qtd. in Tallis, In Defence of Realism 23).  While acknowledging that
narrative extends beyond the scope of literature, literature can nevertheless provide us
with an insight into the structuring narratives of subjects.  This study contends that
because “narrative is an essential constituent of our understanding of reality”, one can
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draw connections between particular genres and particular subjects.  Realist writing on
selves and their worlds, as found in autobiography and other forms of life-writing,
presents subjects whose structuring narratives are uncomplicated by post-structuralist,
self-reflexive meta-analysis.
Furthermore, Cartesian-like structuring narratives prescribe strict forms of
engagement with, or deny altogether, dialogical engagement with the Other, and such
forms of engagement allow for an easy complicity with colonial and neo-colonial
practices.  For example, colonial practices such as Christian missionism, dispossession of
Indigenous peoples by settlers, and the imposition of English law all depended on the
denial or denigration of the rights of the Other.  The structuring narratives operating in
these colonialist subjects, while all distinctive, worked with their colonialist practices to
privilege themselves and dispossess other subjects.  For colonialist subjects to have a
relativistic understanding of themselves, whereby they are not privileged to dispossess
others, would jeopardise the success of economically and culturally empowering
colonialist practices.  In this sense, Cartesian-like (transcendent) subjects may be
understood to operate according to Althusser’s formulation of the subject, that is, they are
produced by and complicit with the ideologies of nation-states, such as colonialist nation-
states.
To acknowledge that the Cartesian subject is highly fictionalised as a consequence
of over abstraction does not mean it does not have a significant impact on the imaginary
of living subjects.  The term ‘imaginary’ is used here in a special sense to mean those
constructs that exert powerful influences in shaping subjective experience and the
narratives that attest to that experience.  Moira Gatens defines the imaginary as “those
images, symbols, metaphors and representations which help construct various forms of
subjectivity” (viii).  To employ the concept of the imaginary means that it is not necessary
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to defend the use of the Cartesian subject as an instance of heuristic method for analysing
the subjects of life-writing, where the Cartesian subject is merely a foil employed to find
out or discover something — in this case, to find out something about new subject
formations and the writing in which they are presented.  Rather, it is enough to say that
the structure underpinning the Cartesian subject is influential in ordering the imaginary of
traditional autobiographical narratives and subjects.  Indeed, it is because Cartesian-like
subjects are a dominant part of the Western colonialist imaginary that they can be usefully
adapted and interpolated by the subaltern to question the privileges of such imaginaries,
for instance, in the use of authoritative literary modes like life-writing by Aboriginal
writers.
In Imaginary Bodies, Gatens investigates the way imaginaries order the world
from the individual to the body politic.  Gatens, introducing her collection of essays,
states that a “major concern of these essays is to identify the resonances of imaginary
understandings of human embodiment in relation to accounts, in political theory, of
another kind of body: the body politic.  It will be argued that this body shares several
features with the masculine imaginary body” (x).  Whereas Gatens focuses on sexual
imaginaries and shows the impact of those imaginaries on the body politic and social
institutions, this study is interested in the way colonial and racist imaginaries continue to
operate in collaboration with a wide range of social practices, and in identifying genres of
subjects/texts that embody or reject these imaginaries — specifically Aboriginal
testimonial life-writing as an instance of rejection of these imaginaries.  Feminist work on
the Cartesian imaginary has demonstrated how such an imaginary marginalises women
and this study employs insights from such feminist scholarship.7  However, as Gatens
writes, the concept of the imaginary should not be limited to that of the sexual imaginary:
                                                 
7 I primarily employ the work of Moira Gatens, Elizabeth Grosz, Donna Haraway, Genevieve Lloyd and
Aileen Moreton-Robinson.
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“I do not think it is helpful to reduce the complexity and variety of social imaginaries to a
univocal sexual imaginary.  To do so leaves the notion of the imaginary open to precisely
those objections that may be made to Marxist and post-Marxist notions of ideology” (x).
Gatens aims to avoid the over abstraction and application of the concept of the imaginary
that I earlier argued was a limitation of Althusser’s concept of ideology and its role in the
production of the subject.  For instance, Alan Lawson stresses the significance of racist
rather than sexual imaginaries in the social imaginary and pinpoints the way such racist
imaginaries, although considered anachronistic, recur during moments of social crisis
(19-37).  Lawson points out that while racist imaginaries may be discredited as irrational
or inhumane, there is, nevertheless, the uncanny re-emergence of them when particular
triggers are engaged.  What then are the features that characterise the Cartesian
imaginary?
Descartes formulated the concept of the Cartesian subject in Discourse on Method
thus: “I thereby concluded that I was a substance, of which the whole essence or nature
consists in thinking, and which, in order to exist, needs no place and depends on no
material thing; so that this ‘I’, that is to say, the mind, by which I am what I am, is
entirely distinct from the body” (54).  Here we see Descartes’s (in)famous mind/body
split, where the mind (the Cartesian subject) is independent of the body specifically, and
the material environment generally.  Qualities and practices of this subject are
detachment, objectivity, effacement of intersubjective formation and historical context,
belief in a soul independent of the body, and the ability to transparently represent the
world through language.  The Cartesian imaginary, and its associated qualities, is
desirable because it is a powerful and masterful subject position that is unaffected by the
vicissitudes of history and contact with others’ difference.  The Cartesian subject is
masterful and universalised by virtue of its abstraction.  Due to the emphasis on power in
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certain imaginaries/fictions, it is not surprising that recourse is made to them, or to
elements of them, as a way of empowering agency.  The master/slave dialectic is a case in
point and was without doubt a significant imaginary in colonialist cultures.  As Redding
writes, “[a]s a model social institution based on recognition, master and slave instantiate a
simple hermeneutic social ontology.  Their respective roles are indeed ‘fictions’ in the
sense that they exist only inasmuch as they are recognised.  Stripped of this ‘clothing of
the imagination’, each is only a ‘man’” (123).
A striking example of the effects of a Cartesian-like imaginary on embodied
persons is contained in Oliver Sacks’s A Leg to Stand On, an account of his incapacitation
following an injury to his leg.  Eakin writes:
After the accident, Sacks experienced two sets of symptoms, neurological
and psychological: a loss or ‘extinction’ of feeling in the leg (an
anosognosia), and a sense of radical ‘alienation’ from the leg.  Two sets of
symptoms and two stories, for the narrative recounts not only the doctor-
turned-patient’s struggle to learn to walk again but also his passage
through an acute if peculiar identity crisis, ‘a total breakdown in his inner
sense of identity, memory, ‘space’; but one confined to the domain of the
limb, the rest of consciousness being intact and complete’.  (How Our
Lives 26; Sacks 199)
The crisis referred to here is the shock of an assumption about the split between identity
and body being proved false by the experience of an injury.  This crisis inaugurates a
rethinking of the relationship between mind and body; identity and embodiment.  Eakin
asks, “[h]ow, though, to understand the injury to the leg as an injury to identity?”, and
notes that “[b]affled, Sacks the patient called for a new disciplinary paradigm, ‘a
neurology of identity’ (199), that would address the link between body and self” (26-27).
The physiological trauma resulting from injury to the leg triggers an epistemological
trauma characterised by the collapse of the distinction between a more or less Cartesian
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identity and the body; between an abstracted, unembodied self and an embodied one.
This crisis of identity is parallelled on a more general theoretical level with the movement
away from concern with abstracted models of identity to localised, embodied and
historically specific persons.
Belsey’s characterisation of the author in classic realism invests it with qualities
associated with the abstracted Cartesian subject, with a Cartesian-like imaginary.  The
transcendent and abstracted qualities of the authorial subject of the classic realist text
signal its similarities with the Cartesian formulation of agency, a subject sovereign to
historical contingencies and to language.  As Tallis writes:
According to Catherine Belsey, contradiction is overcome in classic
realism by the deployment of a ‘hierarchy of discourses’.  Warring voices,
mutually incompatible points of view, conflicting worlds, etc., evident at
one level, are resolved by being gathered up into the homogenous and
unified discursive space of a higher-level authorial voice and standpoint.
The very tense in which realistic stories are told seems to confer a
privileged viewpoint upon the teller.  (In Defence of Realism 52-53)
Transcendence in classic realist writing and the Cartesian subject functions by
“gather[ing] up [multiple perspectives] into the homogeneous and unified discursive
space of a higher-level [emphasis added] authorial voice and standpoint” (53).  In classic
realism the author is presented as a distant authority who is the source of the narrative.
The author, according to this model, as the source of the realist narrative does not self-
reflexively meta-narrate itself and is, thereby, complicit with dominant imaginaries.  The
shadowy and hidden quality of the author is a consequence of the lack of an
acknowledgement of the role of history and language in the construction of the authorial
subject.  By placing the author outside the text as a distant authority, classic realism
constructs the author as an abstracted, transcendent and objective subject.  It also signals
the close relationship between classic realist fiction and traditional autobiography,
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because nowhere do we more clearly see the assumption that the self as a subject can
know itself as an object than in traditional autobiography.
For instance, some philosophers saw autobiography as a genre through which they
could record the formation of a rational self.  In this way, traditional autobiography was
viewed as empirical data from which knowledge of the self could be derived.  John Stuart
Mill writes of the subject of autobiography that: “[it] has also seemed to me that in an age
of transition in opinions, there may be somewhat both of interest and of benefit in noting
the successive phases of any mind which was always pressing forward, equally ready to
learn and to unlearn [. . .]” (1).  Mill assumes that it is possible to represent accurately the
successive phases of the mind through a retrospective analysis of one’s life.  There is no
acknowledgment that mimetic representation relies on the vagaries of memory.8  This
assumption that the self can successfully represent itself is also seen in Sir Henry Morton
Stanley’s autobiography when he writes, “I may tell how I came into existence, and how
that existence was moulded by contact with others; how my nature developed under
varying influences, and what, after life’s severe test, is the final outcome of it” (xv).  This
is certainly an optimistic view of autobiography’s power to represent the self truthfully.
It also shows that to achieve an account of how the self came into existence relies more
on interpretation than on mere presentation of life data and, therefore, the stress is on the
desire to know and understand rather than simply re-present.  Linda H. Petersen explains
why this may occur in the following passage:
The autobiographer focuses less on narrative emplotment than on explicit
interpretation.  This focus may help to explain why the finest practitioners
of the genre in the Victorian era were historians, philosophers, and critics
rather than novelists and why readers who value the autobiography have
been those who take special interest in the interpretative act.  (4)
                                                 
8 As I will discuss in Chapter Three, disruptions of memory are magnified in traumatised subjects.
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In such representation of the self, a split is formed between the self that is presented (the
protagonist) and the self that interprets this presentation (the narrator).  This splitting of
the autobiographical subject is indicative of a Cartesian-like subject.
Perhaps the most striking example of this split subject is found in the traditional
autobiography of Herbert Spencer.  Wayne Shumaker writes that
Spencer tried to examine himself as if he were a complete stranger,
drawing deductions from his own books and letters as though no recourse
to memory were possible; and in the attempt, of course, he forfeited much
of the advantage of his intimate knowledge and became, so far as he was
faithful to his method, his own biographer.  (91-92)
In the effort to truly represent the self, memory is sacrificed in favour of ‘objective’
sources, and the split between the subject as author and as protagonist is at its most
extreme.
Such autobiography posits a transcendental authorial subject characteristic of the
subject position of classic realist fiction.  A transcendent subject is a subject that is
transparent to itself as an object, and “[a]utobiography purports to present the truth of a
self as grasped by itself” (Lloyd 170).  Descartes’s Discourse on Method functions in this
way and presents the split subject of traditional autobiography most clearly, “for as a
narrative it traces this very transition, from the personalised I of autobiography to the
impersonal I of philosophy” (Sturrock 94).  Such a subject, rather than faithfully
representing itself in the narrative, which is the aim of autobiography, encourages an
abstracted, unlocatable, and unaccountable authorial position that, because of the
combination of its presence in and transcendence of the text, is powerful.  By envisioning
him or her self as outside history and the text, the author of classic realist life-writing
effaces the fact that the effect of his or her self as present is a consequence of the
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narrative form itself.9  The narrator achieves this by purporting to “see each event in its
fixed relation to a past which has presumably achieved its final form.  The past self, from
this God-like stance, is seen as having a completeness which it could not attain while
present.  The retrospective narration constitutes the self as a coherent object, grasped
from the stance of immutable truth” (Lloyd 174).
Like classic realist autobiography, the Aboriginal testimonial life-writers
examined in this study present a monological (Aboriginal) viewpoint and do not
interrogate the intra-racial differences that exist between Aboriginal peoples.  However,
there are important differences in the way in which the monological, abstracted
viewpoints are presented in Aboriginal testimonial life-writing and classic realist
autobiography.  Firstly, the Aboriginal readership is not the addressee of these texts,
rather the addressees are primarily the white non-Aboriginal reader and secondarily the
non-Aboriginal reader.  Unlike classic realist autobiography, wherein the addressee of the
text is encouraged to identify with the author, testimony, as Rosamund Dalziell identifies,
is “generally narrated so that the positions of jury and accused are reversed: the testimony
of the accused implicates the reader in some form of moral deficiency”, thus precluding,
or at least circumscribing, the identificatory impulse of the reader (131-132).  In this
sense, it presents a more complex dialogical relationship between author and reader than
classic realist autobiography.  It appeals for both identification and the acknowledgment
of difference by enacting a dialogical relationship with non-Aboriginal readers that
encourages coalition, not identification.  Furthermore, unlike classic realist
autobiography, Aboriginal testimonial life-writing nearly always presents
subjectivity/Aboriginality in crisis because it is profoundly involved in negotiating post-
colonial trauma and political resistance.  Because the traumatic material and the moral
                                                 
9 Deconstructive critiques of self-presence argue that the sense of presence in a narrative is a consequence
of the literary devices employed.  This view will be explored in more detail below through an analysis of
Paul de Man’s influential essay “Autobiography as De-Facement”.
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deficiency that Dalziell identifies is part of the ongoing process of reconciliation,
Aboriginal testimonial life-writing does not possess as strong a retrospective perspective
as classic realist autobiography.  In this sense, it does not have the teleological
completeness of classic realist autobiography or of Cartesian-like subjectivity because it
does not present a subject that sees “each event in its fixed relation to a past which has
presumably achieved its final form” (Lloyd 174).  It is equally concerned with the
present-centred activity of establishing the self as it is with retrospectively narrating the
self that has achieved, like the Cartesian subject, its final (transcendent) form.  It presents
a subject-in-becoming that to some degree depends on the dialogical relationship between
the author and reader for addressing the unfinished business of colonial dispossession.  It
appeals for recognition by the non-Aboriginal reader of that colonial history and its
ongoing impact as part of the process of symbolic reconciliation.   
While Aboriginal testimony may be critiqued because of its presentation of a
monological Aboriginal perspective in the same way anti-realists critique classic realist
autobiography, it differs in the above ways.  The similarities between the two genres
mean that Aboriginal authors often deploy some of the claims made in classic realist
autobiography in order to sustain the authority of the authorial subject.  Due to this, such
life-writing can be critiqued in a de Manian fashion, discussed in more detail below.
However, the therapeutic and political aims of these texts work against the anti-realist and
deconstructive impulses.  The therapeutic and political drivers of testimony need to be
considered in responding to the criticism that there is a tendency in theorising Aboriginal
testimony to treat the Aboriginal authorial subject less rigorously in a deconstructive
sense than the subject of classic realist autobiography.  Such rigor may be directed
towards the Aboriginal authorial subject to reveal the interestedness, omissions and
contradictions of that subject.  Yet, the risk of such analyses is that they may underplay
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the importance of the identity work of establishing Aboriginality in a context where that
subjectivity has already been threatened and undermined by colonialism.
In another sense, the monological Aboriginal viewpoint of the Aboriginal
testimonial text is a reflection of the colonialist projection of a monological Aboriginality.
However, because the text is primarily directed at the non-Aboriginal reader, the
presentation of a monological Aboriginal perspective that is antagonistic towards its
colonial figuring means that these texts hold the potential to transform dialogical
relations.  The Aboriginal testimonial text presents a monological Aboriginal perspective
in dialogical relation to the non-Aboriginal reader wherein the process of establishing
Aboriginality requires a balance between reinforcing and deconstructing that subjectivity
— a responsibility held by both the author and the reader.  In contrast, the classic realist
autobiography presents a monological perspective that does not of necessity emphasise
racial positioning but rather encourages the reader to fully identify with that perspective.
In the classic realist text the ethics of deconstruction are not as deeply intertwined with
the ethical considerations surrounding the establishment of identity in the aftermath of
colonialism.  While Aboriginal testimonial life-writing encourages identification, it does
so in a way that encourages identification with the Aboriginal figuring of non-
Aboriginality and not Aboriginality itself.  Traditional autobiography can reveal the
reader’s co-extensivity with social forces, but it does not necessarily accuse some readers
as participants in those social forces, as does Aboriginal testimony.  Traditional
autobiography focuses on the author as individual to a far greater degree than Aboriginal
testimony and not on race relations.  Traditional autobiography may be read to explicate
racial relations but it does not necessarily foreground them.
While Aboriginal life-writing presents a monological perspective and a subject
split in the sense that it knows itself as an object of itself, there are fundamental features
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of the genre that undermine the smooth presentation of such a subject.  Each of these
features depends to some degree on the present-centred character of the testimonial text.
Firstly, because the testifying subject is involved in the present-centred process of
working-through trauma and because traumatic material is characterised by its resistance
to representation, testimonial subjects often portray themselves as not fully present to
themselves because they are in the process of integrating the trauma of colonial
dispossession into their identity.  This explains the frequent repetitions/rehearsals found
in these texts wherein the same traumatic issues are revisited in an attempt to integrate
them into the testifiers’ understanding of themselves.  Secondly, because these texts aim
to effect political change as part of the process of reconciliation by convincing non-
Aboriginal readers of their implication in colonial injustice, there is little possibility of the
kind of retrospective closure attributed to classic realist autobiography and Cartesian-like
subjects.  Thirdly, because these texts appeal to the reader to acknowledge the ongoing
legacy of colonial trauma, they again focus not on retrospective closure but on present-
centred political change.  While these testimonies present a monological Aboriginal view,
it is a view that emphasises the tensions and deferral involved in the present-centred
identity work of addressing the complexities of post-colonial Australian conditions.
The later chapters of this study examine life-writing that does not split the subject
in the way described by Lloyd.  They argue that, for a number of reasons, Aboriginal
testimonial life-writing places greater emphasis on the co-extensivity between authors and
their communities (Chapter Two), between authors and readers (Chapter Four), and on
the material and symbolic forces that shape both authors and readers, rather than on the
transcendence of these forces.  They argue that the process of working-through post-
colonial trauma as the establishment of Aboriginal identity (Chapter Three, Four and
Five) cannot afford to split the subject as in classic realist autobiography, and that the
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construction of the author/reader relationship in testimonial life-writing presents subjects
enmeshed in post-colonial trauma.  Equally important, this enmeshment, in turn,
interpellates the non-Aboriginal reader differently from classic realist autobiography.
Classic Realism and Reader/Author Relations
Classic realist autobiography encourages the model of the split subject/author to be
adopted by the reader through the operation of what Althusser termed ‘interpellation’.
Tallis describes how this may occur:
A reader who imagines that the novel he is reading emanated from a
unitary character named on the dust jacket and who, furthermore, believes
that this character has a personal viewpoint expressed in the novel, merely
demonstrates the extent to which he is the dupe of the ideological process
by which he is himself centred in a subjectivity that serves only to hold
him subject to the social formation in which the majority are exploited to
benefit the minority.  (In Defence of Realism 72)
However, many autobiographies persist in presenting to the reader an author who believes
that his/her experiences are his/hers when, in fact, as Tallis sceptically points out, any
writing that is not a meta-linguistic exercise dupes readers by encouraging them to feel
that the author is a real person.  Tallis is identifying a position that states that readers who
are unaware that the author is dead persist in deceiving themselves in their desire to read
autobiographies to experience another’s personal viewpoint.  Eakin identifies the same
tendency when he writes, “I am arguing that this proto-autobiographical tendency — this
identification of reader with autobiographer — constitutes the fundamental motive for the
reader’s interest in autobiography in the first place” (Touching the World 36).
The above discussion of classic realist fiction and its relation to autobiography
referred to Althusser’s ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, in which Althusser
identifies ‘Literature’ as an Ideological State Apparatus (ISA).  As noted, ISAs are
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devices by which the means of production are reproduced.  It was also argued that at the
heart of this process of reproduction is the category of the subject because “there is no
ideology except by the subject and for subjects” (Althusser 170).  To expand on this,
Althusser employs the concept of interpellation to demonstrate how Literature reproduces
ideology, arguing that “the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he
shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely)
accept his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his
subjection ‘all by himself’” (182).  Interpellation is the means by which individuals
become “subjected to the Subject” (179), with the capital in ‘Subject’ identifying the
universality of the category.
Just as the narrator takes up a transcendent and sovereign subject position in
relation to the autobiographical narrative, so too does the reader through the proto-
autobiographical tendency to identify with the author.  Interpellation reinforces the
illusion of a sovereign subject within the reader who, through his or her identification
with the author, assumes that sovereign position to the text.  It is from this point that the
reader, like the author, maintains a detached distance from the fate of the protagonist.
Such interpellation creates a space from which the subject can grasp itself as an object,
but this transparency, rather than ensuring a masterful subject, functions instead to
obfuscate the forces that act upon and form the self.  It is “[i]n this way [that] classic
realism constitutes an ideological practice in addressing itself to readers as subjects,
interpellating them in order that they freely accept their subjectivity and their subjection”
(Belsey 69).  The reader/author relationship as it is characterised in classic realist
autobiography encourages an experience of subjective mastery for both the reader and
author.
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As argued earlier, the persistence of Cartesian-like forms of subjectivity can be
attributed to the fact that the adoption of the privileges of subjective mastery associated
with a transcendent authorial or readerly position is empowering.  However, this mastery
is illusory and predicated on the exclusion of other perspectives and as such the sense of
mastery becomes instead a screen that conceals subjection.  Doris Sommer, borrowing
from Henri Lefebvre, defines a screen as “something that shows and that also covers up”
(135).  A screen both carries a projection and also conceals what is behind it, just as the
interpellation of the subject as sovereign in classic realist autobiography conceals that the
sense of sovereignty over the subject/text is a consequence of suppressing other
perspectives.
Interpellating the Colonised Subject
As argued above, subjects are subjected to the Subject.  This subjection takes a specific
form in colonial societies.  Becoming a colonised subject involves first being interpellated
as one by the colonising culture.  A colony interpellates at least two subject positions, that
of the colonised and that of the coloniser, both of which are defined and ordered by the
laws of the coloniser.  Of course, there are subjects, cultural practices and experiences
that lay outside the laws of the coloniser, but they are unheard, marginalised and deemed
illegitimate.
Natalie Melas employs Frantz Fanon’s model of the relationship between black
and white subjects in colonial societies, presented in Black Skin, White Masks, as a way
of articulating contradictions inherent in interpellating colonial subjects based on colour.
She outlines two different ways of interpellating the colonised subject — that described
by Alfred Adler and that described by Fanon.  She offers the following translation of
Fanon:
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The Martinican does not compare himself to the White man, considered as
father, leader, God, but compares himself to his similars [other
Martinicans] under the White man’s patronage.  [In contrast], an Adlerian
comparison can be schematised in the following manner:
‘Ego greater than the Other’
The Antillean [Fanon] comparison, in contrast, presents itself thus:
White
Ego different from the Other
The Adlerian model (Ego greater than Other) “describes the overcompensation of an
individual’s feelings of inferiority through direct access (via comparison) to a ‘governing
fiction’ or model” (278).  In the Adlerian model of the interpellation of the colonised
subject a hierarchy is established by which comparison with the governing model subject
(White, Western, and Imperial) is possible.  There is a chain of being so to speak (and the
reference to this theological teleology is not without relevance when the links between
Christian missionism and colonisation are considered) through which it is possible for the
colonised subject to identify with the governing fiction, that is, the white Subject.
In Fanon’s model, whiteness stands as the signifier of the transcendent subject
position and as the exclusive attribute of the colonising culture.  The contradiction
identified here is as follows: “[t]he black man finds himself doubly bound by the
contradictory injunction of white culture: you must be like me, you can’t be like me”
(Melas 277).  Fanon shows that the colonised’s identification with the governing
fiction/imaginary and Subject is impossible.  The line that separates the two cannot be
traversed and this is primarily due to the fact that “‘[t]he process of assimilation . . .
requires that which defines the difference between the elements to remain over as a
residue’” (D. Lloyd qtd. in Melas 277).  For Fanon, the Indigenous subject is interpellated
as the colonised, rather than as the coloniser, and is ordered to adopt, yet is barred from
adopting, the position of the privileged white (Cartesian-like) Subject.  This double
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interpellation calls the subject into being white and yet bars it from being white, thus
splitting the subject.  Just as the subject of classic realist autobiography is powerful
because of its ability to be both inside and outside itself and the text, the colonised subject
is rendered powerless because it is barred from such mobility.  As Melas writes, “[t]he
demand colonial society makes on the black man, particularly the black man from
Antilles, where no original culture survived colonialism, Frantz Fanon asserts in Peau
noire, masques blancs, is to ‘blanchir ou disparaitre’ (whiten or disappear)” (277).  Yet,
this interpellative injunction is impossible to fulfil.  In the Antillean case, to be black is to
disappear, but equally to whiten is to disappear, that is, both render blackness invisible.
Interestingly, Aboriginal testimonial life-writing inverts Fanon’s model because it
presents a monological Aboriginality (one that functions in a classic realist, Cartesian-like
way because it does not emphasise the multiplicity of intra-Aboriginal perspectives)
while barring identification with it by non-Aboriginal peoples.  These texts appeal to the
non-Aboriginal reader to identify with the Aboriginal view of colonial history, not
Aboriginality itself.  Furthermore, while these texts function in a classic realist mode in
that they present a monological Aboriginal viewpoint, they contain many other features
that distinguish them from classic realist texts (discussed further below).  It is sufficient to
note here that the feature of classic realism they do employ (the monological perspective)
is used in such a way as to invert Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal positions of authorial,
colonial power as presented by Fanon.
Colour has been the marker of difference and citizenship in colonial Australia and
functioned as outlined in Fanon’s model above.  It was not until the 1967 referendum that
the Australian Government was granted the power to begin providing equal citizenship
rights to Aborigines and to include ‘full-blood’ Aborigines in the Census.  The Bringing
them Home Report discusses the first Australian Commonwealth-State Native Welfare
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Conference held in 1937, where the conference was sufficiently impressed by the
attitudes of West Australia’s Chief Protector on ‘absorption’ that the conference stated
that “the destiny of the natives of aboriginal origin, but not of the full blood, lies in their
ultimate absorption by the people of the Commonwealth, and it therefore recommends
that all efforts be directed to that end” (32).  After citing this excerpt from the conference,
The Bringing them Home Report goes on to say that
[f]rom this time on, States began adopting policies designed to ‘assimilate’
Indigenous people of mixed descent.  Whereas ‘merging’ was essentially a
passive process of pushing Indigenous people into the non-Indigenous
community and denying them assistance, assimilation was a highly
intensive process necessitating constant surveillance of people’s lives,
judged according to non-Indigenous standards.  (32)
However, assimilation as the interpellation of the colonised subject as white can be
contested and Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is a case in point.
Interpolating the Colonising Subject
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines interpolation as “[t]he action of inserting
words into or altering a book etc., esp. in order to mislead; an interpolated word or
passage.”10  Interpolation in a post-colonial context can also designate the way subaltern
agency is reflexive and actively moves back to contest the construction of the subject by
dominant colonialist ideologies.  Bill Ashcroft writes that interpolation is a strategy that
includes all the tactics through which a colonised group enters “the ‘scene’ of
colonisation to reveal frictions of cultural difference, to actually make use of aspects of
the colonising culture so as to generate transformative cultural production” (177).
Aboriginal testimonial life-writing inserts specific Aboriginal subjects into non-
Aboriginal life-writing practices and in so doing unsettles dominant cultural imaginaries.
                                                 
10 While testimonial life-writing is not produced to mislead, it is written to register Indigenous difference.
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It contests official historical accounts of colonisation that might, for instance, argue that
colonisation and assimilationist practices were positive and necessary experiences for
Aboriginal people.  It does this by interpolating into colonialist history the marginalised
voice of the colonised, voices that articulate the traumatic consequences of colonial
impact.
Elisabeth Burgos-Debray, in her introduction to I Rigoberta Menchú, outlines how
Rigoberta Menchú enters the ‘scene’, writing:
there are the ‘indigenists’ who want to recover the lost world of their
ancestors and cut themselves off completely from European culture.  In
order to do so, however, they use notions and techniques borrowed from
that very culture.  Thus, they promote the notion of an Indian nation.
Indigenism is, then, itself a product of what Devereux calls ‘disassociative
acculturation’: an attempt to revive the past by using techniques borrowed
from the very culture one wishes to reject and free oneself from.  (xvii)
This excerpt shows the way in which Indigenous life-writing does not necessarily have to
be a form of oppositional political writing that demands a complete rejection of dominant
cultural practices.  Interpolation as a form of literary resistance is distinct from direct
opposition.  In a sense, it is a strategy that comes from the fact that the language and
cultural practices of the colonising force have already deeply penetrated Indigenous
culture.  For instance, Aboriginal English is a central part of many Aboriginal peoples’
lives and in no way illegitimates the authenticity of Aboriginal culture, but rather,
embodies the process of contact.  Pam Johnston stresses this very point, not surprisingly,
in similar terms to Burgos-Debray’s, in her ‘Foreword’ to Ruby Langford Ginibi’s My
Bundjalung People, writing:
Ruby, I know, has had the experience of being questioned in relation to
Aboriginal people writing in the European mould, as the Koori cultural
tradition is oral.  As you will note, Ruby has very much made the English
language her own.  Koori English is an existing language that you will
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meet repeatedly in these pages.  We are all adaptors and survivors who
must tell our histories in our own way.  To be questioned in relation to
language structure, or cultural ‘correctness’ seems to me to continually
illegitimise the Aboriginal race as much as questioning just exactly how
much Aboriginal blood courses in ones’ [sic] veins.  (xiii)
Aboriginal English embodies the cross-pollination of cultures characteristic of post-
colonial nations.  It provides the reader of English with both a means of identification and
an indication of the distance between him or her self and the Aboriginal testimonial voice.
Aboriginal life-writing has qualities in common with classic realist autobiography,
yet often counters classic realist assumptions.  Indigenous adaptation of the culturally
dominant language and genres is an appropriation of language and genre that can benefit
the colonised community.  Johnston writes that Aboriginal people “are all adaptors and
survivors” (xiii), highlighting the way the appropriation of language is part of surviving
colonisation, while also highlighting the presence of Aboriginal agency.  Johnston
criticises the position that views the colonised’s use of the coloniser’s language as a loss
of ‘authenticity’, equating it with the denial of Aboriginality on the basis of blood or
colour.  The denial or attribution of Aboriginality based on colour and language are both
colonialist strategies because, as quoted above, for the colonising power “‘[t]he process of
assimilation . . . requires that which defines the difference between the elements to remain
over as a residue’” (D. Lloyd qtd. in Melas 277).  Melas identifies colour as this residue,
yet language use can also be this residue.  In this sense, it is not so much the particular
signified of difference that matters for maintaining colonial power, but rather the
colonising culture’s power to define difference through any signifying system.  As
Johnston shows, the power to define reflexively moves between the coloniser and the
colonised and the appropriation of the coloniser’s language by the colonised attests to an
agency that adopts, defines and transforms dominant cultural practices in its own interest.
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Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is a striking example of this and it interpolates classic
realist life-writing in a number of ways, for instance, in its inversion of Fanon’s model of
black/white relations discussed above.  Indeed, it is by employing classic realist
autobiography’s Cartesian-like subject that testimonial life-writing inverts and adopts the
privileges of the abstracted white Subject of Fanon’s model.  It also interpolates classic
realist life-writing in the following ways, each of which is discussed in more detail
throughout this study.
First, Aboriginal testimonial life-writing strongly emphasises co-extensivity
between the author and his or her cultural group presenting an almost, but not completely,
group subject in the position of author (see Chapter Two).   By placing emphasis on racial
identity (which is a group in part because it was Othered as one by colonists) within a
genre of individualism, testimonial life-writing constructs an authorial presence that
restricts the prototypical readerly desire to identify with the author of autobiography.
Secondly, Aboriginal testimonial life-writing interpolates the classic realist
author/reader relationship by implicating the non-Aboriginal reader in the history of
colonialism by presenting, as outlined above, to non-Aboriginal readers a group
Aboriginal subject that has been dispossessed by non-Aboriginal settlers.  In classic
realist life-writing, the reader may identify with an author (narrator) who grasps him or
her self as object (protagonist), that is, the reader is detached from the fate of the
protagonist due to the centre of identificational gravity.  In contrast, testimonial life-
writing presents a profoundly troubled link between the narrator and the protagonist due
to the present-centred concerns of the testifier’s life-story, such as the ongoing effects of
colonial trauma.  The non-Aboriginal reader is interpellated as an ambivalent subject
because the Aboriginal testimonial text complicates the autobiographical desire to
identify with the author who is, in this case, an antagonist of dominant white non-
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Aboriginal subjects.  Moreover, the non-Aboriginal Australian reader is made responsible
to some extent for negotiating the ongoing impact of colonial history.  Such writing aims
to shift the reader away from identification with the colonial non-Aboriginal subject
towards identifying with the struggle of the colonised (see Chapter Four).
Thirdly, because such life-writing interpolates the ongoing effects of colonial
trauma into the text (as above), it does not offer the teleological completeness of classic
realist life-writing wherein conflict is resolved in a retrospective understanding of the
protagonist’s fate shared by the narrator and reader.  The Aboriginal narrator’s
commitment as a protagonist to effect political change and work-through trauma
undermines easy retrospective closure and redemptive resolutions (see Chapter Three).
Fourthly, Aboriginal life-writing works to dismantle the notion of the colonised
Indigenous subject as the ‘Exotic’, which is defined by Livio Dobrez thus:
Where the merely stereotypic simplifies, the Exotic enigmatizes.  It
forcibly inserts its object into and restricts it to the category of the
Indefinite.  In short it refuses definition.  [. . .] The Exotic neutralizes what
is Other.  But if all discourses of Unfamiliarity involve a knowing of the
Other through the process of othering oneself, then the Exotic amounts to a
refusal of self-definition.  (31)
Aboriginal life-writing others the reader, as outlined above, and in so doing establishes a
recognitive relationship that both de-exoticises the Aboriginal subject and brings the non-
Aboriginal reader into better self-definition (see Chapter Four).
Lastly, Aboriginal testimonial life-writing emphasises cultural difference and
traumatic post-colonial history to underscore its truth claims.  It aims to reinforce the
reader’s belief that they are hearing the ‘real’ rather than the ‘reality effect’ of the classic
realist mode (Chapters Two, Three and Four).
These are some of the ways Aboriginal testimonial life-writing reconfigures the
classic realist autobiographical mode.  New literary modes arise through authors’
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rejections of dominant literary modes as inadequate for the representation of new
subjects.  Likewise, new theoretical investigations result from the limitations of old
models for figuring these new subjects.
Reconfiguring the Subject
Challenges to traditional forms of subjectivity have been undertaken by different theorists
and in different theoretical fields, such as psychoanalysis, post-colonialism and post-
structuralism.  Underlying these challenges is a belief that subjectivity is highly
determined by cultural symbolic systems and by the particular historical and social
manifestations of those systems.  The view that the self is constituted by discourses or, in
Gatens’s terminology, ‘social imaginaries’, complicates Cartesian-like conceits.  In order
to pursue the consequences of this disruption, a reappraisal of the structure of subjectivity
is required.  To acknowledge that language constructs the authority of the authorial
position is one way of deconstructing Cartesian-like presence, as does Eakin’s
qualification (via Descombes) that the Cartesian subject is not a person.  Consequently, a
reconfiguration of the sovereign subject underpinning this conception of autobiography is
required because “[t]he Cartesian self, originally at the very centre of objective
knowledge, now seems in danger of disappearing — not just as the archetypal object of
knowledge, but as an object of knowledge at all” (Lloyd 170).
I have argued that classic realist autobiography relies upon a subject/object split
within the writer that cannot be sustained; a split that, once experienced as illusory,
precipitated a traumatic crisis for Sacks and caused him to call for a new neurology of
identity.  Such a call need not necessarily be met with a new neurological model but may
be adequately dealt with through the conceptual resources of contemporary cultural
theory.  The notion of the sovereign subject has undergone the most effective challenges
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in the twentieth-century, and the problems with this subject are mirrored in three areas in
the theory of autobiography.  Robert Smith outlines the problematic thus:
1.  Theories and surveys of the theory [. . .] showing perhaps ‘the tendency
of much recent work on autobiography to cancel out both itself and its
subject’.
2.  Suspicions as to whether autobiography can be theorised as a genre
since as Candace Lang pointed out, it seems to get everywhere, like sand.
3.  Positivist definitions of autobiography, merging with quasi-
existentialist claims about self-knowledge.  (55-56)
All three difficulties arise from one central problem, that is, the formulation of the subject
as bordered, “isolatable, constitutive and self-identical”  (56).  The first point shows that
theories of autobiography that aspire to formulate an objective theory distinct from the
creator of the theory are untenable.  As E. S. Burt writes, “the critic’s job of writing about
autobiography [is] dangerously like writing autobiography” itself (18-19).  The second
point follows from the first, in that classic realist autobiography’s claim to truly represent
the self outside the text is untenable because the subject it claims to record resists
categorisation.  This point could be made with regard to all genres but it has a special
significance for classic realist autobiography because the putative aim of the genre is to
truly represent the subject.
Like Smith, I take the third point as the most important one because “it takes
autobiography above all as a document of personal history, or ‘history of personality’,
and so places autobiography fairly within an ideology of individualism” (Smith 56).  The
connection between this point and my claim that all three points are compromised by
their formulation of subjectivity as bordered, “isolatable, constitutive and self-identical”
(56) should be clear.  Smith argues that the individualism that underpins autobiography
begins to collapse when the subject is interrogated.  Autobiography’s aspiration to self-
knowledge, gained through a history of personality, fails for exactly the same reasons
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Lloyd gives for the disappearance of the Cartesian subject.  In both cases the subject can
never be entirely present to itself as object and thus never entirely transparent to itself.
However, as we have seen, such an attack on the Cartesian claim to self-presence may
have only limited connections with ‘real’ persons, because Descartes’s Cartesian “subject
is not a person” (Eakin, How Our Lives 8).
This movement from self-knowledge to a loss of self-presence is addressed in
Paul de Man’s influential essay on the relationship between identity and representation,
“Autobiography as De-Facement”.  De Man writes of autobiography that “[i]t seems to
belong to a simpler mode of referentiality, of representation, and of diegesis.  It may
contain lots of phantasms and dreams, but these deviations from reality remain rooted in a
single subject whose identity is defined by the uncontested readability of his proper
name  [. . .] (emphasis added)” (68).  In this excerpt we see that the authority behind the
autobiographical narrative is the proper name of the author.  De Man provides a sketch of
the traditional Cartesian subject in accordance with my earlier outline: that is, the proper
name, the author, is identical with an essential self that is sovereign to and unifying of
multiple perspectives and experiences.  De Man goes on to make what can now be
considered a classic deconstructive operation, that is, reducing the referent to the signs
that attest to it.  This deconstructive operation will be analysed (employed and criticised)
throughout this study with regard to its effects on the establishment of subaltern
identity.11  At this point, it is sufficient to state its function in autobiographical theory.  De
                                                 
11 Examples of this operation can be found in a number of post-structuralist writers.  For example,
Baudrillard writes, “[a]ll of Western faith and good faith was involved in this wager on representation: that
a sign could refer to the depth of meaning, that a sign could exchange for meaning, and that something
could guarantee this exchange — God of course.  But what if God [. . . was] reduced to the signs which
attest his existence” (30).  Catherine Vasseleu makes a similar point when she writes that narratives in their
“very manufacture of metaphors, images, models, diagrams and analogies, and their simultaneous dismissal
as just substitutes for or illustrations of the essential thing [. . .] efface [themselves] as figurative practices”
(59).  Spivak identifies the same point in Friedrich Nietzsche’s writing when she states that “[i]n its
simplest outline, Nietzsche’s definition of metaphor seems to be the establishing of an identity between
dissimilar things.  Nietzsche’s phrase is ‘Gleich Machen’ (make equal), calling to mind the German word
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Man writes, “but can we not suggest, with equal justice, that the autobiographical project
may itself produce and determine the life and that whatever the writer does is in fact
governed by the technical demands of self-portraiture and thus determined, in all aspects,
by the resources of his medium?” (69).  Here we see that the author’s selfhood is defaced
by the autobiographical narrative that attests to it.  The autobiographical project that was
meant to evoke and record an accurate representation of a self has failed.
De Man argues that the language that is meant to evoke the self is tropological and
metaphorical.  The figure he employs to characterise autobiography is prosopopeia which
is “the fiction of an apostrophe to an absent, deceased, or voiceless entity [. . .]” (75).
Prosopopeia is the rhetorical operation by which an absent figure is represented and
addressed.  Its etymological root means to give or make a face; prosopon meaning ‘face’,
and poien ‘make’.  Yet, the irony of prosopopeia is that in giving a face it erases it, thus
the title of de Man’s essay, ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’.  This is the reason for its
problematic use in post-colonial studies.  Prosopopeia functions like this because it
cannot evoke the ‘real thing’; it is a metaphorical operation and thus a substitution that
effaces the self as much as it evokes it.  These issues are dealt with in greater detail
throughout this study and it is enough at this point to indicate the consequences of de
Man’s classic deconstructive operation for the authorial presence of classic realist
autobiography and the crippling of agency that it engenders.  De Man finishes his essay
with these words:
As soon as we understand the rhetorical function of prosopopeia as
positing voice or face by means of language, we also understand that what
we are deprived of is not life but the shape and the sense of a world
accessible only in the privative way of understanding.  Death is a displaced
name for a linguistic predicament, and the restoration of mortality by
                                                                                                                                                  
‘Gleichnis’ — image, simile, similitude, comparison, allegory, parable — an unmistakable pointer to
figurative practice in general” (Translator’s Preface xxii).
58   S. R. J. Gibbons
autobiography (the prosopopeia of the voice and the name) deprives and
disfigures to the precise extent that it restores.  Autobiography veils a de-
facement of the mind of which it is itself the cause.  (80-81)
The death of the subject is a linguistic predicament because the effort to speak oneself
effaces oneself.  De Man’s subject is a mute subject and, he argues, it is the very effort to
restore and reclaim the voice of the subject that defaces it.
The potential consequences of this for colonised communities are ominous and
redirect attention to the ethics of such deconstruction.  Colonised subjects have
experienced a history that is characterised by their exclusion from self-representation and
written history.  De Man’s position suggests that if there were an opportunity for the
subaltern to speak it would be an act of self-violence because defacement is a condition of
autobiographic, or for that matter ethnographic, self-presentation.  Therefore, in de Man’s
deconstruction of the classic realist autobiographical subject, there is a risk of erasing the
agency that would allow the subaltern to speak.
In the testimonial writing that I will investigate later in this study, de Man’s
pervasive erasure of agency is contested.  Underlying this contestation is — as Ashcroft
maintains — a reinstatement of “a principle of post-colonial agency which concedes, on
the one hand, the central function of language in constructing subjectivity, but which
confirms the capacity of the colonised subject to intervene in the material conditions of
suppression in order to transform them” (176).  Such a conception of agency is necessary
for acknowledging those practices and interventions performed by colonised peoples that
have an effect on the material and symbolic conditions that have subjugated them.  To
deny this is an act that works to strengthen processes that have traditionally been
employed to render others inaudible.  However, this should not entail a regression to a
Cartesian-like conception of the subject because such a transcendent and sovereign
subject was also central to the colonising process.  To return to such a subject would only
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reinstate the underlying principles of the traditional notion of agency.  We require a
conception of agency that does not create a sovereign subject, nor the wholesale erasure
of the subject that results from deconstructions of realist agency such as de Man’s.  As
LaCapra states, we need to ask what is at stake in the deployment of “an (an)aesthetics of
the sublime that indiscriminately valorizes the un(re)representable or the experimentally
transgressive without posing the problem of the actual and desirable relations between
normative limits and transgression” (Representing the Holocaust 223).  This study seeks
not so much a balance between post-structuralist (de Manian) and post-colonialist views
on agency, nor a reinstatement of Cartesian-like subjects, but rather an understanding of
the liminality of a form of subjectivity that is neither “isolatable, constitutive and self-
identical” (Smith 56), nor unlocatable and deferred, and a form of representation that is
neither “an anti-representational antihumanism” nor a “humanist [. . . defence] of
representation” (Arac qtd. in Colas 163).
Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism
Ashcroft affirms “a principle of post-colonial agency which concedes [. . .] the central
function of language [while confirming] the capacity [. . .] to intervene in the material
conditions of suppression” (176).  This signals that the relationship between language’s
determination of identity and cultural identities’ reconfiguration of language as acts of
survival, between realism’s presentation of a monocentric reality and anti-realism’s denial
of it, is more complex than the arguments recounted above concerning realism and anti-
realism suggest.  As Donna Haraway has written on the issue of absolutism and
relativism: the ‘god-tricks’ of totalisation and relativism “promise [. . .] vision from
everywhere and nowhere equally and fully [. . .]” (191).  Haraway identifies such a form
of relativism as an effective way of risking laying oneself out on the table with self-
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induced multiple-personality disorder (186).  This insight is equally applicable to the
debates on realism and anti-realism.  Realism in its potential effacement or non-
recognition of multiple perspectives is a form of absolutism or totalisation that, like the
Cartesian subject, “promise[s] vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully
[.  .  .]” (191).  Anti-realism, in its advocacy of an openness to multiple perspectives, also
becomes, paradoxically, like totalisation: unlocatable, highly mobile and, in a sense,
unified by its omniscient ability to evacuate.  It cancels out difference by meeting each
object with the same operation.
Haraway’s insights, like Gatens’s discussed above, are derived from feminist
theory.  Haraway critiques two trends in feminist theory.  The first is the
overdetermination of subjectivity, and the consequent erasure of difference, that Marxist,
psychoanalytic, feminist and anthropological efforts have engendered.  Haraway
identifies the second trend thus: “If my complaint about socialist/Marxian standpoints is
their unintended erasure of polyvocal, unassimilable, radical difference made visible in
anti-colonial discourse and practice, [. . . the] intentional erasure of all difference through
the device of the ‘essential’ non-existence of women is not reassuring (emphasis added)”
(159).  Such an essential non-existence is reminiscent of de Man’s use of the rhetorical
figure prosopopeia to show how the inessential is essentialised.  Like Haraway’s
arguments in a feminist context, this study also argues for a more complex and specified
approach for theorising post-colonial literatures and the post-colonial cultures they
present.  Exceeding both totalisation and relativism, realism and anti-realism, are
subjectivities born in the liminal spaces of the post-colonial.  Such post-colonial spaces
are formed from the interaction between different cultures, and by the construction,
erasure and reconfiguration (the becoming) of subjectivity: they are not formed by
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overdeterministic theories, or by the complete evacuation of subjectivity in de Manian
deconstruction.
It is no surprise that much feminist writing has strong connections with post-
colonial theory since they both arise from the need to establish spaces that allow for the
registration of voices within a symbolic order that marginalises them.12  In addition, it is
clear that feminist theory also confronts the tension between “continu[ing] the resistance
to (neo) colonialism [or patriarchy] through a deconstructive reading of its rhetoric and
retriev[ing] and reinscrib[ing women’s or . . .] post-colonial social traditions [.  .  .]”
(Slemon 5).  Thus, a strand of both intellectual practices is deconstructive practice and it
is important to now address some deconstructive strategies for dealing with identity in the
context of the realism/anti-realism debate explored in this chapter.  Again, this analysis
will be aimed at showing how realism and anti-realism’s formulations of language and
identity at the level of the acquisition of the symbolic are inadequate.
On this topic, Tallis writes:
The very process of recounting experience transforms it; or rather past
reality becomes stories only at the cost of being changed into something
that wasn’t, or couldn’t be, lived.  Narration dramatizes, and hence
distorts.  We don’t live inside the referent of stories; and since there is no
liveable reality corresponding to them, all stories must, in an important
sense, be untrue [. . .].  (In Defence of Realism 22)
Of importance for this study is Tallis’s discussion of the essentially metaphorical nature
of experience.  Even before language metaphorises experience, experience has already
been metaphorised:
I have already discussed how articulated or factual reality is in an
important sense artefactual reality; how even remembered reality,
inasmuch as it is structured differently from current experience, is an
                                                 
12 There has been much criticism of the tendency to conflate Western feminist practice with women’s
experience in other cultures, and this issue is explored in more detail in Chapter Five.
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artefact of the remembering consciousness.  I argued, however, that we
were not entitled to conclude from this that factual and remembered reality
are false.  For if they were false, there would be no means of proving or
knowing this.  There would be no alternative, direct access to what is out
there that would enable us to compare reality itself with those
representations that are supposed to traduce it.  As an argument against
realism in fiction, therefore, the appeal to the observation that reality and
fiction are differently structured seems to be self-defeating.  (43-44)
Post-structuralists and literary anti-realists would agree with Tallis that reality and fiction
are not differently structured.  Tallis misses this point, although I would not go as far as
John Sturrock in sourcing this to, in an act of unbridled stereotyping, “‘scouse
commonsense’” (qtd. in Tallis, Not Saussure xi).  There is the soft argument against
realism that states that realism does not acknowledge its own constructedness and
therefore presents a false view of reality.  The hard case against realism is that it does not
acknowledge its own constructedness and that all representation is misrepresentation
when there is no recognition that all experience is constructed.  Tallis misrepresents anti-
realists of the hard argument in criticising the soft argument.
Yet, moving on, how attractive is the hard argument when all that its criticism of
realism calls for is that realist fiction acknowledge its constructedness and fictionality;
merely a caveat applicable to any narrative?  Furthermore, why is this important when the
distinction between reality and fiction has been deconstructed?  Surely, we can in some
sense take this for granted and move on to the sometimes serious and sometimes playful
work of literary criticism.  More importantly, what risks are involved in requiring that the
distinction between realism and anti-realism is acknowledged to be false?  Does it not
emphasise fictionality at the expense of emphasising materiality; place emphasis on the
limitless possibilities of being structured differently at the risk of effacing the deep impact
and formativeness of fictions and imaginaries that shape the world?  Rather than reading
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against the grain, is it too much to ask why not read with it?  Tallis continues, “[m]ore
particularly, anyone who asserts that stories are false on the grounds that their
construction involves the ordering of experience in a way that does not reflect any
inherent order it may have must hold the more general belief that any ordering of
experience necessarily falsifies it” (In Defence of Realism 25-26).  Beyond being
necessarily false or true, the ordering of experience is simply necessary.  Yet, different
subjects are restricted or enabled in ordering experience by their particular placement in a
symbolic system.  Symbolic systems are material and have material effects.  Racist, sexist
and colonialist discourses marginalise some subjects with real material effects, so why
not deal with them in a realistic problematic?  As Brydon and Tiffin discuss, there is no
reason why realism cannot deal with these symbolic systems as effectively as post-
structural anti-realists (26).
In addition, there is no imperative that anti-imperialist texts should not be
complex anti-realist meta-narratives.  After the realism/anti-realism distinction is
deconstructed (or, ubiquitously, ‘always/already’ is), what is it about certain texts that
demand certain ways of reading and responding?  When is it not appropriate to indulge in
Barthesian playfulness?  What is at stake for the subaltern in the play of weaving and
unweaving multiple perspectives?  It is true that realism, at its worst, is a form of
totalisation that marginalises other perspectives; anti-realism, at its worst, is a form of
relativism that by asserting the equality of all perspectives effaces them; both “promising
vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully [. . .]” (Haraway 191).
What is needed is a critical method for dealing with historically specific
subjectivities, invoked by metaphors/concepts such as ‘located’, specific’, ‘embodied’,
‘particular’.  Once the realism/anti-realism distinction is broken down, the specificity
required by literary criticism can still distinguish between modes of experience in dealing
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with texts: focusing on materiality, imagination, affectivity, delusions, normativeness,
self-reflexivity, unself-consciousness, politically engaged texts and apolitical texts.  Once
specificities are acknowledged more productive readings result.  It is to exploring the
distinct concerns of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing, which works-through the trauma
of colonial impact in the twentieth-century, that this study now turns.
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Chapter 2
Aboriginal Testimonial Life-Writing and Literary Resistance Theory
We do not confront reality as isolated individuals but as members of collectives.  The
encounter between the individual and what is ‘out there’ is mediated by the other
individuals who constitute those various collectives.  For what is ‘out there’ is not simply
matter-in-itself but what is acknowledged to be out there; pieces of matter are ‘there’ not
simply in virtue of their existence but because they matter to someone.  Reality is what
counts as real to someone — or, more precisely, to someone representing or adopting the
viewpoint of a group or someone under its influence.  Reality, in other words, is what
‘they’ — or ‘I’ insofar as I am they — acknowledge.  (In Defence of Realism 45)
In the previous chapter, analysis centred on debates surrounding realist and anti-realist
perspectives on testimonial life-writing and identified risks associated with the
deconstruction of the subject for colonised peoples.  This chapter furthers that analysis by
investigating the links between the reclamation of identity and agency in Aboriginal
testimonial life-writing with the reclamation of political agency in the public sphere.  It
looks at some culturally distinct conceptions of community in Aboriginal societies and
the way in which the process of writing Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is a political
affirmation of that distinct culture.  It also begins an analysis, explored further in later
chapters, of the way in which such life-writing works in a psychoanalytic sense to
establish narrative and affective control over traumatic histories.
This chapter also addresses generic similarities and differences between
testimonial life-writing and other life-writing practices such as autobiography and diary.
As discussed in Chapter One, particular genres, such as realist life-writing, are suited to
presenting certain forms of agency and identity practices.  This chapter discusses the
ways in which Aboriginal testimonial life-writing presents a group agency in contrast to
autobiography’s greater emphasis on the individual.  Such testimonial life-writing frames
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the narrator’s life-story within the broader story of the colonial dispossession of the
narrator’s cultural group.
This chapter argues that testimonial life-writing functions in a realist mode like
traditional autobiography, although with important differences.  In Chapter One, it was
argued that traditional autobiography is a form of realism because it is underpinned by a
notion of agency that splits the subject by rendering it transparent to itself as an object.  It
was also argued that this split created an extremely abstracted authorial subject that is
temporally and spatially unlocatable, that is, simultaneously everywhere and nowhere.  In
contrast, testimonial life-writing functions in the realist mode in a way that emphasises
difference and the polycentrism of reality (or at least the dialogical reality of
Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations) rather than effacing difference by gathering up
multiple views into an overarching viewpoint.  This fundamental difference causes a
range of generic differences.  As discussed in Chapter One, classic realist autobiography’s
claim to truly present a subject as grasped by itself as an object is supported by a number
of narrative devices including “retrospective narration [that] constitutes the self as a
coherent object [. . .]” (Lloyd 174).  Yet, testimonial life-writing’s negotiation of post-
colonial reality results in very different temporal structures being employed.  Instead of
presenting a split within the narrator through the retrospective closure of identity,
testimonial life-writing is present-centred because it is concerned with negotiating
persistent and present post-colonial injustices.  In this way, the testimonial text is opened
to the world and appeals for different responses from its readers than classic realist
autobiography.
Because Aboriginal testimonial life-writing focuses on the collective Aboriginal
experience of injustice and trauma, its scope is circumscribed in ways that traditional
autobiography, with its focus on the individual life-story, is not.  Although classic realist
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autobiography is strictly prescribed, post-colonial issues of race, post-colonial injustice
and trauma do not prescribe it.  Finally, because testimonial life-writing is involved in
contesting post-colonial reality, it is suitable for being read through post-colonial
theorisations that are beyond the scope of both realist and anti-realist positions,
particularly anti-realist positions that risk crippling subaltern agency.
One of the defining features of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is the way it
emphasises the co-extensivity between the narrator/protagonist and his/her community.13
This emphasis is closely connected to Aboriginal testimonial life-writing’s political
agenda of voicing unheard histories of colonial dispossession.  As such, it highlights the
large-scale political, collective and cultural forces that shape identities rather than a
particular individual’s distinctiveness from such forces, as is often the case in
autobiographical writing.  Rigoberta Menchú, in an exemplary testimonial text, I
Rigoberta Menchú,14 illustrates her co-extensivity with her Quiche Indian collective when
she writes/says:
My name is Rigoberta Menchú.  I am twenty three years old.  This is my
testimony.  I didn’t learn it from a book and I didn’t learn it alone.  I’d like
to stress that it’s not only my life, it’s also the testimony of my people.
It’s hard for me to remember everything that’s happened to me in my life
since there have been many bad times but, yes, moments of joy as well.
The important thing is that what happened to me happened to many other
people also.  My story is the story of all poor Guatemalans.  My personal
experience is the reality of a whole people (emphasis added).  (1)
In this passage, Menchú presents her role as one in which she publicly represents Quiche
identity and history on behalf of all Quiche Indians, directing her testimony to non-
                                                 
13 Some critics may argue that autobiography is equally collective in scope and that it is an expression of
collective identity, for example, class.  However, to varying degrees, autobiographical writing always
focuses more exclusively on the individual.  In contrast, testimonial life-writing is characterised by multiple
generic modes of which the autobiographical is not predominant.
14 The direct English translation of the original Spanish title is My Name is Rigoberta Menchú and this is
How My Consciousness was Raised.
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Quiche Guatemalans and an international audience.  Menchú explicitly asks the reader to
hear her experience as a culturally distinct group experience and through doing so her
“testimonio evokes an absent polyphony of other voices, other possible lives and
experiences” (Beverley, “Margin at the Centre” 28).  Menchú establishes herself as an
agent of a group agency that employs a popular literary genre (the life-story) in order to
direct the popularity and reach of that genre for the benefit of her community.  In contrast
to autobiography, Menchú’s testimony emphasises the ‘we’ in place of the ‘I’ and
performs “a transvaluing of the ‘we’, so as to rescind its status as the necessary other
against which the tyrannical ‘I’ measures its existence, and to claim a space for the
collective identity to exist in its own right” (Marin 53).  In distinction to autobiography,
which usually emphasises the narrator/protagonist’s individuation from his or her
community, testimonial life-writing emphasises the co-extensivity of identity,
highlighting the way individual and community mutually produce each other.
Testimonial life-writing counters the individualism of autobiography and in doing
so may implicitly redress what Robert Smith views as autobiography’s failure of the
standards of philosophical rigor, standards “that might dispute ‘self-identity’ on the
grounds that any identity conferred upon the self is done so solely, and at best jaggedly,
by hegemonic determinisms, for the self cannot identify itself ex nihilo (56).  However, it
may also be argued that Smith’s criticism of autobiography applies to testimonial life-
writing.  If it is applicable, it means that testimonial life-writing’s claim to present an
authorial voice in a collective mode is no less a ‘hegemonic determination’ of identity
than autobiography.  And, if this is so, according to Smith, testimonial life-writing is no
less a failure in terms of philosophical rigor than autobiography.
To respond to this disqualification of autobiographical and testimonial life-
writing’s rigor, it is only necessary to challenge Smith on his assumption that ‘identity’
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and ‘hegemonic determinism’ are conceptually incompatible.  Determinism, as a position
that views subjects and their actions as the consequence of external or antecedent forces,
is a key concept for thinking through the way testimonial life-writing establishes political
and therapeutic agency.  Post-colonial theorisations of testimonial life-writing, rather than
dismissing the concept of identity due to its dependence on ‘hegemonic determinisms’,
place their focus firmly upon hegemonic determinations of identity and, by doing so, aim
to show the ways in which testimonial life-writing is a force that works to establish some
control over such determinations.  By acknowledging that group identities are in some
ways formed by large-scale national and political forces and, in turn, that the group
shapes individuals within it, testimonial life-writing challenges the criticism that
hegemonic determinism and the registering of difference are mutually exclusive practices.
It is precisely the hegemonic generators of identity that is the issue in post-colonial life-
writing.  In this sense, there is some merit in Fredric Jameson’s claim that “the great
testimonies are those in which a life is necessarily intersected by the convulsions of
history — for Esteban Montejo, the wars of independence, for Rigoberta Menchú, the
struggle for Guatemalan liberation” (188).  The liberation of Quiche Indians is the goal of
Menchú’s testimony.  The convulsions of history that are significant for Aboriginal life-
writers are colonisation and dispossession, and the traumatic experiences resulting from
those convulsions are the historical objects that testimonial life-writing endeavours to
establish political, narrative and affective control over.  Melas writes that “[c]olonialism
is indeed the imposition of a single law” (277), that is, a hegemonic determining force,
and testimonial life-writing is a counter-force that forms part of a larger program of
wresting power away from colonialist forces in order to reclaim what has been deposed.
As I will discuss below, it is testimonial life-writing’s focus on the conflicts that arise
from the hegemonic determinations of entire peoples, such as that between the imposition
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of colonial law and the resistance to such imposition, that create significant differences
between it and autobiographical texts.  Aboriginal testimonial life-writing embodies the
tension between colonialist culture’s hegemonic determination of Aboriginal identity as
the colonised and Aboriginal people’s resistance to that colonially imposed identity
position.
One form of such resistance, arising from cultural difference, is the refiguring of
the individualism of Western colonialist identities.  In literary terms, the emphasis on the
co-extensivity between the life-writer and his or her community found in Aboriginal life-
writing counters the emphasis on the individual in Western autobiographical life-writing.
Nevertheless, some features of autobiography remain in testimonial life-writing, for
instance when Menchú states that “[t]his is my testimony (emphasis added)” (1).  Yet, in
strongly identifying her story with that of her group’s and her group’s story with her own,
the reader is alerted to testimonial life-writing’s simultaneously collective and personal
character.  Neither pole of the self/group spectrum is entirely collapsed into the other, as
is often the case in autobiography, which strongly emphasises the self as an entity distinct
from its community.  Autobiography often presents a protagonist who is characterised by
his/her adoption of several identity positions on his/her path to individuation, whereas the
protagonists presented in the Aboriginal testimonial life-writing examined in this study
are almost exclusively characterised by their racial identity.  In Aboriginal testimonial
life-writing, the protagonist’s individuation is to a great degree reliant on the group’s
individuation.
It is the emphasis on co-extensivity that leads Jameson to argue that testimonial
life-writing disrupts the “Western-style bourgeois subjectivity” (184), and instead enacts
[an] anonymity [that] is understood as designating what the
poststructuralists envisage as some new ‘decentered subject,’ or what
political people celebrate as genuine democracy or plebeianization, a
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social world without privileges, including that very peculiar form of
special privilege and private property that is the old bourgeois ego or
‘personal identity.’  This is then a good anonymity that I have in mind; but
it will still be misleading to the degree that the word suggests
namelessness, facelessness, the indistinction of the mass, the empty
representativity of the sociological case or example.  (185)
Thus it is important to remember that this anonymity, or to recast it slightly, group
identity, does not mean that the individual is entirely effaced.  To the contrary,
testimonial life-writing has a strong sense of the individual, but as John Beverley writes,
“testimonio constitutes an affirmation of the individual self in a collective mode”
(“Margin at the Centre” 29).  To function in such a mode entails the acknowledgment of,
to again use Marin’s poetic description of the condition, the presence of the ‘we’ at the
heart of the ‘I’.15  It may be argued that the registering of the narrator/protagonist’s
individuated self risks being effaced by the collective voice of the collective political
agenda.  However, testimonial life-writing retains a sense of the individual agent,
although it radically differs from the individualism of the sovereign agent of classic
realist autobiography.
Menchú is an exceptional individual and it is her very exceptionality that allows
her to speak and act as an agent of her people in a collective mode.  Yet to do so, Menchú
leaves her village, against her cultural tradition, to learn the coloniser’s language
(Spanish), chooses not to have children, and takes up an organisational role in Quiche
Indian politics: it is these decisions that provide her with the opportunity to act as an
agent of and register her people’s oppression in wider fora.  While sharing the material
conditions of her collective culture, it is still necessary for Menchú to transform those
                                                 
15 In Chapter Three, I critique psychoanalysis on the basis that its efforts at re-establishing agency after the
disruptive experiences of trauma do not dedicate enough time to the collective and political aspects of re-
establishing agency.
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conditions in order to register her culture (transform her culture in the very act of telling)
in the wider political and literary spheres.
Although Aboriginal testimonial texts construct the narrator as an agent of a
colonised collective, the processes involved in gaining access to the technologies of such
textual construction rely on adopting practices associated with the colonising culture.  As
discussed in Chapter One, a hitherto unheard voice is interpolated into a literary mode of
the colonising culture, but this mode is not endemic to the colonised culture.  Menchú’s
testimonial text claims “[m]y personal experience is the reality of a whole people” (1)
but, as discussed above, this is not absolutely accurate.  To claim that an individual within
the collective can simply adopt the role of effective cultural agent in the manner of
Menchú is too simplistic.  In fact, to be an agent of this unheard voice relies on
establishing a gap between the voice and the material conditions that are registered by
that voice.  In such a way, the voice of the agent in the testimonial text performs both a
simulation of the bourgeois subject and a dismantling of it.  Employing the coloniser’s
literary modes involves adopting voicings and identity positions that are endemic to the
coloniser’s culture and its autobiographical mode while simultaneously registering
difference.16  Indeed, it is in part through generating this ambiguity that testimonial life-
writing gains much of its rhetorical force because the interplay between identificatory and
distancing effects brings the reader’s attention to the performative nature of presenting
Indigenous identity positions to non-Indigenous readers.  Such performance is “a
culturally specific and appropriate presentation of subjectivity and experience” that
                                                 
16 As identified in Chapter One, such testimonial life-writing simulates the colonising subject in the way in
which it presents a monological Aboriginal subject characteristic of the monological subject presented in
classic realist autobiography.  However, due to testimony’s therapeutic and political agendas, this is only
one correspondence among many differences between the genres.  For example, in contrast with classic
realist autobiography, Aboriginal testimonial texts bar non-Aboriginal readers’ identification with the
Aboriginal authorial subject and in doing so perform an inversion of black/white roles as defined in Fanon’s
model of coloniser/colonised relations.
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highlights the discourses operating in Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations in specific
historical contexts (Whitlock 208).
To some extent, the testimonial text needs to simulate the identity of the colonised
subject because the very adoption of the coloniser’s literary modes necessitates
establishing a gap between the testifier (Menchú) and her people.  This gap is established
through a variety of means, discussed above, that often include adopting the coloniser’s
language, engaging with Western intellectuals (Burgos-Debray), furthering one’s
education, and disengaging from traditional family and gender structures (choosing not to
have children or remain in one’s village).  This situation is compounded by the fact that
the testimonial content has been translated from Quiche to Spanish to French to English
languages.  This gap creates a space through which to advocate on behalf of one’s people
in domains where one’s people have traditionally not been heard.  Therefore, it is not
surprising that the negotiation of truth is fraught in a situation where the representation of
the subaltern relies on separating she who represents from what is represented.
Furthermore, there is no possibility for any agent of the subaltern to establish a seamless
equivalence with the subaltern because the subaltern community is itself fractured.  The
impossibility or at least extreme difficulty in presenting a fractured subaltern reality in the
testimonial mode is one reason the mode adopts the monological authorial perspective
characteristic of classic realist autobiography.
David Stoll’s critique in Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of all Poor
Guatemalans of Menchú’s testimony identifies this fracturedness of the subaltern and in
doing so casts doubt on the veracity of Menchú’s testimony.  The value of Stoll’s critique
is that it brings the attention of readers of Menchú’s testimony to the fracturedness of
subaltern reality.  Yet, what this critique seems to gloss over is that it is impossible to find
any representative of the subaltern that does not participate in such incongruity.  Rather
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than view this situation as an impasse, this study, as has been stated, adopts a principle of
historicism that aims for “the simultaneous acceptance of two contradictory moves: the
search for ever-closer historical linkages and the avoidance of a naive historical
positivism leading to simplistic and self-assured historical narrations and closure”
(Friedlander qtd. in LaCapra 212).  The so-called ‘Menchú controversy’ strikes me as
being an instance of such naïve historical positivism because both sides of the debate
appear to be involved in establishing self-assured historical closure in that they are
primarily concerned with establishing the truth or untruth of Menchú’s testimony.
Further problematising this debate is the way such historical positivism seems to be used
to support broader ideological debates of the neo-Marxist/anti-Marxist, ‘neo-
conservative’ contra ‘politically correct’ kind and, in doing so, further mute the
expression of the colonised.  What is potentially useful about Stoll’s critique is that it
might encourage a more detailed historicism that seeks to register the fracturedness of the
subaltern.  Yet, identifying this fracturedness does not undermine the broader aim of
Menchú’s testimony to record and convey to the world the violence involved in
coloniser/colonised relations in Guatemala.  By rendering Menchú’s case definitive, both
sides of the ‘controversy’ fall into overly simplistic iconism.  Rather than viewing
Menchú’s testimony as the definitive case regarding the truth or untruth of colonial
trauma in Guatemala, it should be viewed as one point from which to pursue closer
historical linkages regarding the history of coloniser/colonised relations.
Such historical positivism regarding the ‘facts’ as seen in the Menchú controversy
is currently being practised in Australia in debates surrounding the Stolen Generations
and it forms part of a larger political agenda that seems to be focused on undermining
Aboriginal testimony to Aboriginal experience.  As I argue in Chapter Four in my
discussion of psychoanalytic theory and defensive mechanisms that are employed for not
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hearing testimony to trauma, such historical positivism enacts a “[f]oreclosure through
facts, through an obsession with factfinding; [it is] an absorbing interest in the factual
details of the account which serve to circumvent the human experience” (Laub, “Bearing
Witness” 72-73).  This study supports factfinding when it employed to open debate but
not when it is employed to foreclose debate in the interests of simplistic, albeit insidious,
self-serving political and cultural agendas.
Another point to consider in the context of the Menchú controversy is the way in
which testimony is not only concerned with accurately representing reality but also with
transforming it.  This dual agenda may result in slippages in testimonial texts that need to
be challenged.  Menchú’s purported silence in responding to the questioning of the
factualness of her testimony has worked to support naïve historical positivism.  It is
important that this slippage between conveying and transforming reality is acknowledged
so that the rhetoric of testimony as political appeal does not betray the experience of
colonised peoples.  In this sense, it is important for discerning readers to carry out their
readings in such a way as to avoid the historical positivism of both Stoll and Menchú, that
is, to follow Friedlander’s principle of historical research.  With such a strategy, the
reader of Menchú’s testimony could not hastily conclude that it is all true or all false, but
would rather pursue a more balanced ethicopolitical judgment of the value of testimonio.
Genre
Another striking example of the way in which testimonial life-writing disrupts the
discourse of literature and the autobiographical mode is its resistance to genre
categorisation.  As previously argued, testimonial life-writing emphasises the collective
rather than the individual aspects of identity and acknowledges the depths to which
cultural community forms selfhood.  In addition, and this is a point that many theorists on
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testimonial life-writing have not stressed strongly enough, it is the collectivity of
testimonial life-writing’s origins that complicates the effort to distinguish between the
individual and the collective that also frustrates easy categorisation of it as a genre.  For
example, Beverley writes:
[t]estimonio may include, but is not subsumed under, any of the following
textual categories, some of which are conventionally considered literature,
others not: autobiography, autobiographical novel, oral history, memoir,
confession, diary, interview, eyewitness report, life-history, novela-
testimonio, non-fiction novel, or ‘factographic literature’.  (“Margin at the
Centre” 24-25)
The narrative strategies that conflate the individual and the collective are also the reason
that such writing contains characteristics from a wide variety of genres.  The authorial
voice of testimonial life-writing contains not only its individual history, but also the
history of its cultural group.  Furthermore, to speak as an agent of others requires certain
ethical and political considerations to be registered in the text itself — considerations that
are not necessary for traditional autobiographical writing.  To claim that one is writing
history compounds this ethical weight, again in contrast to autobiography.  Due to these
considerations, testimonial life-writing employs different textual sources and modes that
have been traditionally on the margins of the literary, such as oral patterns of speech,
court reports and historical documents.  These sources are addressed in more detail later
in this study with reference to particular testimonial texts.
Taking into account the distinct and diverse cultural factors shaping the process of
producing testimonial life-writing, it is not surprising that such writing displays aspects of
many different genres.  To illustrate: testimonial life-writing is autobiographical because
it records the personal; it is cultural and political history because it records collective
experience; and its claims to historical accuracy mean that it often employs material from
quasi-legal sources such as eye-witness reports that, in turn, are gathered from oral
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mediums like interviews and confessions.17  Testimonial life-writing, rather than merely
disputing official representations of Aboriginal history, problematises the discourses that
order these representations into strict categories.  It problematises the institutional
compartmentalisations of cultural practices because, as Gugelberger writes, it
is placed at the intersection of multiple roads: oral versus literary (which
implies questioning why the literary has always colonized the oral);
authored/authoritarian discourse versus edited discourse (one authors or
two authors? [. . .] literature versus anthropology; literature versus non-
literature, or even against literature; autobiography versus demography
(people’s writing); the battle of representationality; the canon debate [. . .];
‘masterpiece’ of literature versus minority writing; and issues of
postmodernity versus postcoloniality.  (10-11)
Often the complexity of forces that make up identities and texts are effaced by their
resolution into individuality and genre respectively.  This explains why the fusion of the
individual and the collective may have significant repercussions for literary debates on
genre.  By interpolating a collective, oral, popular voice into the autobiographical mode
and the institution of literary studies, testimonial life-writing highlights the omissions and
gaps that characterise the genre and the institution.  However, this inherent
indeterminability does not mean that testimonial life-writing cannot be better determined
in the minds of readers.
Beverley focuses on the generic characteristics of testimonial life-writing and
influentially defines testimonio as “a novel or novella-length narrative in book or
pamphlet (that is, printed as opposed to acoustic) form, told in the first person by a
narrator who is also the real protagonist or witness of the events he or she recounts, and
                                                 
17 Ruby Langford Ginibi and her son’s (Nobby Langford) jointly produced testimonial text Haunted by the
Past provides many instances of the use of quasi-legal sources.  It contains extended extracts from
psychological and probation reports submitted in court.  Of particular note for those interested in the
testimonial mode is the inclusion of a letter written by Langford Ginibi to the judge presiding over one of
Nobby Langford’s court cases in which she describes the collective trauma of colonial dispossession in an
effort to have that history acknowledged as central to any deliberation on justice (165-69).
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whose unit of narration is usually a ‘life’ or a significant life experience” (“Margin at the
Centre” 24).  Beverley dates the coalescence of the various narrative techniques that make
up testimonio as a genre to the 1960s with its history of consciousness raising politics,
while also acknowledging testimonio’s narrative antecedents in war diaries (diaries de
campana), colonial cronicas, the contumbrista essay, and the tape recorded life-story
employed by the 1930s anthropologists of the University of Chicago.18  It is important to
note that Beverley identifies different generic features of testimonial life-writing that
contribute to its status as a form of resistance literature — a project that devotes an equal
amount of attention to generic features as to their potential political effects.  Beverley also
observes that there is a collective, polyphonic dimension in the testimonial narrative
voice, as discussed above, that distinguishes it from autobiography and is itself a form of
resistance.  Concerning testimonial life-writing’s difference from autobiography,
Beverley writes that testimonial life-writing can approximate “the symbolic function of
the epic hero, without at the same time assuming his hierarchical and patriarchal
status” (27).
One of the best examples of this movement between the individual and collective
is found in the Aboriginal writer Ruby Langford Ginibi’s testimonial life-story My
Bundjalung People.  In her ‘Foreword’ to My Bundjalung People, Pam Johnston aims to
guide the reader’s attention to what is characteristic of and significant in the testimonial
life-story.  In doing so, Johnston stresses the communality of Langford’s voice:
My  Bundjalung People is not an academic work.  It is not a remote
observation of a people.  This is an Aboriginal history as experienced by
many many Aboriginal people [emphasis added].  It has been begging to
be told for so very long.  It has heart and soul, and tears of blood because it
has been lived and tested by time itself.  It is wholistic in the same way
                                                 
18 For further analysis of testimonio’s narrative antecedents refer to Eliano S. Rivero.  Also see Jimmie
Barker’s The Two Worlds of Jimmie Barker for an example of Aboriginal life-writing that employs edited
transcriptions of self-recorded testimony.
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that Aboriginal culture is wholistic.  One part cannot be separated from
another.  It tells what it is to be an indigenous person, what that means.
Aboriginal history involves fact, spirituality, and culture.  (xii)
The movement between individual and collective is pinpointed when Johnston writes
“[o]ne part cannot be separated from another.  It tells what it is to be an indigenous
person, what that means” (xii).  Langford Ginibi’s testimonial is a record of a personal
journey that also functions as a collective rediscovery of unwritten cultural history.  The
individual aspects of the testimony are no doubt what led its publishers to categorise it as
autobiography rather than testimony or Aboriginal Studies.  Yet the publication history of
Langford Ginibi’s books reflects the growing realisation of the impulse to record
collective history and its associated generic complexity.  Langford Ginibi’s publication
history begins with the more personally focused autobiographical work Don’t Take your
Love to Town, moves on to the tribal history of My Bundjalung People, and then on to
Haunted by the Past, the last jointly produced by Langford Ginibi and her son Nobby
Langford to record his life-story and experiences with the Australian justice system.  In
Haunted by the Past, Langford Ginibi restates the collective significance of Aboriginal
life-stories first identified in her earlier books, writing:
My son’s story is not only his story but the story of many others.
Speaking of her own family’s experience, Aboriginal magistrate Pat
O’Shane wrote that: ‘I recognised all the things that happened to me
through my grandparents, and their parents; their brothers and sisters;
through my mother and her siblings; through my cousins and my siblings,
the things that happened to thousands of other Aboriginal families, and I
have marvelled, THAT WE ALL WEREN’T STARK RAVING MAD!’
(48)
Like Kevin Gilbert’s and Sally Morgan’s testimonial texts discussed below, Langford
Ginibi’s texts contain many discrete life-stories from different Aboriginal people,
although in the Langfords’ jointly produced Haunted by the Past, these stories might be
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more accurately termed death-stories.  In fact, Haunted by the Past dedicates as much
attention to death-stories as it does to life-stories by including case studies of Aboriginal
deaths in custody.  Langford Ginibi writes:
I want to write about some of the Aboriginal deaths in custody.  The lives
of any one of these could easily have been my son Nobby’s.  I feel that
now is the time to show people what really happened.  Maybe it will open
up people’s eyes!  It knocks the guts outa me to write it up, so you read it,
and form your own opinions.  For legal reasons I haven’t been able to
include all the facts as I know them, or write about all the people who have
died.  I have had to cut back some details I think you all should know.
That’s the white fella’s law for you, aye?  (77-78)
This use of a series of discrete death-stories to illustrate colonial injustice is distinctive of
the testimonial mode.  This passage also shows connections that are distinctive of the
testimonial mode, such as those between injustice, traumatic experience, the conflict
between different cultural laws, the appeals to the reader to listen empathetically to the
stories, and a sense of shared history.  Notwithstanding, it is simply important to note that
the collective features of Langford Ginibi’s life-story present in her first books are given
greater and greater expression as her publication history continues, highlighting, I
suggest, the desire in her earlier autobiographical work to register her people’s history.
Like other authors of testimony, Langford Ginibi maintains that her story is the story of
all her people and, unlike autobiography, her writing does not “affirm a self-identity that
is separate from a group or class situation marked by marginalisation, oppression, and
struggle” (Beverley and Zimmerman 177).  Likewise for Marnie Kennedy who, in the
preface to her Born a Half Caste writes, “[t]his is my story and it is the story of many
Australian Aborigines.  My tribe, the Kalkadoons, fought and lost a terrible battle for
what was theirs” (1).
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As I have argued, the presence of a narrator who emphasises his or her co-
extensivity with his or her community is one feature that distinguishes testimonial life-
writing from autobiography.  Autobiography’s emphasis on the individual often sets up
personal individuation against the political forces that oppress a group of people and, in
so doing, understates the power of the material and symbolic conditions of disadvantage
that colonised peoples have suffered.  Autobiography’s emphasis on the individual risks
delegitimating the agency of those individuals who remain within their disadvantaged
cultural group.  It is this predominance of individualism in autobiography that leads
Beverley and Zimmerman to note that autobiography is a literary genre of the middle and
upper-classes and “is an essentially conservative mode in the sense that it implies that
individual triumph over circumstances is possible” (Beverley and Zimmerman 178).
Beverley goes on to say that “[t]estimonio, by contrast, always signifies the need for a
general social change in which the stability and complacency of the reader’s world must
be brought into question” (178).  Therefore, testimonial life-writing is distinguished not
only by the way it emphasises the collective but also by the way it politicises collective
history by strongly binding it to larger historical and political contexts such as colonial
injustice.  Langford Ginibi ties her testimony to the story of colonial impact in her
dedication at the beginning of Haunted by the Past:
I dedicate this book to my son Nobby and to every mother’s son or
daughter who has fallen foul of the Westminster system of justice that
came with the first squatters and settlers in 1788.  Those laws are not our
Koori laws — our laws were the first laws of this land.
Since we Kooris are invaded people, we have always had to
conform to other people’s laws, rules and standards — we were never
allowed to be ourselves as Aboriginal people.  (v)
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Another Aboriginal testimonial life-story, Auntie Rita (jointly produced by mother
and daughter, Rita and Jackie Huggins), similarly illustrates the connection between
Aboriginal family history and the effects of colonialism.  Jackie Huggins writes:
The writing of this book was an attempt to reclaim the history of our
people.  To do this is to encounter a double fold of silence.  Each fold is of
the same cloth — two centuries of colonisation.  There are the acts of
violence that attempted to alienate (with varying degrees of success).
Black people’s access to knowledge of their own culture and its history:
taking people from their lands, separating children from their parents,
insisting on the surrender of traditional languages and customs and the
adoption of European ways.  This list goes on, and continues into the
present.  There is another order of silence again, though, and this is the
silence that you meet in Aboriginal elders who cannot bear to speak of the
humiliations and mutilations they have experienced and which they have
witnessed.  (4-5)19
Auntie Rita, as a testimonial text, aims to redress such silences.  In doing so, Jackie
Huggins addresses non-Aboriginal culture’s role in controlling the emergence of
Aboriginal life-stories themselves when she writes:
One of the many contemporary forms that the silencing takes is the
resistance that Aboriginal people meet in white bureaucrats when they
attempt to see Aboriginal records.  Files were compiled on every person
who had lived on a reserve, in Queensland and elsewhere, and often were
continued long after the person had moved on.  As part of writing this
book, we sought access to my mother’s personal files held by the
Department of Family Services and Aboriginal and Islander Affairs in
1990.  When I first made enquiries about seeing my mother’s file, I was
made to watch across a huge desk as two white public servants turned the
pages.  Watch, not touch.  The men stopped at various pages and read
them, and made comments to each other that I couldn’t hear.  These
gatekeepers behaved as if the files were their personal property whereas
                                                 
19 See Chapter Four for discussion of the significance of Huggins’s use of italics.
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they are in fact my people’s inheritance, part of a history that remains to
be recovered and claimed.
A white friend of ours had far greater access to these files than we
would ever have.  He was taken to be a credentialled researcher whereas I
am dismissed as just another Blackfella wanting to know some family
roots.  (4-5)
Aboriginal testimonial life-writing works to address this censorship of Aboriginal history
by bringing that history to public attention through employing oral and official sources.
In addition, it works to counter representations of Aboriginal people’s histories as found
in official sources.  Rita Huggins tells of the time she finally got to read the files that
consist of over thirty years of surveillance of her by government bureaucrats, files
maintained long after she left the mission.  She says, “[i]t told of all the bad things in my
life and none of the positive, of which there were many.  Anyone would think I was a
murderer.  But I guess there has to be something to keep those dorry [stickybeak] public
servants in a job.  There were even comments in the files on the lives of my children who
were born free, not on the mission” (5).  As I will demonstrate throughout this study,
Aboriginal testimonial life-writing’s objective is to bring the effaced historical
experiences (official and unofficial alike) of Aboriginal people to national attention.
Kevin Gilbert’s testimonial text, Living Black, identifies the destructiveness of
colonialism on Aboriginal people’s lives and self-esteem when he writes:
White people’s devaluation of Aboriginal life, religion, culture and
personality caused the thinking about self and race that I believe is the key
to modern Aboriginal thinking.  As Robert Kantilla said, ‘Suffering is that
the white people class them as the lowest person on earth.’  Modern
Aboriginals are victims of this chain of historical events.  I believe that
Aborigines should come to view their background a bit more realistically
on the surface and with a bit less shame underneath.  (2-3)
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Gilbert, in addressing the ties between personal histories and the larger story of colonial
impact, also aims to address the white reader’s role in that history:
I have also written this book in order to bring white Australia to some
greater compassion through understanding and to enlighten it to its
responsibilities in the areas of land and compensation for Aborigines.
It is my thesis that Aboriginal Australia underwent a rape of the
soul so profound that the blight continues in the minds of most blacks
today.  It is this psychological blight, more than anything else, that causes
the conditions we see on reserves and missions.  And it is repeated down
the generations.  (3)
In the above two quotes, Gilbert identifies some central aims of Aboriginal testimonial
life-writing: to create a more realistic view of Aboriginal history and to counter feelings
of shame felt by Aboriginal peoples; to bring non-Aboriginal Australia to a better
understanding of Aboriginal peoples and, thereby, to a more compassionate view of
Aboriginal peoples; and to identify the nature of the traumatic legacy of colonial
dispossession, particularly its inter-generational effects on the psychological and spiritual
well-being of Aboriginal peoples.
One of the most widely read Aboriginal life-stories is Sally Morgan’s My Place.
While it displays generic features that have more in common with traditional
autobiographical texts (discussed in more detail below), it nonetheless displays features
of testimonial life-writing that reflect the agenda of the more clearly testimonial texts
discussed above.  For instance, when Sally Morgan discusses with her mother what she
found at the Western Australian library, My Place takes on a distinctively testimonial
tone:
Mum sat down.  ‘Tell me what you read.’
‘Well, when Nan was younger, Aborigines were considered sub-
normal and not capable of being educated the way whites were.  You
know, the pastoral industry was built on the back of slave labour.
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Aboriginal people were forced to work, if they didn’t, the station owners
called the police in.  I always thought Australia was different to America,
Mum, but we had slavery here, too.  The people might not have been sold
on the blocks like the American Negroes were, but they were owned, just
the same.’  (151-52)
Sally Morgan’s mother recounts her reaction to this: “‘I know’, Mum said.  There were
tears in her eyes.  ‘They were treated just awful.  I know Nan . . .’  She stopped.  ‘I better
get going, Sal, I’ve got to go to work early tomorrow’” (151-52).  And later, the book
evokes a similarly testimonial tone:
‘Now, you know Sally’s trying to write a book about the family?’
‘Yes.  I don’t know why she wants to tell everyone our business.’
‘Why shouldn’t she write a book?’  Mum said firmly. ‘There’s
been nothing written about people like us, all the history’s about the white
man.  There’s nothing about Aboriginal people and what they’ve been
through.’
‘All right’, she muttered, ‘what do you want to ask?’
‘Well, you know when you write a book, it has to be the truth.
You can’t put lies in a book.  You know that, don’t you Nan?’
‘I know that, Glad’, Nan nodded.  (161)
Following this passage, the text moves on to show Sally Morgan’s mother asking her own
mother who she thinks her (Sally Morgan’s grandmother) father was.  Again, such
Aboriginal life-writing shows the important link between the individual and collective
dimensions of rediscovering and reclaiming Aboriginal history.  Morgan’s historical work
depends upon the assistance of many members of her extended family.  In describing this
historical work the text continues in the testimonial mode.  Sally Morgan recounts talking
with her uncle:
‘I want to write the history of my own family’, I told him.
‘What do you want to do that for?’
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‘Well, there’s almost nothing written from a personal point of view
about Aboriginal people.  All our history is about the white man.  No one
knows what it was like for us.  A lot of our history has been lost, people
have been too frightened to say anything.  There’s a lot of our history we
can’t even get at, Arthur.  There are all sorts of files about Aboriginals that
go way back, and the government won’t release them.  You take the old
police files, they’re not even controlled by Battye Library, they’re
controlled by the police.  And they don’t like letting them out, because
there are so many instances of police abusing their power when they were
supposed to be Protectors of Aborigines that it’s not funny!  I mean, our
government had terrible policies for Aboriginal people.  Thousands of
families in Australia were destroyed by the government policy of taking
children away.  None of that happened to white people.  I know Nan
doesn’t agree with what I’m doing.  She thinks I’m trying to make trouble,
but I’m not.  I just want to try to tell a little bit of the other side of the
story.’  (163-64)
Again, the story she recounts is not solely her family’s story.  The story she aims to tell is
intended to have familial, community, cultural and national significance and, like
Gilbert’s and Langford Ginibi’s books, it is a form of historical redress that is often
presented in the form of testimonials.
While My Place contains features that are more easily attributable to the
autobiographical mode than other Aboriginal life-writing, it nevertheless consistently
employs the testimonial mode when addressing colonial trauma and injustice.  When the
life-stories begin to be told in the first person by Sally Morgan’s extended family (Arthur,
Gladys and Daisy Corunna), they are not constructed with autobiographical figures of
detection (such as doubt, self-searching, and discovery), but rather as testimonial
statements uncomplicated by self-searching.  These passages can be contrasted with the
more traditional construction of the majority of Sally Morgan’s text.  To illustrate, Arthur
Corunna, in a taped interview that was later incorporated into My Place, says, “[y]ou see,
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the trouble is that colonialism isn’t over yet.  We still have a White Australia policy
against the Aborigines.  Aah, it’s always been the same.  They say there’s been no
difference between black and white, we all Australian, that’s a lie.  I tell you, the black
man has nothin’, the government’s been robbin’ him blind for years” (212).  And later:
I got no desires for myself any more.  I want to get my land fixed up so my
children can get it and I want my story finished.  I want everyone to read
it.  Arthur Corunna’s story!  I might be famous.  You see, it’s important,
because then maybe they’ll understand how hard it’s been for t h e
blackfella to live the way he wants [emphasis added].  I’m part of history,
that’s how I look on it.  Some people read history, don’t they?  (213)
Likewise, the following parts of this section of My Place sustain the testimonial mode.
Temporality in Testimonial Life-writing
Another distinctive element of testimonial life-writing, one related to the way the political
and therapeutic agenda of testimonial life-writing determines generic features, is the way
temporality is structured differently than in classic realist (traditional) autobiography.  In
defining traditional autobiography, Roy Pascal contrasts it with diary to highlight its
distinctive temporal structure.  He writes:
The formal difference between diary and autobiography is obvious.  The
latter is a review of a life from a particular moment in time, while the
diary, however reflective it may be, moves through a series of moments in
time.  The diarist notes down what, at that moment, seems of importance
to him; its ultimate, long-range significance cannot be assured.  (3)
And later Pascal writes, “the diary [. . .] can never be so systematically retrospective” as
autobiography (4).  Extending this observation, Genevieve Lloyd in a discussion of the
retrospective structure of Augustine’s confessions writes:
The unconverted protagonist, ignorant of his true nature, is in the position
of the temporal self, able to see the events of the life only in their ever
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changing relations to a past continually reshaped by the addition of new
experience, and to future expectations which experience is constantly
revising.  The narrator, in contrast, purports to see each event in its fixed
relation to a past which has presumably achieved its final form.  The past
self, from this Godlike stance, is seen as having a completeness which it
could not attain while present.  The retrospective narration constitutes the
self as a coherent object, grasped from the stance of immutable truth. (174)
Testimonial life-writing, its subject and temporality, differs from Lloyd’s and Pascal’s
definition of traditional autobiography.  In contrast to traditional autobiography (and like
diary), testimonial life-writing contains much material that is present-centred.  The
testimonial life-writing of Langford Ginibi in My Bundjalung People and Haunted by the
Past records journeys that have the goals of the discovery, recovery and reinforcement of
cultural identity.  The acts of discovery, recovery and reinforcement are present-centred
activities and their prominence in Langford Ginibi’s testimonial narratives shows a
significant difference from the retrospective structure employed in traditional
autobiography.  While retrospective elements are employed in Langford Ginibi’s
testimonial life-writing, they are not as singularly dominant as in traditional
autobiography, and when they do occur it is in a more temporally complicated manner.
Like diary, and in contrast with autobiography, testimonial life-writing is more present-
centred because the life-story presented is often told as the events under discussion, or the
effects of the events, take place and are worked-through.
This difference between the temporal structures of testimonial life-writing and
traditional autobiography can be found in Morgan’s My Place, which contains instances
of both modes.  While much of My Place contains significant elements of writing in the
testimonial mode, it differs from the majority of testimonial texts examined in this study
in its use of temporal structures more commonly found in autobiographical texts.
Recalling a scene when she found her ‘Nan’ in the backyard tapping on trees and
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listening to their trunks, Morgan writes, “‘Nan’, I called out, ‘what on earth are you
doing?’” (66).  Her Nan refuses to answer, but after being further pressured to give an
answer, responds: “‘All right, I was just checking on them to make sure they were all
right, that’s all’” (66).  The narrator in turn responds in a style not seen in predominantly
testimonial texts:
‘Okay’, I sighed as I burrowed my head down into my towel once
again.
I hadn’t comprehended her answer at all.  What on earth did she
mean, making sure they were all right?  I puzzled over her words for a few
seconds and then dismissed them.  There was so much about Nan I didn’t
understand.  (66-67)
This scene shows the way in which Morgan’s text employs techniques that manipulate the
reader in a more traditional literary fashion.  This use of traditional literary techniques
may also be a factor in the book’s greater success in reaching a wider audience than
testimonial texts have achieved.  In this text, mysteries are not maintained to protect
cultural sovereignty as is often the case in many testimonial texts (see Chapter Four of
this study), but rather are employed to hold the reader’s interest by indicating an answer
will be provided later — a retrospective, non-present-centred resolution of textual tension
characteristic of the classic realist mode analysed in the previous chapter.
Such figures of detection result in more mediated temporal structures than found
in testimonial texts or diary.  In contrast to testimonial life-writing, these figures are a
form of revelation fabricated through traditional novelistic devices.  The traditional
literary device at work here, in contrast to testimonial writing, is the greater separation
between narrator and protagonist.  Morgan retrospectively constructs herself as ignorant
of her Aboriginality, from a position that carefully demarcates the roles of narrator and
protagonist.  Morgan the narrator aims to alert the reader to significant clues concerning
the search for Aboriginal identity before Morgan the protagonist is aware of them.  This
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separation has at least two important consequences: the reader knows things the
protagonist does not and the narrator knows things the protagonist does not.  Another
example of this demarcation is demonstrated in the following excerpt in which Morgan
remembers her grandmother drawing pictures in the sand:
‘You want me to draw you a picture, Sal?’ she said as she picked
up a stick.
‘Okay.’
‘These are men, you see, three men.  They are very quiet, they’re
hunting.  Here are kangaroos, they’re listening, waiting.  They’ll take off if
they know you’re coming.’  Nan wiped the sand picture out with her hand.
‘It’s your turn now’, she said, ‘you draw something’.  I grasped the stick
eagerly.
‘This is Jill and this is me.  We’re going down the swamp.’  I drew
some trees and bushes.
I opened my eyes, and, just as suddenly, the picture vanished.  Had
I remembered something important?  I didn’t know [emphasis added].
That was the trouble, I knew nothing about Aboriginal people.  I was
clutching at straws.  (100)
As readers, we know that this scene is important.  As a narrator, Morgan knows why it is
important.  It is important because Morgan’s grandmother is communicating with her
granddaughter in a culturally specific way.  Sand drawing is one of the most common
cultural signifiers of Aboriginality, yet the protagonist is unaware of this.  It would be
naïve to believe that the narrator or most readers are not aware of this.
A similar phenomenon is found in the many allegories that occur throughout the
text that are incomprehensible to the protagonist except through the cipher of
Aboriginality.  For example, Morgan cannot understand the habits of her mother and
grandmother, such as hoarding items of questionable value, the use of the hot-water
system, and their frugality (117-18).  Yet, the reader and protagonist ‘discover’ that this
behaviour is the result of Aboriginal historical experiences.  In contrast, when the text
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moves into stories recounted in the first person by Morgan’s extended family (Arthur,
Gladys and Daisy Corunna), the text loses these figures of detection and adopts a
testimonial mode uncomplicated by doubt.  Although these testimonial passages
concentrate on individual life-stories and are not as politicised as other testimonial texts
examined in this study, they do, nevertheless, address racism and colonialism and identify
historical injustices that are felt to require redress.  To repeat: “You see, the trouble is that
colonialism isn’t over yet.  We still have a White Australia policy against the Aborigines.
Aah, it’s always been the same.  They say there’s been no difference between black and
white, we all Australian, that’s a lie.  I tell you, the black man has nothin’, the
government’s been robbin’ him blind for years” (212).
Testimonial life-writing shares characteristics with both autobiography and diary.
The standpoint of traditional autobiography is a unifying one that “purports to see each
event in its fixed relation to a past that has presumably achieved its final form”
(Lloyd 174).  This feature is not as common in testimonial life-writing, although it can be
found.  For instance, Langford Ginibi’s writing displays a narrator who is the protagonist
in the process of discovering and reclaiming cultural and personal identity, a cultural
identity disrupted by colonial displacement.  Langford Ginibi’s writing records a journey
that is part of the testimonial process because it endeavours to provide evidence of
colonial dispossession and reclaim Aboriginal identity, rather than simply represent it
from a “fixed relation to a past” (Lloyd 174).  And yet, like autobiography, the life-story
contains elements that are constructed retrospectively.  It functions in this way in order to
show the continuing impact of past colonialist practices on the present.  Thus it shares a
temporal aspect with both genres.  Unlike autobiography, the retrospective construction
of a life is focused on describing present injustices.  This manifests itself textually in the
inclusion of government, court, psychological and police reports, documents, letters, oral
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data from interviews, eye-witness reports, the present-tense construction of the reader
through oral inflections like ‘aye’, newspaper articles, and historical archives.  But, while
diary-like and documentary material is used in testimonial life-writing, it is nevertheless
constructed (and this is where it is useful to compare it with traditional autobiography) as
a first person narrative told from the standpoint of the political and moral attitudes of the
narrator — a standpoint circumscribed by the history of colonial dispossession that
necessarily contains retrospective elements.  It is the emphasis on present-centred
political agendas and the urgency involved in dealing with the ethically charged content
of traumatic post-colonial histories that determines testimonial life-writing’s different
temporal structure from traditional autobiography.
Resistance Literature
The urgency of addressing moral issues as a process of discursive resistance to injustice
found in Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is characteristic of what is termed ‘resistance
literature’ in Latin American Studies, following Barbara Harlow (1987, 1989, 1991).
This is a category of writing, of which testimonial life-writing is only one example, that
addresses and challenges political and moral oppression.  Understood as resistance
literature, testimonial life-writing aims not only for the portrayal of reality but also the
transformation of it.  Indeed, resistance literature does not necessarily aim for the accurate
portrayal of reality and this is one feature that distinguishes it from the strong truth claims
of testimonial life-writing, although in many other ways there is a strong resemblance.
Harlow argues that one way in which testimonial discourse transforms reality is
through the reconstruction of traditional models of the relationship between the author
and the text.  She argues that this is due to the collaborative process involved in the
production of many testimonial texts, whereby testimonial life-writing “might well be
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read [. . . as] a single volume with two authors, or two protagonists and no author at all”
(“Testimonio and Survival” 12).  While involving very different relationships, all the
testimonial texts examined in this study have more than one protagonist/author: Ruby
Langford and Pam Johnston in My Bundjalung People; Ruby Langford and Nobby
Langford in Haunted by the Past; Jackie and Rita Huggins in Aunty Rita; Douglas
Lockwood and Phillip Roberts (Waipuldanya) in I, the Aboriginal; Sally Morgan and her
family in My Place; and Rigoberta Menchú and Elisabeth Burgos-Dubray in I, Rigoberta
Menchú.  As I discuss later in this study (Chapter Four), testimonial life-writing presents
numerous subject positions both in the narrative voices it employs and in the type of
reading subject it projects.  For example, Harlow argues that the collaborative process
redefines the role of the traditional intellectual (in this case she is referring to
anthropological and ethnological scholars) from being a commentator to being the mere
amanuensis of marginalised voices.
George Yúdice argues that testimonial life-writers like Menchú do not “speak for
or represent a community but rather perform [. . .] an act of identity-formation which is
simultaneously personal and collective” (15).  This can be contrasted with writing or
political activity undertaken by protagonists who do not share the material conditions of
the ‘voiceless’ but who nevertheless act as spokespeople of the ‘voiceless’ or, preferably,
‘unheard’ group.  Yúdice usefully distinguishes being an ‘agent of’ from being a
‘representative for’ in order to alert readers to the possibility of paternalism or
maternalism in the latter, as distinguished from the former’s stronger claim for the
narrator/protagonist’s co-extensivity with his or her cultural group and the material
conditions associated with it.  Yúdice’s objective is to show how testimonial life-writing
undercuts the literary practices of great writers or, as he terms them, ‘master subjects’,
who represent the cause of the ‘voiceless’ through high cultural forms.
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Resistance literature seeks to transform reality through the participation of
narrators/activists who, due to the link between their narrative voice and political
activism, are said to “historicize and politicize the traditional claims to an aesthetic
autonomy of culture [. . .]” (Harlow, “Testimonio and Survival” 11).  This is said to
remind us, and Harlow quotes Roque Dalton here, that “Poetry / pardon me for having
helped you understand / [is . . .] not made of words alone” (17).  Resistance literature
“transgress[es] distinctions of discipline and genre, introduces that politically conscious,
strategically developed, even militant articulation into an isolationist literary arena and
collapses its self-protective defenses” (11).  While I agree that testimonial life-writing can
be classified as predominantly a form of resistance literature, there are also ways in which
it can function regressively.  For instance, Harlow balances her celebration of testimonial
life-writing’s transformative power when she notes that gender inequities are occluded in
Dalton’s Miguel Marmol.  This is due to that same sublimation of the personal to the
political that grants testimonial writing its status as resistance literature, although this is
the only instance of many possible occlusions that can be identified — others at times
include race and class.
A similar tension is also relevant to Aboriginal testimonial life-writing.  Because
such writing emanates from shifting political and cultural terrain, intra-Aboriginal
conflicts may be effaced in the project of advancing Aboriginal culture as a whole.  One
issue that has been developing as a site of intra-racial tension in Aboriginal communities
is the problem of family violence, particularly violence against women and children, and
it may be anticipated that Aboriginal testimonial life-writing will begin to reflect this
conflict more in the coming years, particularly because it is predominantly written by
women.
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In Latin American testimonio, the issue addressed by the testimony is the injustice
experienced by a dispossessed people.  Such testimony is intended to function as a
consciousness raising activity, written to represent the marginalised community and to
inform communities outside of its own of the injustices it suffers in order to develop
larger and more effective networks.  Testimonio made its greatest impact on and through
academic and political networks in the West — Menchú was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize for her work (her testimony being the primary example).  Marc Zimmerman writes:
testimonio signals a transformation of literary production that may well
symptomize at least those forces tending toward an overall transformation
in national social formations or even (at the extreme) modes of production.
It is, then, a form which takes its place in the struggle for the middle
sectors so often crucial in supporting and opposing revolutionary
struggles.  It may help constitute a new national narrative or deconstruct
limited and excluding national constructs.  (22-23)
We see here that testimonio is aimed at reconstructing national narratives through an
appeal to those sectors of a nation where a politics of solidarity and coalition may be
developed, that is, those sectors of the community that will empathetically read
testimonio.  Yet, as the current impasse in the project of Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal
reconciliation in Australia shows, testimonial life-writing forms only one part of the
overall process of reconciliation.
While Beverley’s definition of testimonial narrative is vitally important for the
discussion of testimonial life-writing in this study, an equally significant definition of
testimonio is provided by Yúdice who defines it
[a]s an authentic narrative, told by a witness who is moved to narrate by
the urgency of a situation (e.g., war, oppression, revolution, etc.).
Emphasizing popular, oral discourse, the witness portrays his or her own
experience as an agent (rather than a representative) of a collective
memory and identity.  Truth is summoned in the cause of denouncing a
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present situation of exploitation and oppression or in exorcising and
setting aright official history.  (17)
This definition is important because it draws attention to the fact that instances of
injustice are frequently concurrent with the text’s production and dissemination, as well
as providing the impetus for the testimonial text’s production.  Providing a response to an
urgent and “present situation of exploitation” is one of the main characteristics that
distinguishes testimonial life-writing from autobiography and allows such writing to
claim extra-literary significance (17).
Holocaust Testimonies and Resistance Literature
The other primary source for theoretical analysis of oral and written testimony is
Holocaust Studies.  In contrast to Latin American testimonio, Holocaust testimonies do
not focus on present injustices — although the testimonies are effective at working
against the insidiousness of revisionists — but rather focus on working-through the
continuing effects of the traumatic material of the Holocaust.  Because of this, Holocaust
Studies places more emphasis on the past than the present and on psychotherapeutic
analysis of individual responses to trauma.  It is centrally concerned with the operations
of time, memory and trauma in individual responses to the Holocaust.  It considers
testimony in terms of the bearing witness to the effects of traumatic experience, as a
memorial to lost others, as an expression of the need to counter the vagaries of memory
and memory’s centrality in forming identity.  The central concern of Holocaust
testimonies is the recollection of the experiences and effects of the Holocaust on the
testifier.
Due to this focus on memory, identity and trauma (and also because of the Jewish
people’s strong presence in the psychoanalytic field), Holocaust Studies employs
psychoanalytic concepts such as working-through, acting-out and latency, and explores
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the possibility of therapeutic breakthroughs resulting from the narrative reconstruction of
traumatic events.  The centrality of memory, identity and representation in testimonial
writing that bears witness to traumatic experience is similar to the concerns found in self-
reflexive autobiographies and autobiographical theory.  In contrast, testimonial writing as
resistance literature, as the bearing of witness to injustice, has less concern with the
operation (even the accuracy) of memory because its primary and stated aim is to identify
and challenge injustice, usually an injustice that has present-centred and ongoing
significance.  The distinction between the two can be expressed thus: testimonial
literature that functions as resistance literature (testimonio) is concerned with identities
and communities in political resistance and protest, while the other form of testimonial
literature (narrative working-through of trauma) is primarily concerned with an individual
in crisis, that is, traumatised identity.  One more strongly emphasises the causes and
agents of injustice and the other emphasises the traumatic effects of injustices.
Gugelberger writing on the relationship between Holocaust Studies’ and Latin
American Studies’ work on testimony states:
Most certainly we do not wish to identify Holocaust testimonies, which are
basically documentary, with the testimonio that wants to effect change and
is quite different from documentary writing.  The one has no audience, or
perceives its audience as having vanished apocalyptically, while the other
definitely lives from the hope and the will to effect change or at least raise
consciousness.  (4)
I maintain Gugelberger is mistaken when he separates these two sites of testimonial
discourse so completely.  Psychoanalytic work on testimony, while different from post-
colonial theorisations of testimonio, can offer much to post-colonial work concerned with
registering and analysing literatures that “constitute [. . .] new national narrative[s] or
deconstruct limited and excluding national constructs” (Zimmerman 23).  To say that
Holocaust testimonies have no audience is simply wrong, and the psychoanalytic work
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involved in interviewing Holocaust survivors provides resources for understanding the
complexities of witnessing and recognition involved in hearing testimony to post-colonial
trauma.20  These include, as discussed in Chapter Four of this study, being witness to
oneself, to others witnessing, and to the process of witnessing itself.
In my view, Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is writing that can be
constructively read by employing insights from both post-colonial testimonio and
psychoanalytic theory.  One cannot simply generically categorise Aboriginal testimonial
life-writing as being either best read through the eyes of resistance literature or trauma
theory because the injustice that demands political resistance is the cause of the traumatic
experience/material.  Although it is by no means always the case, acts of injustice often
have attendant trauma, as is the case in the Aboriginal testimonial life-writing examined
in this study.  With this in mind, I am interested in the following questions: how do the
different emphases of these two discourses (post-colonial testimonio and Holocaust
Studies) and literary genres (resistance literature and autobiography) undermine and
reinforce one another?  How does the urgent need to set the official record straight
through acts of discursive resistance conflict with the difficulty of expressing the impact
and effects of traumatic experiences?  How does traumatic material impede the capacity
to resist?  And how does the urgency to resist drive the process of working-through and
coming-to-terms with trauma?  To be more culturally and historically specific: how do
those in the Aboriginal community who write on cultural dispossession and survival deal
with the tensions between testimonial literature as a form of resistance and as a form of
working-through trauma.  And, how do these tensions complicate the long undertaken
project of (re-)culturation required to counteract the legacy of dispossession resulting
from colonial impact?
                                                 
20 While many psychoanalytic resources on trauma come from work in Holocaust Studies, it is important to
be careful not to collapse them into one another because they often deal with different subject matter and
address different audiences.
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In order to think through these questions it is useful to return to the question of
how Aboriginal testimonial life-writing differs from traditional autobiographical
literature.  This comparison is productive because both literary practices implicitly deal
with the relationship between representation and identity, while testimonial life-writing
additionally deals with issues surrounding traumatic experience and resistance.  It is
important to appreciate that there is a synergetic relationship between identity,
representation, trauma and resistance.  Such a correlation between identity and
representation is a foundational concept in autobiographical theory and this synergetic
relationship is maintained and broadened in testimonial literature because of the inclusion
of material related to trauma and injustice.  Testimonial life-writing is different from
traditional autobiography for a variety of reasons over and above those already outlined
because it is driven by a need to articulate individual and group trauma.
Due to the effects of traumatic experience, the relationship between representation
and identity is profoundly more complicated in testimonial life-writing than the
relationship between representation and identity found in traditional autobiography.  The
disruptions to memory and affectivity resulting from traumatic experience affect the
capacity of testimonial narratives to “present the truth of a self as grasped by itself”
(Lloyd 170).  This means that testimonial life-writing’s presentation of identities and their
reconstructed histories can be contrasted with the presentation of a static subjectivity in
Cartesian reflection on the self and, by extension, with classic realist autobiography.  Put
simply, unlike traditional autobiography, testimonial life-writing presents identity in a
crisis that results from the effects of injustice and/or traumatic experience.
Sir Ronald Wilson, who headed the development of the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission’s Bringing them Home Report, commented on the testimonies
that formed the oral history basis of the report as follows:
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Grief and loss are the predominant themes of this report.  Tenacity and
survival are also acknowledged.  It is no ordinary report.  Much of its
subject matter is so personal and intimate that ordinarily it would not be
discussed.  These matters have only been discussed with the Inquiry with
great difficulty and much personal distress.  The suffering and the courage
of those who have told their stories inspire sensitivity and respect.  (3)
And later:
In no sense has the Inquiry been ‘raking over the past’ for its own sake.
The truth is that the past is very much with us today, in the continuing
devastation of the lives of Indigenous Australians.  That devastation
cannot be addressed unless the whole community listens with an open
heart and mind to the stories of what has happened in the past and, having
listened and understood, commits itself to reconciliation (3)
On testimonial life-writing (as distinguished from oral testimony), Rosamund Dalziell
writes:
In memoralising the dead, Don’t Take Your Love to Town resembles other
autobiographical texts addressing grief and loss, but also bears witness
specifically to the high mortality rate among younger Aboriginal people.
Langford Ginibi’s narrative counters the shame of being the object of
racism primarily by expressing pride in her survival and in that of
Aboriginal people.  This work may be characterised as testimonio in that
the narrator bears witness to suffering and loss.  The narrative attests to
endurance and resilience, and has been described as ‘the ultimate battler’s
tale’.  (131)
In Haunted by the Past, Langford Ginibi directly cites testimony from The Bringing them
Home Report to make her case, demonstrating the frequent use of official documents in
testimonial life-writing:
We may go home, but we cannot relive our childhoods.  We may reunite
with our mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, aunties, uncles, communities,
but we cannot relive the 20, 30, 40 years that we spent without their love
and care, and they cannot undo the grief and mourning they felt when we
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were separated from them.  We can go home to ourselves as Aboriginals,
but this does not erase the attacks inflicted on our hearts, minds, bodies
and souls, by caretakers who thought their mission [in life] [sic] was to
eliminate us as Aboriginals.  (6; Bringing them Home 12)
Later Langford Ginibi connects such collective Aboriginal trauma directly to her family’s
trauma when she writes the following about her son:
Nobby was seeing a Dr Kordik [the naming of people frequently occurs in
testimonies] at Polyclinic Mt Druitt to sort himself out.  He was a
psychiatrist.  When a Koori person has a breakdown, it’s very easy for
people to blame that person alone, because they do not understand that that
person’s breakdown is part of a bigger historical picture.  They never look
at the dispossession, the having to conform to other people’s laws, rules
and standards.  Koori people have never been able to be themselves.  We
were forced to assimilate, and never had a choice.  My son is fair, and
looks like a whiteman, but he says, ‘I’m a black man wrapped up in a
white skin!’  And all the trauma he’s had to cope with throughout his life
has been bound up with this identity crisis that goes right back to when he
was young.  He never knew who he really was.  (Haunted by the Past 48)
Langford Ginibi clearly ties her son’s traumatic experience to colonial dispossession and
identifies the synergetic relationship between identity, trauma and dispossession.
Elsewhere, Langford Ginibi describes how she responds to her son’s trauma:
But now I said, ‘Listen, son.  We must talk about our loved ones, and not
just lock them away as though they never lived, cause their life had
meaning and they really lived, you know.  And we just can’t lock them out
forever.  Besides, talking about them and how they were in the family with
us keeps them close to us.  I know it still pains you if anyone mentions
their names.  But if you want me to write your story with you, you’ve gotta
sit down and talk to me and tell me things you couldn’t tell me before.’
(26)
Langford Ginibi’s testimony attests to pain and to the difficulty of attesting to that pain,
but also to the necessity in her view of articulating painful material, recording it, and
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memorialising members of her family.  The reader also witnesses her motivation to heal
herself and her family in the process of narrating injustice in the testimonial life-story.
The same relationship between pain and truth in testimony has been identified in
Morgan’s My Place:
Gladys Corunna’s story, recounted in Morgan’s My Place, does
demonstrate the kind of commitment to truth that characterises the
discourse of testimony; involving a willingness to reveal experiences of
shame:  [Gladys Corruna says] ‘it hasn’t been an easy task, baring my
soul.  I’d rather have kept hidden things which have now seen the light of
day.  But, like everything else in my life, I knew I had to do it.  I find I’m
embarrassed sometimes by what I have told, but I know I cannot retract
what has been written, it’s no longer mine.’  (Dalziell 130-31)
The traumatic experience resulting from colonial dispossession is the primary factor
determining the testimonial nature of Aboriginal life-writing.  Traumatic material affects
the narrative devices the life-writer/testifier employs to construct his or her life-writing,
the dominant of these devices being the testimonial mode.  By extension, the expression
of trauma affects the ways in which readers respond to and witness testimonial life-
writing.  For the Aboriginal authors examined in this study, life-writing is an engagement
with post-colonial trauma aimed at coming-to-terms with that trauma.  In order to come-
to-terms with that trauma it is important to establish narrative control over the traumatic
material and, as I will show, the process of establishing narrative control extends beyond
the individual autobiographer/testifier to his or her cultural group.  Thus, testimonial life-
writing is a dual project of self/group re-personalisation and self/group political
representation and, consequently, addresses issues of national significance that come to
form part of national history — the contestation of history is history itself.
The effort to gain narrative control over traumatic experience is of a different
order to other literary endeavours because it is the nature of traumatic experience to both
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urgently demand and also to confound expression.  This is distinct from other literary
challenges to expression such as developing suspense, continuity or thematic coherence
because, as I will argue below, it is a function of traumatic experience to disrupt
representation regardless of the narrative mode employed to express it, be it oral, poetic,
prosaic, colloquial, or theoretically technical.  Yet the reader of Aboriginal testimonial
life-writing continuously witnesses a unifying factor in this writing: the struggle (both
conscious and unconscious) to represent post-colonial trauma in order that it be integrated
into the sufferers’ lives and that of their culture and society.  Post-colonial trauma
functions for Aboriginal authors of testimonial life-writing as that which both resists and
demands representation, and testimonial life-writing narratives are the records of their
engagement with this tension.
In addition to being a series of acts aimed at establishing narrative control over
post-colonial trauma, it may be constructively argued that Aboriginal testimonial life-
writing is simultaneously a form of post-colonial resistance.  There is a profound
connection between testimonial life-writing’s function as a process of working-through
post-colonial trauma and its function as a literature of post-colonial resistance.  As a form
of resistance literature, testimonial life-writing is part of a larger process of re-
personalisation, and both working-through and resistance aim to reinscribe subaltern
agency by working against the de-personalising and de-familiarising effects of post-
colonial traumatic experience and injustice.  In this study, I aim to show that Aboriginal
testimonial life-writing’s function as a process of re-personalisation is inseparable from
its function as a written practice of resistance.  Essential for this argument, in addition to
the analysis of resistance literature, is an expansion of the resources of psychoanalytic
theory regarding the experience of trauma away from their traditional focus on the
individual towards their application to group and social analysis in a post-colonial
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context.  Instead of focusing on the individual, the process of gaining narrative control
over post-colonial traumatic experience demands that psychoanalytic theory on the nature
of trauma be extended beyond the individual and its potential for social and collective
analysis be examined.
Earlier in the examination of group-oriented life-writing, it was argued that
breaking down the overly individualistic separation between self and collective is a
necessary step for maintaining philosophical rigor in theorising identity.  Aboriginal
testimonial life-writing, in its voicing and narrativising of post-colonial traumatic
memories, maintains such rigor by demonstrating that the re-emergence and re-
personalisation of what has been effaced is of collective significance.  In this way,
individual re-personalisation, as seen in testimonial life-writing, is also a process of
collective re-familiarisation because, as Langford Ginibi writes, it entails a journey “to
the places we were born to find our extended families” (My Bundjalung People 1).
In emphasising the links between individuals and their cultural community, it is
important to develop a complementary framework that places psychoanalytic insights in a
collective and social context, a framework that contrasts with psychoanalytic theory’s
traditional focus on the individual or family unit.  We must, that is, demonstrate how
psychoanalytic concepts extend beyond the individual and beyond therapy to social
exegesis.  Dominick LaCapra writes that he is interested in
showing why psychoanalysis is misunderstood as merely a psychology of
the individual, and its basic concepts are overly reduced when they are
confined to a clinical context, however important the latter may be.  [. . .]
The processes referred to by the basic concepts of psychoanalysis undercut
the opposition between individual and society insofar as they involve
social individuals whose relative individuation or collective status should
be a problem for inquiry and argument.  (Representing the Holocaust 9)
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Much like the way the co-extensivity between individuals and their cultural groups is
foregrounded in Aboriginal testimonial life-writing (in contrast to traditional
autobiography), the traditionally individual-oriented practice of psychoanalysis can be
extended to articulate material of collective significance.  In testimonial life-writing, the
foregrounding of co-extensivity between individual and collective is due to the fact that
testimonial life-writing “constitutes an affirmation of the individual self in a collective
mode” (Beverley, “Margin at the Centre” 29).  This is because testimonial life-writing
addresses issues of significance for the larger cultural community in a mode that does not
“rescind [the ‘we’s’] status as the necessary other against which the tyrannical ‘I’
measures its existence” (Marin 53), as is the case in traditional autobiography.
Testimonial life-writing has a strong collective dimension because it addresses the
conditions of subalterneity, and subalterneity is, by definition in a post-colonial context, a
group identity position imposed by colonialist practices.21  This is one reason why
testimonial life-writing “evokes an absent polyphony of other voices, other possible lives
and experiences” (Beverley, “Margin at the Centre” 28).  Psychoanalytic theory, used as a
resource for collective rather than individual analysis, acknowledges that there is an
interrelationship between the individual and community.  Psychoanalytic theory, as a set
of tools for specifying and working-through historical sites of anxiety, can improve the
accuracy of post-colonial historicism, which, in turn, extends the scope of post-colonial
literary theory.
Aboriginal post-colonial trauma is a direct consequence of the experience of
colonialism.  This is not to say that all traumatic material experienced in the lives of
Aboriginal life-writers is the result of colonial impact.  No doubt, the experience of
trauma would have antecedents that predated colonial impact.  Pre-colonial figurations of
                                                 
21 There is also the sense in which testimonial life-writing places a stronger emphasis on collectivity, in
contrast to traditional autobiography, due to the different organisation of filial relationships in Aboriginal
societies.
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traumatic experiences would make an interesting study but it is well beyond the scope of
this present study to do so.  Furthermore, traumatic experience in Aboriginal communities
is not necessarily related to the nexus of colonial power-effects and to argue so would be
an overestimation of the degree to which colonial impact determines Aboriginal society.
Regardless of these considerations, the testimonial life-writers examined in this study
directly concern themselves with the destructive effects of colonialism on Aboriginal
culture.  Individual testimonial life-writings form part of a larger community-based
process of writing-through post-colonial traumatic events and are best understood as part
of a larger process of cultural articulation and consolidation.  It is in this way that the
work of re-personalisation becomes one of re-culturation and the process of cultural
consolidation becomes one of resistance to neo-colonial practices.  However, as I have
been suggesting, to better understand testimonial life-writing’s potential for both re-
personalisation and resistance, it is essential to have an understanding of its
counterweight, trauma.
I have aimed to set out different responses along with my own position towards
the complex interaction between representation, trauma and subjectivity that occurs in a
style of writing that I place in the broader spectrum of resistant writing practices that
write back to and challenge the ‘centre’.22  Not all testimonial life-writing always
employs all of the features I and others attribute to it as a genre: different combinations of
its generic features occur.  Yet, the one feature common to all the cases of writing
identified as testimonial in this study is the way they address a situation characterised by
either injustice or trauma.  Different writers will negotiate this terrain of injustice and
trauma differently and, consequently, literary theorist’s readings of these texts will vary.
Some, like Elzbieta Sklodowska (see Chapter Four), may emphasise the rhetorical
                                                 
22 See Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin’s  The Empire Writes Back for more on post-colonial resistance writing
and the concept of the ‘centre’.
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strategies and devices of testimonial texts while others, like Dori Laub (see Chapter
Three), may focus on guarding against too great an emphasis on the rhetorical and
discursive features of testimonial texts in an effort to aid the process of establishing
narrative and affective control over traumatic material.  I suggest the way in which a
reader interprets testimonial life-writing ought to be guided by the strategies the narrator
of the testimonial text employs for challenging injustice and writing-through trauma.
This is because the tension between what can and what cannot yet be phrased that exists
within the on-going process of redressing “the case where the plaintiff is divested of the
means to argue and becomes for that reason a victim” involves changing contexts that
demand different responses from testifiers and readers (Lyotard 9).
Theories of writing-through trauma, as a process of working to phrase what has
not yet been phrased, have not received enough attention as a resource for dealing with
the legacy of colonial dispossession.  This is due perhaps to the difficulty contemporary
theory is experiencing in “envisioning an effective process of working-through in a
posttraumatic context in which agency cannot simply be assumed but must be
reconstituted” (LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust 194).  This difficulty may itself be a
consequence of the difficulty confronting contemporary theory in linking the benefits of
deconstructive critiques of agency with the benefits of affirming agency in political and
therapeutic contexts.  Furthermore, the reconstitution of agency in a political sense
requires the reconstitution of agency in a therapeutic sense.  The reconstitution of agency
cannot simply rely on political empowerment because the effects of trauma continue to
undermine effective public agency.  The complexities of toxic memory, debilitating
traumatic affects and transgenerational trauma must be addressed to deal adequately with
the political dimensions of agency.  Consequently, this study will now explore in more
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detail the complexity of the relationship between trauma, resistance and representation
through a more detailed focus on theories of trauma.
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Chapter 3
Aboriginal Testimonial Life-Writing and Trauma Theory
The convergence of testimonial life-writing as a form of political resistance with
testimonial life-writing as a form of writing-through post-colonial trauma encourages an
alliance between post-colonial critical theory and psychoanalytic theory.  Beverley, one
of the most prominent voices in debate on testimonial discourse, asks in his essay “The
Real Thing”, “[d]o testimonial narrators such as Rigoberta Menchú have an unconscious,
and would a psychoanalytic reading of their narratives be useful?  The answer on both
scores, it seems to me, should be yes” (268).  Such a positive view about a coalition
between psychoanalytic and post-colonial theory is only briefly outlined in Beverley’s
essay.  He discusses how Menchú’s testimonial can be read “as an Oedipal
bildungsroman built around the working-through of an Elektra complex [. . .]” (268).  It is
not the aim of this study to employ notions such as the Oedipal or Elektra complexes or
any other Freudian archetypes as a way of understanding Aboriginal life-writing, because
I contend that they are, like most over-enthusiastic deployments of theory, over-
deterministic meta-narratives with little relevance to the life-writing examined here.23
Rather, this study will make use of the more mobile concepts found in psychoanalytic
theory, such as working-through, acting-out, resistance, denial, repression,24 and to a
lesser extent, a reformed version of the concepts the Real, the Imaginary and the
                                                 
23 See Chapter Five for further discussion on forms of psychoanalytic theory this study distinguishes itself
from.
24 There is another deployment of psychoanalytic concepts that must be distinguished from the use of those
concepts in this study.  The use of such concepts has become popularised through the ‘self-help’ industry,
most publicly in the American daytime chat-show Oprah.  This industry’s constant use of concepts like
‘working-through’, ‘acting-out’, ‘denial’ and ‘repression’ corrupts the use of such concepts.  The most
significant problem, apart from the banalisation of these concepts, is the underlying goal to establish
simplistic redemptive narratives that are closely related to religious redemption.  In this context, for every
assertion that ‘to name it is to control it’ there is the assertion that ‘to name it is to create it’, a tactic that
operates to ensure perpetual confession for ‘good’ television.
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Symbolic, with the intention of providing more specific analyses than psychoanalytic
complexes allow.25
The post-colonial project of describing the mechanisms by which post-
colonialised subjects reinscribe their agency and register their voice is compatible with
the psychoanalytic concern with working-through the disruptions to identity resulting
from traumatic experience.  Both work towards a reinscription and retrieval of identity,
which involves preserving the tension between avoiding restrictive identities/nationalisms
and the crippling of identities/nationalisms in epistemological and ontological aporia.
Psychoanalytic concepts like working-through, acting-out, resistance, denial and
repression can be usefully employed in post-colonial studies as theoretical tools for
dealing with the cluster of problems associated with post-colonial cultural articulation and
re-emergence, cross-cultural dialogue, and the relationship between history (often effaced
and traumatic) and the present.
By extension, the compatibility of post-colonial and psychoanalytic theory is
useful for combating that particular deployment of post-structuralist thought which
emphasises aporia, impasse and infinite regression.  There is a tendency in post-
structuralist thought to oppose
total-mastery, full ego-identity, ‘totalitarian’ social integration, and
radically positive transcendence [. . . to] acting out repetition compulsions
with endless fragmentation, aporias, and double-binds [. . .].  Sometimes
evident as well is a perspective fixated on failed transcendence or
irremediable loss in which any mode of reconstruction or renewal is seen
as objectionably recuperative or naive.  (LaCapra, History and
Memory 46)
                                                 
25 Deleuze and Guattari have been frequently used in post-colonial theory, particularly the concept of the
rhizome (see bibliographical references to Ashcroft, Brydon and Tiffin, and Gugelberger).  However, as I
will show later in this study, more of their theoretical repertoire is applicable to post-colonial conditions,
particularly their framework of schizo-analysis.
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Donna Haraway warns against the risks of such oppositions when she argues that
“[r]elativism and totalization are both ‘god-tricks’ promising vision from everywhere and
nowhere equally and fully [. . .]”.  Both relativism and totalization deny “partial
perspective; both make it impossible to see well” (191).  LaCapra’s and Haraway’s
interest in the liminal is also what drives post-colonial theorists Diana Brydon and Helen
Tiffin when they write, “we [do not] mean to suggest that an uncontaminated alternative
space exists outside imperialist discourse from which the subaltern may speak.  Instead,
we are suggesting that even dominant discursive systems are diverse and multiply
fractured, opening themselves to different levers in different times and places” (26).  The
point that there is no uncontaminated space from which the subaltern may speak also
applies to dominant discursive systems because they too are fractured.  In criticising the
idea of an uncontaminated space and, by extension, full-identity and mastery, Brydon and
Tiffin do not become “fixated on failed transcendence or irremediable loss [. . .]”
(LaCapra, History and Memory 46), but rather focus on specific instances of the
registration of post-colonial agency, that is, “different levers in different times and
spaces” (Brydon and Tiffin 26).  I will argue that some such levers in the post-colonial
context are psychoanalytic concepts developed for understanding and dealing with
traumatic experience.  However, before their capacity for interpretation in the post-
colonial context can be explored, it is necessary to outline how trauma has been
conceived more generally.
Trauma and Latency
I have so far concentrated on testimonial life-writing’s potential as a method for
effectively transforming post-colonial traumatic memory into narrative and social history.
However, general trauma theory argues, over and above its specific employment in the
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post-colonial context, that traumatic material repeatedly resists language’s efforts to
capture, control and communicate it.  One of the reasons for this resistance is the effect of
latency.
Sigmund Freud argued that what is unique to the experience of trauma is that it is
not fully witnessed by the victim as it occurs.  In fact, the experience of trauma could be
defined as an event that invades the subject to a degree that the ability to witness that
event is incapacitated.  As Freud argues in “Moses and Monotheism”, witnessing is
disrupted due to a latency inherent in the experience of trauma.  Freud writes:
It may happen that a man who has experienced some frightful accident —
a railway collision, for instance — leaves the scene of the event apparently
uninjured.  In the course of the next few weeks, however, he develops a
number of severe psychical and motor symptoms which can only be traced
to his shock, the concussion or whatever else it was.  He now has a
‘traumatic neurosis’.  It is quite unintelligible — that is to say, a new —
fact.  The time that has passed between the accident and the first
appearance of the symptoms is described as the ‘incubation period’ [. . . it
is this] characteristic that might be described as ‘latency’.  (309-10)
Latency is a useful concept for understanding some important features of testimonial life-
writing’s process of writing-through post-colonial trauma.  In narratives that testify to
trauma, we see repeated confrontation and struggle with traumatic material.  This is
because traumatic memory eludes narrativisation and, contradictively, demands to be
articulated and integrated into the life-story of the testifier.  Traumatic experience is
difficult to contain and control in narrative form and continually re-enacts itself, irrupting
into the narrator’s life until a sense of integration is achieved.  It is the complexities of
this not knowing, coupled with the urgency to know, that Aboriginal testimonial writing
elicits, and which psychoanalytic theory can to some extent explicate.  The life-
writer/testifier is the site of this ‘unknowing’ and the site of the desire to know, and in the
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project of representing him or her self the life-writer/testifier embodies the complexity of
this contradiction.
The traumatic material addressed in testimony directly affects the temporal
structure of the retrospective narrative characteristic of most life-writing.  Traumatic
material does so because it disrupts the effective operation of memory in the present and,
thereby, the ability to narrativise the past.  In this sense, testifying to traumatic experience
is a strongly present-centred activity rather than simply a retrospective one because it
aims to establish narrative control over traumatic material that directly disrupts the very
capacity to narrativise.  Dori Laub argues that the process of testifying to trauma is an
effort to tell the story for the first time.  While problems of memory are at times
acknowledged in traditional autobiography, the vagaries of memory that it may contain
are not often the direct result of an injustice and its attendant traumas, which is often the
case in testimonial life-writing.  In traditional autobiography, the present-centred
“uncertainties, false starts [and] momentariness” are smoothed out in the retrospective
narrative (Pascal 5).
The latency inherent in the experience of trauma creates difficulties in re-
presenting and knowing that experience.  It is this ongoing negotiation with an
undisclosed but actively toxic past that structures the present (it is both present and non-
present) that leads Cathy Caruth to ask and answer: “Is the trauma the encounter with
death, or the ongoing experience of having survived it?  At the core of these stories, I
would suggest, is thus a kind of double telling, the oscillation between a crisis of death
and the correlative crisis of life: between the unbearable nature of an event and the story
of the unbearable nature of survival” (Unclaimed Experience 7).  The legacy of trauma is
the trauma itself, and testimonial life-writing’s negotiation with trauma is the record of
living through trauma.  Trauma defies being witnessed, but simultaneously demands to be
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witnessed due to its repetitive intrusion into the life of the subject.  For example,
Langford Ginibi’s journey to her birth place, the Bundjalung country, is one of discovery
and recovery in which she confronts the effects of her people’s collective trauma, that is,
the disruptiveness effected by colonial dispossession and its continual presence in their
survival.  It is for this reason that it becomes important in reading testimonial life-writing
to trace “the movement of [.  .  .] not knowing within the very language of [. . .] telling”
(Caruth, Unclaimed Experience 37).
Such tracing is found in Morgan’s My Place, in which a great portion of the book
is concerned with working-through family history in a project of establishing identity.
This novel is filled with figures of detection because, apart from aiming to create
suspense for the reader, it is Morgan’s particular performance of “the movement of [. . .]
not knowing within the very language of [. . .] telling” (Caruth, Uncla imed
Experience 37).  Morgan writes:
On my return from Sydney, Mum met me at the airport.  ‘What did you
find out?’ was her first eager question.
‘Quite a lot’, I replied.  ‘I’m really glad I went.  I never found out
anything startling, but I think sometimes you learn more from what people
don’t tell you than from what they do’.  (170)
Likewise, after Morgan listens to her uncle Arthur’s life-story, she writes, “[h]owever, in
an odd way, we also experienced a sense of loss.  We were suddenly much more aware of
how little we knew about Nan and about the history and experiences of our own family.
We were now desperate to learn more, but there appeared to be few obvious leads left”
(214).  Morgan’s My Place is essentially the story of her and her family’s journeys
(physical and psychical) to discover their place.  As such, it is a project of identity
formation concerned with, like Langford Ginibi’s My Bundjalung People, establishing
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non-metaphorical facts, such as who Morgan’s grandfather is, who her relations are,
where they came from and the ways in which they lived.
Before traumatic experiences can be narrativised in order to establish some degree
of narrative and affective control over them (thus articulating what was not
comprehended as it was experienced (latency)), Laub argues that it is necessary to
establish ‘non-metaphorical facts’.26  These consist of non-metaphorical statements that
form the foundation of the history that will be developed throughout the testimony.
These ‘facts’ are, as the authors frequently state, intended by the authors to be read as true
in order that the testimony is effective both politically and therapeutically.   In Aboriginal
life-writing a great deal of effort is spent presenting non-metaphorical facts.  For
example, Langford Ginibi begins her testimony by establishing when her father and uncle
came to northern New South Wales, who they worked for, as well as detailing the family
tree.  Langford Ginibi lists the Aboriginal families who moved to the mission area and
which particular clan groups within the larger Bundjalung group they belonged to (My
Bundjalung People 35-37).  Facts such as the amount of land allocated by the Australian
Government to each family are noted, as well as the names of the white mission managers
who played a role in the mission, specific racist policies targeting Aborigines are
identified, and the names of Boys’ Homes and prisons that have impacted on Aboriginal
families are listed.  A particularly interesting example of establishing non-metaphorical
facts is the description of sacred sites in Langford Ginibi’s Bundjalung country.
Brigitta Olubas, writing on Wilson Harris, states:
There is also the way that literary texts interrelate with, interpenetrate the
landscape.  The effect of this is to textualise the landscape, but this
textualising takes place within a broad historical context, involving myth,
                                                 
26 The need to establish ‘facts’ for the successful re-externalisation of the traumatic event appears to
contradict the point that the construction of a referent erases the reality of the traumatic event.  However, to
establish ‘facts’ does not mean that one exhausts the meaning of the event.  Rather, it is a point from which
to begin to explore that event.
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eclipsed discourses — for example Aztec astrology and astronomy — the
reading of those myths, and the conscious and/or unconscious reading and
re-visioning of those myths at later times.  (“Wilson Harris’s Essays”
72-73)
This quotation alerts us to the fact that the differences between Aboriginal and settler
textualisations of the landscape are important because they determine how the landscape
is experienced.  It is through Langford Ginibi’s presentation of the Aboriginal visioning
of the Aboriginal relationship with the landscape, based on cultural and oral history, that
the reinscription of Aboriginal cultural identity occurs.  The facts lie not in an ultimate
truth but in the cultural cosmology that generates and orders the signifying systems
governing culture and land.  The displacement of such codes is linked to the inscription of
new colonial codes that in the Australian context functioned to circumscribe Aboriginal
experience of the land within fringe-dwellings, camps, missions, children’s homes and
prisons.  The fact is that Aboriginal cosmologies were historically displaced and denied
from occupying traditional Aboriginal lands.  The testimonial project of reinscribing them
demands acknowledgment by non-Aboriginals of Aboriginal cosmologies as legitimate so
that the process of cultural recovery through the reinscription of cultural and narrative
control over the land is effective.  Langford Ginibi’s testimonial reinscription of
Aboriginal sacred sites on to northern New South Wales is a process of working-through
the tensions of two or more (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) textualisations of the
landscape and what is at stake in this process of working-through is cultural identity
itself.
The project of establishing the history of the dispossession of Aboriginal
textualisations of the land as fact is prerequisite for the project of re-personalisation and
re-culturation because it forms a basis for the “re-externalization — and thus
historicization — of the [traumatic, colonial] event” (Laub, “Bearing Witness” 70).
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Dominant sites of significance in Langford Ginibi’s country such as Wollumbin,
Dooloomi, Nymbunji, Julbootherlgoom and Dirrawong are central to the Bundjalung
people’s cultural practices and personal identity.  While Langford Ginibi has spent most
of her life living in the largest urban centre in Australia, these cultural sites structure her
life and are a source of traditional cultural meaning.  Moreover, her familiarity with them
also works to establish the narrative authority of the text for the reader.  This is not to say
that Langford Ginibi’s culture is not that of a city-dweller because her experiences of the
city also form a large part of her life-story and life-writing.  It is only to say that
traditional cultural cosmology is an essential part of her identity and it is the project of
reinforcing this cultural identity that leads to her repeated trips from Sydney to northern
New South Wales.
Langford Ginibi introduces her testimonial My Bundjalung People thus:
I wanted to travel back to the country where I was born to find my
roots.  It had been forty-eight years since I had left the mission at Box
Ridge and although I was excited, I still had some qualms about it.  You
see, the memories I had of that place were very painful and I was
frightened that my visit would bring them back to haunt me.
In our own Koori way, we all want to go back to where we came
from originally, it is like a magnet that keeps drawing us to the places
where we were born to find our extended families.  (My Bundjalung
People 1)
The meaning sought in identity is sourced and fixed to a particular place and its history.
This is the case because, as previously stated, they (culturally significant sites) form a
“medium of re-externalization — and thus historicization — of the [traumatic, colonial]
event” (Laub, “Bearing Witness” 70), and their reinscription is a necessary process for
countering identity-eroding forces that are experienced as a threat to personal and cultural
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survival.  Similarly to Langford Ginibi, Jackie Huggins describes her and her mother’s
life-writing project, Auntie Rita, thus:
Returning to my mother’s born country as she refers to it complemented
my own sense of identity and belonging, and my pride in this.  It was
important that together we make this trip as she had been insisting for
quite some time, pining for her homelands.  We shared a special furthering
of our mother-daughter bond during this time, although we argued
incessantly about nothing as usual or, as she calls it, ‘fighting with our
tongues’.  I began to gain an insight into and understanding of her obvious
attachment and relationship to her country and how our people had cared
for this place way before the Royal Geographic Society and park rangers
ever clapped eyes on it.  The way my mother moved around, kissed the
earth and said her prayers will have a lasting effect on my soul and
memory because she was paying homage and respect to her ancestors who
had passed on long ago but whose presence we could both intensely feel.
The land of my mother and my maternal grandmother is my land,
too.  It will be passed down to my children and successive generations,
spiritually, in the manner that has been carried on for thousands of years.
Fate dictates that nothing will ever change this.  As Rita’s daughter, I not
only share the celebration and the pain of her experience but also the land
from which we were created.  (13)
Bessel van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart provide a good explanation for why
the relationship between traumatic experience and narrative is so close.  They distinguish
between the operations of narrative memory and traumatic memory, describing the
difference as follows: “in contrast to narrative memory, which is a social act, traumatic
memory is inflexible and invariable.  Traumatic memory has no social component; it is
not addressed to anybody [. . .] it is a solitary activity.  In contrast, ordinary memory
fundamentally serves a social function [. . .]” (163).  This distinction between traumatic
memory and narrative memory is helpful for understanding the process of establishing
non-metaphorical facts in the project of working-through post-colonial trauma in
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testimonial life-writing.  The distinction is required to understand the importance of
writing, literary and otherwise, to the project of transforming traumatic experiences into
social and historical narrative.  The process of transforming traumatic memory into social
narrative addresses the problem of latency through creating a narrative of what was not
fully witnessed as it occurred.  This is vital to the subject for establishing narrative and
affective control because in the process of transforming traumatic memory into social
memory the traumatic material becomes for the first time an object that can be articulated
and worked-through.  In this way, traumatic material becomes an object that can be
shared socially and, thus, it becomes, in contrast to traumatic memory, more flexible and
variable because it is communicable.  As I discuss in greater detail in Chapter Four, the
ability to articulate an object of historical trauma so that it is socially recognised provides
further control over traumatic material and, when that trauma is itself a result of, say,
institutionalised racism, the process of articulating that trauma is central to challenging
and transforming those institutions.
Van der Kolk’s and van der Hart’s distinction also identifies the way traumatic
memory resists translation into social narratives and thus social history.  The
narrativisation of traumatic memory transforms the isolating and identity-eroding
traumatic experience into social and historical narratives.  This works against the
alienating effects that the experience of trauma has on individuals by emphasising the
social significance of trauma.  Langford Ginibi touches on this issue when she describes
the process of jointly writing her son’s (Nobby’s) life-story Haunted by the Past:
It was very painful for Nobby to talk about these difficult times for this
book.  As well as wanting to forget the years he was incarcerated, he’d
locked the memory of his brother’s and sister’s deaths away in a very
secret part of his heart.  He’d never allow any of us to speak their names.
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He’d say, ‘Don’t get talkin about them, Mum.  They’re at peace
now, resting.  I can’t stand you talking about them.’  And he’d walk away.
But now I said, ‘Listen, son.  We must talk about our loved ones,
and not just lock them away as though they never lived, cause their life
had meaning and they really lived, you know.  And we just can’t lock
them out forever.  Besides, talking about them and how they were in the
family with us keeps them close to us.  I know it still pains you if anyone
mentions their names.  But if you want me to write your story with you,
you’ve gotta sit down and talk to me and tell me things you couldn’t tell
me before.’
So when we started talking together I felt it was bringing us closer
together.  You see, I never really knew what it was like from his side of
the prison wall, and he never knew what it was like from our side.  Telling
the story together made for better understanding.
I learnt about Nobby’s feelings about death of loved family
members, this incarceration, the whole corruption of the police and dicks
— the so-called ‘keepers of the laws’ who turned out to be more corrupt
than the people they were putting in jail.  (26-27)
Individuals who experience the disruptions to narrative that trauma causes become
isolated from their families, their cultural group, and broader society by virtue of not
being able to articulate what they are experiencing.  To say this is not to advocate overly
normative familial and social behaviour, but rather to say that the disruptions to these
relationships are identified by testimonial life-writers as painful and out of their control.
Often, the sense of personal isolation is defined by Langford Ginibi, Rita Huggins and
other Aboriginal testifiers as cultural isolation, wherein their cultural heritage is
denigrated and effaced, as in the many instances of being the target of racist abuse
recounted within Aboriginal life-writing.
Traumatic memory resists transformation into social narratives and thus social
history.  It is “inflexible and invariable”, resisting integration into a narrative by which
the individual might gain some control over the traumatic material.  This resistance to
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integration is characteristically countered by Aboriginal life-writers through repetitive
and partially successful confrontations with the traumatic material in an effort to master
it.  However, this does not mean that traumatic memory cannot be transformed into
narrative memory.  Transformation is precisely the role testimonial life-writing plays as a
literature of re-personalisation and resistance or, in stressing the collective dimension, re-
familiarisation and re-culturation.
In Aboriginal testimonials the reader witnesses a process by which traumatic
material is constructed into social narrative and social memory.  This is the crux of
Langford Ginibi’s My Bundjalung People because the process of narrativising her
traumatic past underpins both her project of cultural resistance and re-personalisation.
Throughout Langford Ginibi’s writings there is a continual return to sites of trauma in her
and her people’s past.  In her many journeys from Sydney to northern New South Wales
there are numerous sites of trauma that have profound significance for her and her people:
gaols (Long Bay); boys’ homes (Kinchella); missions (Box Ridge and Main Camp, darkly
tagged Mein Kampf by the local Aboriginal people); and sites where massacres have
taken place (Evans Head and Myall Creek).  Though most of these institutions no longer
operate in their old roles and/or hold no visible signs of their historical significance, each
is still what Laura Marks calls
a fossil in that it embodies the traces of events whose representation has
been buried.  When [. . . fossils] cannot be connected to a present situation,
they become [and Marks quotes Deleuze here] 'strangely active fossils,
radioactive, inexplicable in the present where they surface, and all the
more harmful and autonomous'.  Such traces are inscrutable on their own,
but when we cut through the different layers and connect them, they tell a
story.  (253)
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Langford Ginibi’s testimonials perform precisely this function, reclaiming her
Bundjalung people’s and Australia's history as she travels north connecting the sites of
significance for her people to tell her people’s story.
Langford Ginibi writes, immediately following her page one statement of the
importance of discovery her roots cited above, that
[i]n the past we have been divided by the dominant culture in Australia,
and it is a very strong urge that keeps pulling us back to our ‘real
belongin’’ places: the mission places or wherever we were born.  I needed
to go back home, and I guess so do a lot of Kooris like me, to establish our
links with our extended families and our past, because that is where the
truth is.  (My Bundjalung People 1)
In this passage, Langford Ginibi identifies the connection between the process of re-
personalisation and resistance by showing that it was the dominant culture in Australia
that divided, that is, de-familiarised, her community.  Her project is to return to her past
to find ‘the truth’ and her ‘roots’.  This necessarily entails recovering a history that
counters the history of the dominant culture.  As such, Langford Ginibi’s project
exemplifies how post-colonial theory’s interest in testimony as a literature of resistance is
compatible with psychoanalytic theory’s interest in testimony as a process of re-
personalisation.
The traumatic material resulting from cultural dispossession uncannily returns to
disrupt the Aboriginal testifier’s life and an understanding of that material continues to
escape the testifier who lives in its grip and unwittingly experiences its ceaseless
repetitions and re-enactments.  Laub writes that “[t]he traumatic event, although real, took
place outside the parameters of ‘normal’ reality, such as causality, sequence, place and
time.  The trauma is thus an event that has no beginning, no ending, no before, no during
and no after” (“Bearing Witness” 69).  An illustration of this is provided when Langford
Ginibi discovers the testimony of Mrs Janet Gomes, recorded by T. J. Olive, concerning
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the Evans Head Massacre of 1842.  Gomes says, “[w]hite fellas started firing shots, there
was no way out.  They [the Aborigines] were chased across the river from the Bundjalung
reserve; women with babies, little ones, swam the river; the others we never saw them
anymore, they were all crying, there was this island in the river there . . . later they called
it Weeping Island” (My Bundjalung People 77).  In response to hearing this testimony,
Langford Ginibi writes, “[w]e drove for a long while before we spoke.  I think we were
both stunned by the fact that we could be confronted with people telling us about these
massacres as if they had happened only yesterday, even though I knew the two tribal
elders mentioned, Granny Gomes and Granny Cowan, were dead” (78).  Describing other
reactions to reading records of the Evans Head Massacre, Langford Ginibi writes, “I read
on, every line torturing me” and, “I read on, feeling like I was being kicked in the
guts” (75).  In these passages the reader witnesses Langford Ginibi attesting to her
speechlessness, as well as the temporal disruptions the confrontation with traumatic
material effects.  The force with which the traumatic material returns from the past and
irrupts in the present shocks Langford Ginibi.  Furthermore, we see that the borders
between one individual’s experience of trauma and another individual’s experience of
trauma are removed by the communality of the event: Gomes’s story is Langford Ginibi’s
story.  Relatedly, the distinction between the crisis itself and the trauma of surviving the
crisis is broken down, highlighting the way both disrupt time and continue to be
significant.  In addition, the double nature of testifying to trauma is conveyed, for
instance, Gomes’s testimony has the power to evoke the traumatic event for Langford
Ginibi, but Langford Ginibi can only attest to language’s failure to adequately register the
traumatic material when she strives to convey it to the reader.  This situation exemplifies
the way in which the complexity of traumatic memory necessitates repeated confrontation
with a traumatic past in an effort to integrate it into narrative, social and historical
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memory.  This irruption and interpolation of Aboriginal trauma into the testimonial text is
fundamental to the radical breakdown of traditional categories that testimonial writing
effects, such as self/other distinctions, demarcations between the past and the present,
speech and silence, and the disciplined generic structuring of the traditional life-story.
Theoretical Psychoanalysis: the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary
At this point, I want to review general psychoanalytic theory before employing and
challenging its potential applications.  To repeat, Beverley asks, “[d]o testimonial
narrators such as Rigoberta Menchú have an unconscious, and would a psychoanalytic
reading of their narratives be useful?  The answer on both scores, it seems to me, should
be yes” (“The Real Thing” 268).  What is Beverley inviting when he encourages a
psychoanalytic reading?  There are wide-ranging divergences between psychoanalytic
theories, for example, between Freud and Jacques Lacan and feminist psychoanalytic
theory (Elizabeth Grosz), between psychoanalysis and other psychotherapies.  As should
be clear, this study is primarily concerned with understanding the effects of traumatic
experience on the testifier and, because of this focus, psychoanalytic theory will be
explored only where it is relevant to trauma.  As noted in the preceding chapter, trauma is
a key concept in psychoanalytic theory on subjectivity.  Subjectivity is of course a key
concept in all psychoanalytic theory, yet this study is primarily concerned with those
theorists who have explicitly discussed subjectivity in relation to trauma.  I am going to
begin by revisiting Lacan for two reasons: first, his schematisation of subjectivity has
been very influential in literary studies; and, secondly, his concept of the Real has, I
argue, something to offer for theorising traumatic experience.27   Other theorists discussed
                                                 
27 It has been argued that although the Real is a useful concept, the Real does not exist.  Contrary to the
view that the Real does not exist, I argue, following Beverley, that “there are different Reals for different
Symbolics”.  Rather than figuring the Real as an abstracted, unlocatable concept, I attempt to anchor the
Real as a particular Other to a particular Symbolic system.
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in this section on trauma and subjectivity are Beverley, LaCapra, Elizabeth Grosz, Julia
Kristeva and Slavoj Zizek.
Lacan’s theoretical framework, like the anti-realist arguments discussed in
Chapter One, employs Saussurean linguistics to discuss the formation of subjectivity.
Lacan argues that basic rules of language construction are also the rules governing the
construction of subjectivity.  In demonstrating this, traditional Lacanian analysis argues
that the formation of the subject passes through three stages: the Real, the Imaginary and
the Symbolic.  The first stage, that of the Real, precedes any sense of identity or
subjectivity and the ‘subject’ is in a condition of complete undifferentiation.  This stage
can be considered as an unordered corporeality that exists before any development of
sensory motor control or of a nascent sense of subjectivity.  The stage at which a nascent
form of subjectivity arises is the Imaginary stage, and it is at this stage that there begins to
develop a basic sense of the self/other distinction.  During the Imaginary stage, the
‘subject’ develops a visual image of itself (the imago) that locates and orders the subject
in space before it has any physical control over space.  This stage is the first movement
away from the affective immediacy of lived experience into that of the representational
domain of language.  The complete separation of these two functions, the Real and the
Symbolic, is effected by the child’s entry into the Symbolic via Oedipal triangulation.
The Symbolic is the stage upon and within which the nascent subject attains the speaking
subject position of ‘I’.  Thus, to understand Lacan’s schema of the formation of the
subject, it is essential to refer to the rules of language because they are central to and
coterminous with the three stages through which the subject emerges.28
                                                 
28 What is crucial to note here is that such a myth of the emergence of the subject effaces specificity,
particularly, cultural specificity.  It needs to be asked how an Aboriginal Symbolic is different from a
colonising Symbolic, although not in an attempt to make a crude binary.  This is explored in more detail in
Chapter Five.
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Like the anti-realists (Belsey) and the post-structuralists (de Man), Lacan inverts
the Cartesian conception of subjectivity by asserting that the subject is created in
language, wherein  “[t]he subject cannot be considered the agent of speech; it is (through)
the Other (i.e. the unconscious) that language speaks the subject.  The subject is the effect
of discourse, no longer its cause” (Grosz, Sexual Subversions 98).  Just as the subject is
generated and lost in/as language, so too is the referent generated and lost in/as the
signifier: the laws of language are also the laws that constitute and govern the subject.  To
illustrate: Lacan substitutes the Freudian terms ‘condensation’ and ‘displacement’ (key
psychoanalytic concepts employed to describe the formation of subjectivity) for the
linguistic terms ‘metonymy’ and ‘metaphor’.  In this way, he establishes the
psychoanalytic subject as a linguistic subject and, thereby, psychoanalysis as compatible
with the analysis of language in general and texts in particular.  The predominance of
representational systems in the formation of the subject is illustrated in Lacan’s theory of
the development of the unconscious.
Lacan takes his account of the development of the unconscious from Freud, who
argues that drives become attached to a memory or affect which, in turn, comes to signify
that drive.  It signifies the drive and also diffuses the power of the drive because it stands
in its place only as a trace.  Consequently, we see that the moment the drive is registered
psychically it becomes subordinate to representational systems in an act of ‘primal
repression’.  The unconscious then develops by attracting other signs into itself that are
similar to the primary significations.  Similarities between signs are determined by the
operations of metonymy and metaphor, which are thus the primary operations that form
the unconscious.  The important thing to take from this account is the acknowledgment of
the centrality of representational and linguistic systems in the most fundamental
formations of the subject.
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As stated, Lacan’s use of metaphor and metonymy replace Freud’s concepts of
condensation and displacement respectively.  Metaphor is the substitution of one term for
another whereby the overlaying of one term for another functions like condensation.
Metaphorical condensation occurs when one signifier gets pushed below the bar by the
weight of its substitute, which then comes to take the place of the original symptom.
Metaphor “flashes between two signifiers one of which has taken the place of the other in
the signifying chain, the occulted signifier remaining present through its (metonymic)
connexion with the rest of the chain” (Lacan 157).  Metaphor, as Lacan himself suggests,
can be understood as the vertical axis of language.  Metonymy also functions by
substitution and is equivalent with displacement.  In contrast to metaphor, where one term
is buried beneath another, metonymy exchanges terms that are contiguous.  This means
that both operations can function at once, sliding across a ‘plane of metonymy’ that can
be understood as the horizontal axis of language.  For Lacan, these rules of language
generate and order both the unconscious and the law of the Symbolic.
The Real and Trauma
The concept of the Real was first developed by Lacan and has been used by literary
theorists to discuss problems relating to representation and the question of what escapes,
if indeed anything can escape, representation.  The Real is figured as the Other to
representational systems and therefore corresponds with the figuration of trauma as the
unspeakable.  As I will argue below, the operations of the Real have striking similarities
to the operations of traumatic experience.  The concept of the Real has been central to
psychoanalytic arguments (from Lacan to Grosz) regarding the relation between
representation and subjectivity and, consequently, I argue that theorisations of the Real
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provide some useful resources for discussing trauma in relation to representations that
strive to establish narrative and affective control over traumatic material.
How we conceptualise the Real (that which is Other to representation) and, in this
study, how I conceptualise trauma as the Real, necessarily affects what we can say about
representational systems.  This is because what we determine to be outside of
representation, to be the limits of representation, necessarily determines what can be
represented.  Traumatic material manifests itself as a tension between what can and
cannot be represented in speech or writing.  This tension at best creates a state of
disruption and, at worst, a state of dangerous crisis for the individual.  Such disruption to
(or crisis of) identity comes about because traumatic material (bad memories, fears,
cognitive confusions) structures an individual’s experience, yet the individual has slight
control over that material.  Traumatic experience determines the painful manner in which
an identity experiences the world, but that identity has little recourse to alter that pain.
While traumatic experience structures the traumatised identity, that identity is not
properly integrated with that structuring force.  The traumatised identity is an identity at
odds with itself.  The process of reconciling disruptive traumatic material within the
subject is a process of establishing narrative and affective control.  It might be said that
some identities would benefit from disruption and that an overly comfortable identity
may be an overly normativised one.  However, traumatic disruption is of an order of
experience where the survival of the individual (not the survival of a rather odd
conception of the subject) is threatened.  Traumatic material is often expressed as
potentially fatal violence towards oneself and others.  Efforts of the person suffering from
trauma to establish an integrated identity are repeatedly undermined and a functioning
identity cannot be established because a personal life-story cannot be established until the
traumatic material itself has been narrativised.
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The concept of the Real is useful for understanding post-colonial conditions and
the processes of cultural retrieval and reinscription.  In the following passage Beverley
introduces the concept of the Real as a tool for understanding post-colonial processes,
writing that “the Real is not the same thing as the concept we are perhaps more
comfortable using, the ‘reality effect’, as it is used in Barthesian or Althusserian criticism.
When [. . .] the blind man crashes against the stone post, [. . . he is] experiencing the Real,
not a reality effect” (“The Real Thing” 274).  Thus, the Real needs to be distinguished
from the terms ‘realism’, ‘reality’, and the ‘reality effect’ as discussed in Chapter One,
although it is related to the notion of ‘reality’ discussed in the examination of realism.29
The three latter terms are to be distinguished from the Real in that they are operations of
the Symbolic, whereas the Real is pre-Symbolic.  As we saw in Chapter One, realism is
problematic because it effaces ‘reality’s’ constructedness, and so the term ‘reality effect’
is employed in anti-realist criticism to identify that writing which aims to be read as
faithfully presenting reality.  In this manner, the ‘reality effect’ is an operation of the
Symbolic, that is, an operation of the dominant signifying codes that, by virtue of being
dominant, generate a repressed Other.  The terms ‘reality-effect’ and the Real are
opposites in that the ‘reality-effect’ is part of the dominant Symbolic that determines and
suppresses the Real.  Thus, the Real does not exist as an entity in itself but is better
envisaged as that which is Other to the Symbolic, where the Symbolic is a specific and
dominant configuration of the signifying process.  As Lacan would argue, it is the
figurative operations of metonymy and metaphor that generate the Real.
Beverley highlights a connection between the Lacanian Real and post-
colonialism, writing:
                                                 
29 Lacan’s ‘Real’ and the ‘reality’ of realism differ because Lacan’s use of the term specifically identifies a
traumatic otherness.  However, they operate similarly because they both are the referent that language seeks
to represent.
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the Real is, like the subaltern itself, with which it is connected both
conceptually and ‘really,’ not an ontological category but a relational one,
historically, socially, and psychically specific.  Just as there are different
strokes for different folks, one might say there are different Reals for
different Symbolics.  As subjects our (non)access to the Real is necessarily
through the Symbolic.  (“The Real Thing” 273)
The connection between the Real and post-colonial ‘reality’ is a consequence of the fact
that colonial practices, in their function as mechanisms of discursive control, generate
extra-discursive silences; active silences that render some subjects mute.  Not all colonial
practice operates in the same way and, thus, the re-emergence of the Real in a post-
colonial context takes different forms in, say, Australian and Canadian settler/invader
cultures than it does in South African Apartheid.  As Beverley puts it, “there are different
Reals for different Symbolics” (273).  Beverley continues to tie together the Real,
subalterneity and testimonial life-writing when he writes that “[testimonio] was the Real,
the voice of the body in pain, of the disappeared, of the losers in the rush to marketize
[neo-colonise], that demystified the false utopian discourse of neoliberalism, its claims to
have finally reconciled history and society” (281).  Here we see that the Real, as
testimonio, is generated by the “utopian discourse of neoliberalism”, that is, the Symbolic
as neoliberal ideology.  Beverley has provided a starting point for understanding the
convergence of post-colonial and psychoanalytic theory in his use of the Real because, for
Beverley, there is an equivalence between the Real and the experience of trauma.
It is also important to note that when Lacan uses the term ‘stages’ to denote the
Real, Imaginary and Symbolic, he not only uses it to designate a moment or series of
moments in time, but also to signify a place, for example, a stadium or a theatrical stage.
Thus, these stages are not only teleological (moving from one to the other) but also
omnipresent (active at any one time) — the Real is not confined to the past.  The notion
of stages, in conjunction with Lacan’s use of Saussurean linguistics, is deeply influential
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in Lacan’s deconstruction of a self-knowing Cartesian-like subjectivity.  As we saw in
Chapter One, Saussurean linguistics has been employed to show “that the elements
composing the sign, as well as the sign itself, can only have identity by virtue of their
pure difference” (Grosz, Sexual Subversions 93).  Precisely the same operation is
employed in de Man’s deconstruction of the autobiographical subject, that is, the referent
is subsumed to the signs that attest to it.30
To mark the special significance of the Real, Beverley restates Lacan’s use of the
word ‘thing’ and shows that Lacan’s analysis of the original German term das Ding was
used, following Freud, to distinguish das Ding from the German term die Sache, which
designates “‘a product of industry and of human action as governed by language’ in the
sense of a created or linguistically elaborated object [. . .]” (“The Real Thing” 266).  In
contrast, das Ding “designates a traumatic otherness that cannot be represented or
incorporated by the subject in language [. . .]” (266).  Earlier we saw that de Man
employed the trope prosopopeia to describe this opposition between the linguistic object
and ineffable ‘otherness’.  Lacan’s Real performs an almost identical operation as de
Man’s referent, in that both elude representation or are displaced by Symbolic
representation, or as Kristeva figures the condition, “I abject myself within the same
motion through which ‘I’ claim to establish myself” (Kristeva qtd. in Yúdice 27).
In a post-colonial context we could rephrase this to say that the colonialist
symbolic abjects itself within the same motion through which it establishes itself.  In a
post-colonial context, Kristeva’s point is dubious because it renders self-privileging as
abjection.  It suggests that the establishment of an abjected post-colonial subaltern, as
experienced by living embodied persons, is a form of self-abjection.  Kristeva’s abjected
object is the unrealised possibilities available for subjective becoming, in distinction from
                                                 
30 The reader will also remember that the term ‘classic realism’ was used by post-Saussurean linguistics to
designate writing that created an effect or illusion of reality.  In Lacan’s case, the ‘reality effect’ creates an
illusion of a subject that is distinct from the language that attests to it.
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determining forces such as racist discourses that construct selves and worlds.  In this
sense, the criticism of the referent as the denied Other is based on a retreat into the self as
abstracted possibility.  De Man’s and Kristeva’s post-structuralist move to, and emphasis
on, the defaced referent and the ‘always already’ effaced Real instantiates epistemological
impasse.  LaCapra identifies the potentially crippling consequences of such a move:
Theory itself in this context may take necessary critical and self-critical
inquiry — including inquiry into one’s own assumptions — and
autonomize or fetishize it until it becomes an externally predictable but
internally compelling process of disarticulation, disorientation,
destabilization, dismemberment, and so forth.  The discursive symptom of
this understanding of theory is the repeated, moth-to-flame movement
toward the paradox, aporia, or impasse that ‘sublimely’ brings language to
a halt and renders impossible (or situates as helplessly naive) any form of
recovery or viable agency.  (Representing the Holocaust 192)
LaCapra suggests that although we can concede that traumatic material behaves like the
Real, or a he sometimes puts it, the ‘sublime’,31 there is still the potential for symbolic
purchase of it.  The Real, as repressed traumatic material, as the Other to the dominant
Symbolic, uncannily returns and disrupts the Symbolic, similar to the way traumatic
material continually disrupts the subject who lives in its grip.
Again: “The traumatic event, although real, took place outside the parameters of
‘normal’ reality” [. . .]” (Laub, “Bearing Witness” 69); and, das Ding denotes “a
traumatic otherness that cannot be represented or incorporated by the subject in language
[. . .]” (“The Real Thing” 266).32  Thus, the irruption of the Real, in its otherness and
irreducibility, is similar to the experience of trauma.  Post-colonial trauma, as experienced
                                                 
31 The Real and the Sublime are related concepts in that they are beyond the scope of representation.
32 It is important to consider how trauma relates to Lyotard’s notion of the differend.  The language gap
between different cultures that divests the plaintiff of the means to represent his or her self is further
complicated by traumatic material because even if one had an adequate cross-cultural means of representing
oneself, the traumatic material remains difficult to access. Thus, trauma is another order of the differend.
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by the dispossessed Other to the colonial Symbolic, even if historically repressed,
disrupts that Symbolic, its legacies, and similar neo-colonial formations.  It undermines
the claims to normativity of colonial ideology.  Often such disruption is literary.
Testimonial life-writing is structured around the intrusion of the Real which,
according to Lacan, as cited by Beverley, is “that which resists symbolization absolutely”
(266).  As my argument above suggests, I am in disagreement with Beverley regarding
the Real’s absolute resistance to symbolisation because I agree with him that there are
different Reals for different Symbolics.  Just as there are differences between cultural
Symbolics and dynamic changes within them, and because there are different Reals for
different Symbolics, it follows that the Real shifts with shifts in the Symbolic.
The experience of trauma corresponds with the Real in its defiance to be spoken,
but unlike the Real, it manifests itself over and above the sign of absence — prosopopeia.
The Real supposedly can never be spoken because it is purely asymptotic, whereas
trauma defies being spoken while simultaneously manifesting itself through repeated
affective and linguistic disruptions.  This is what distinguishes my analysis of post-
colonial subaltern agency from deconstructive positions like that of de Man’s or
Kristeva’s which state, to use Foucault as an example, that while “‘the ‘other’ is ‘that
absence in the interior from which the work paradoxically erects itself’ (Foucault 66), it
does not exist” (Yúdice 22-23).  In contrast, subaltern life-writing’s negotiation with
traumatic post-colonial material that resists representation is not a “‘representation’ [. . .]
born of the exclusion of the ‘limiting otherness’ [. . .] but, rather, by dialogue and
interaction with it” (Yúdice 27).33  Yúdice further defines the implicit difference between
the practices of subaltern life-writers and what he terms ‘hegemonic postmodernism’, that
is, infinitely regressing, impasse-enacting deconstructions, writing:
                                                 
33 The nahual is “[t]he word given to the double, the alter-ego, be it an animal or any other living thing,
which, according to Indian belief, all human beings possess.  There is a relationship between the nahual and
a person’s personality” (Menchú 250).
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Again, in contrast with the hegemonic postmodern text, in which the ‘I’ is
expelled as vomit, in which the body transforms into vomit, that which is
expelled, separating it from nature (mother and father), thus making
dialogue impossible — ‘I abject myself within the same motion through
which ‘I’ claim to establish myself’  (Kristeva, 1982, 3) — Menchú’s text
is, rather, a testimonial of incorporation, embodiment.  (27)
The same problematic theoretical position that states that the Other is that which it is
impossible to have dialogue with can be seen in the work of Lacan’s scholarly disciple,
Zizek.  In discussing trauma and the Real, LaCapra describes Zizek’s position thus: “The
‘sublime object of ideology’ itself emerges as the Lacanian Real — an unsymbolizable
limit or unrepresentable kernel of experience.  Indeed, in Zizek the sublime seems to
involve fixation on a radically ambivalent transvaluation of trauma as the universal hole
in Being or the abstractly negative marker of castration” (Representing the
Holocaust 206).  Furthermore, LaCapra argues that Zizek identifies Lacan “with Hegel as
the negative dialectician who subverts speculative synthesis or wholeness (Aufhebung)
and validates alienation and infinite desire as the horizon of thought and action” (206).
If traumatic material can function like the Lacanian Real in the way that it eludes
representation, as I have argued, and if, in contrast to the Lacanian Real, it is often
successfully articulated and narrativised in testimonial writing, I maintain that we can say
considerably more about it than Lacan’s schema allows theorists to do.  This means that
the deconstruction of voice can be contested.  In contrast to Lacan’s notion of das Ding as
“a traumatic otherness that cannot be represented or incorporated by the subject in
language [. . .]” (“The Real Thing” 266), testimonial life-writing, as a process of working-
through trauma, demonstrates that it is possible to transform traumatic memory into
narrative memory.  Trauma, as the closest approximation of the Real, can be spoken and,
I think that, following LaCapra, “instead of becoming compulsively fixated on or
symptomatically reinforcing impasses, it [testimonial narrative] would engage a process
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of mourning that would attempt, however self-questioningly and haltingly, to specify its
haunting objects and (even if only symbolically) to give them a ‘proper’ burial”
(Representing the Holocaust 193).  The difference between impasse-enacting
deployments of post-structuralism and subaltern negotiation with post-colonial trauma is
as follows: post-structuralism contends that the Real is always negatively inscribed
through narrative and, thereby, the self cannot represent itself without effacing
possibilities of itself; post-colonial negotiation with trauma suggests that the Real, or the
closest approximation of it, traumatic experience, can be productively represented in
language and, in fact, demands to be represented in language in order for it to be
integrated into the individual’s life-story and cease being a disruptive force.  Such
representation is an act of survival.  The former position dismantles and risks crippling
subaltern agency and the latter affirms agency, demonstrating the effectiveness of its
position by the therapeutic benefits provided by narrativisations of trauma that are
claimed by testimonial life-writers.  Evidence of this success is that testimonial life-
writing comes to form an important and empowering written history for the
testifier/writer, their family and cultural community and, in the case of contemporary
Australia, an important contribution to the vocabulary of debates on national identity and
history.
In testimonial life-writing’s claim to represent the Real/trauma, it aligns itself with
the mimetic practice of realism discussed in Chapter One.  But, while testimonial life-
writing may explicitly align itself with realism, it need not necessarily be categorised as
such.  In the case of Aboriginal life-writing, testimonial life-writing might be categorised
as a variety of projects aimed at historical object-specification within a process of
mourning.  Nevertheless, object-specification is a process that is never entirely completed
because, as Lyotard explains, “that what remains to be phrased exceeds what we can
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presently phrase” (13).  Testimonial life-writing is not best described by the broad brush
strokes of realism or impasse-oriented deconstructions, but is better described as a literary
practice oriented towards specifying particular historical events that by their nature are
both transparent and opaque, phraseable and beyond phrasing.
The existence of a desire to reduce traumatic post-colonial events to theoretical
categories may be the result of confusing what LaCapra calls historical trauma and
structural trauma.  He writes that it is important
to argue for a problematic distinction between structural or existential
trauma and historical trauma that enables one to pose the problem of
relations between the two.  [. . .] It is deceptive to reduce, or transfer the
qualities of, one dimension of trauma to the other, to generalise structural
trauma so that it absorbs historical trauma, thereby rendering all references
to the latter merely illustrative, homogeneous, allusive, and perhaps
equivocal, or, on the contrary, to ‘explain’ all post-traumatic, extreme,
uncanny phenomena and responses as exclusively caused by particular
events or contexts.  Indeed the problem of specificity in analysis and
criticism may be formulated in terms of the need to explore the
problematic relations between structural and historical trauma without
reducing one to the other.  (History and Memory 47-48)
LaCapra provides evidence of the desire to collapse historical trauma into structural
trauma with reference to Zizek, citing him thus:
All the different attempts to attach this phenomenon [concentration camps]
to a concrete image (‘Holocaust’, ‘Gulag’ . . .), to reduce it to a product of
a concrete social order (Fascism, Stalinism . . .) — what are they if not so
many attempts to elude the fact that we are dealing here with the ‘real’ of
our civilization which returns as the same traumatic kernel in all social
systems?  (qtd. in LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust 206 fn. 2)
LaCapra comments on this: “One should also not forget that these various historical cases
have different valences and pose specific problems [. . .].  Zizek’s stance often seems to
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be that of the high-altitude theorist obsessed with the Real and its putative effects” (206
fn. 2).  There is damage to be done in collapsing historically specific traumatic events into
instances of the structural operations of trauma because the complexity of the experience
is concealed by generalisations.
In discussing trauma with colleagues and students I have found most people fall
into one of the two following positions: one that argues that traumatic experiences may be
understood as ahistorical instances of traumatic structures and that different historical
instances of trauma are commensurate; and, in opposition, the view that historical
instances of traumatic experience are always incommensurable.  Such an opposition
presents an either/or conception of the problem that may ultimately limit understanding of
historically specific trauma, such as post-colonial Aboriginal trauma.  For example, not
only do Apartheid and settler/invader forms of colonialisation differ, they both differ
from the Holocaust or a Sudanese war, and all differ from the killing fields of Cambodia.
Furthermore, the individual experience of trauma within each of these tragedies differs
one from another.  However, it is important to note that the functions of structural trauma
are not necessarily at odds with historical trauma.  As with my discussion of different
Reals for different Symbolics, the analysis of structural trauma benefits from historically
specific analysis.
The relationship between Holocaust Studies and the cultural memory work
underway in Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is a productive one for addressing issues
of cross-cultural commensurability and incommensurability with regard to trauma.  As I
have shown, the theoretical work on cultural memory and trauma has been most
extensively undertaken in Holocaust Studies.  This is the reason this study has employed
many of the insights and the vocabulary of Holocaust Studies to think through processes
that are involved in Aboriginal testimonial life-writing.  It also explains why some of the
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most dominant public voices in the debate on the traumas of Australia’s Stolen
Generation employ a theoretical framework based on Holocaust Studies.  For instance,
Inga Clendinnen’s Reading the Holocaust and Robert Manne’s The Culture of Forgetting
precede their public engagement with the Stolen Generations debate and provide them
with a vocabulary with which to articulate the issues involved.  As I discuss below, some
of the issues that have demonstrated cross-cultural significance are the importance of, and
the disruption to, personal memory and, by extension, cultural memory, the destructive
effects of trauma, inter-generational toxicity, the importance of telling stories that need to
be told, and the ethical significance of listening to those stories.
However, it should be asked, as Gillian Whitlock does: is there damage to be done
by articulating Aboriginal testimonials of trauma through a structural vocabulary template
of Holocaust discourse?  Whitlock writes:
As I have argued, the geographies of Holocaust work on cultural memory
have been fundamentally important in the emergence of a response to
[Aboriginal] testimonies.  [. . .] But the Holocaust template doesn’t quite
capture an element of the anxiety induced by these testimonies, and why
discursive justice is so difficult to produce here.  Why do we, the second
person, the witness, the non-indigenous element in the transaction, why do
we have to be told so didactically, so repetitively, what our response
should be?  (207)
Whitlock is not suggesting that Holocaust discourse is not relevant or useful for
discussing Aboriginal testimonial life-writing, but is drawing attention to the cross-
cultural differences between the two.  This study, as part of an overarching theoretical
approach, argues that it is important to employ both tactics, that is, draw ever closer
historical linkages while simultaneously underlining difference.  The difference Whitlock
is interested in is the position of the addressee in Aboriginal autobiography.  Whitlock
writes:
139S. R. J. Gibbons
Holocaust testimony draws all of us into a horrified questioning of what it
means to be human.  In response to this, there is almost always some kind
of compensatory movement in that we can install the Nazi as the Other,
and so displace our immediate responsibility.  We can imagine that we
might refuse to become that figure, that third person who is the object of
the testimony, the perpetrator of the crime [. . . whereas in] interracial
narratives there is a quite different movement [. . . wherein] the second
person, who is the witness and the narratee, is called upon to witness her
own complicity and implication in the loss and suffering which is finally
being spoken.  (209)
I address the particular concerns related to interracial relationality and witness positions
in Chapter Four.  At this point, it is important to realise that cross-cultural differences
exist not only at the level of the addressee, but also in the very event and experience of
trauma itself.
To complement this interest in difference, it is also useful to investigate
similarities that exist between supposedly incommensurable historical instances of
trauma, for instance, in the disruption of temporality (in the phenomena of latency and
flashback), the disruption of narrative control and cosmological security, in inter-
generational toxicity, the role of memory in the process of coming-to-terms with trauma,
and the importance given to the recognition of trauma by the wider community.  It seems
clear that the subjective experience of trauma cannot be reduced to being either absolutely
cross-culturally commensurate or incommensurate.  An instance of commensurability is
seen in the way Australia’s Bringing them Home Report was developed.  The Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) recommended to the Inquiry that
‘Support be provided for the collection and culturally appropriate
presentation of the stories with the approval of those who experienced
separation policies’ (submission 684 page 18).  Link-Up (NSW) called for
the establishment of an Aboriginal Oral History Archive.  This Archive
would be ‘modelled on the Shoah Foundation set up to record the oral
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histories of Jewish victims of the Nazi holocaust’ and would ‘fund and
facilitate the collection of oral histories of Aboriginal survivors of our
holocaust’ (submission 186).  (Bringing them Home 21)
Here we see Australia’s peak Indigenous body borrowing the language of and forms of
memorialisation from Jewish responses to the Holocaust.  In addition to the similarities I
have outlined above, the commensurabilty between the Jewish and Aboriginal responses
to trauma arises in part from the active, performative modelling of one experience on
another.
Writing on inter-personal relationality, Paul Redding writes, “[a]s mutually
presupposing but differently embodied and located self-consciousnesses, [. . . subjects]
are linked by recognition, a relation that maintains difference as essential; they are not
submerged within some overarching supermind” (125).  One can expand this insight into
the cross-cultural relationality of trauma: traumatic events are events connected neither by
an overarching supermind nor absolutely separate, but are rather intersubjective and
relational.  Just as subjects are generated within the relational systems of their
communities as well as cross-culturally, so too does traumatic experience range across a
spectrum of similarity and difference.  Thus LaCapra invites exploration of the
problematic relation between structural and historical trauma and, by extension, between
the commensurate and incommensurate.  To repeat, the best approach is not to emphasise
structural trauma or historical trauma, incommensurability or commensurability, realist
transparency or the opacity of impasse-oriented deconstruction, but rather to emphasise
phenomena that lie between these extremes.
To present different material as being either commensurate or incommensurate,
transparent or opaque, A or B, is a recurring and illogical tendency I have encountered in
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discussing the theory in this study.34  If one assumes A (commensurability) and evidence
proves this assumption to be false, there is a tendency to assume B (incommensurability):
if not A then B.  Writing on examples in trauma theory of the ‘if not A then B’ kind,
where A is a false assumption to begin with, LaCapra argues that trauma theory itself
may be correlated with two complementary ways of responding to trauma
that may mistakenly be seen as alternatives.  One response involves denial
or repression, for example, in a redemptive, fetishistic narrative that
excludes or marginalizes trauma through a teleological story that
projectively presents values and wishes as viably realized in the facts,
typically through a progressive, developmental process.  (Representing the
Holocaust 192)
With regard to the complicit and opposite tendency, LaCapra writes:
The second and complementary response tends intentionally or
unintentionally to aggravate trauma in a largely symptomatic fashion.
This may be done through a construction of all history (or at least all
modern history) as trauma and an insistence that there is no alternative to
symptomatic acting-out and the repetition compulsion other than an
imaginary, illusory hope for totalization, full closure, and redemptive
meaning.  (193)
Thus there is a tendency in theorising trauma to simulate typical either/or logical
responses to trauma itself.  Often, trauma theory either argues for redemptive narratives
that mirror victims’ desires for redemption from traumatic experience, or argues that any
attempt for narrative or affective control results in another traumatising impasse — a
position that mirrors the destructive acting-out witnessed in victims of trauma.  LaCapra
discusses the proposition of an
extreme version of totalization [. . . which serves] as a foil to its radical
undoing.  An extreme and compulsively repeated undoing may
nonetheless bear witness to the attraction of totalization and remain within
                                                 
34 A similar tactic is used in banalised versions of deconstruction, such as hegemonic postmodernism,
wherein criticism consists solely of demonstrating that A is not A.
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an ‘all-or-nothing’ frame of reference.  For the extreme reaction to an
assumption that everything ultimately makes sense may be the assumption
that ultimately nothing makes sense.  Or, through an overly generalized
theory of romantic irony, one may believe that one always remains
suspended between sense and non-sense in a manner that stymies all
possible judgment and action.  (191)
The structure of traditional autobiography is in a certain way geared to effect
redemptive narratives.  This is due in part to the strong split between the narrator and
protagonist whereby the narrative voice retrospectively bestows an order that never
existed for the protagonist.  The desire for redemptive closure is also found in testimonial
life-writing that works-through traumatic injustices.  Relevant to both traditional
autobiography and testimonial life-writing is LaCapra’s insight into the desire for closure:
Ideologically, the achievement of full identity or closure is the telos of
totalization, and the full redemption of meaning and value is the very
essence of discourse.  Mourning in this sense is a process that succeeds to
such an extent that it negates or overcomes itself, and (to paraphrase
Hegel) the wounds of the past are healed without leaving any scars.  (191)
The either/or approach in responses to trauma, the desire for full identity or the complete
collapse of identity, is a strategy available to both traditional autobiographical and
testimonial life-writing.
However, to better understand the complex narrative engagements with trauma
found in testimonial life-writing one must forego the either/or approaches outlined above
and instead focus on more subtle interstitial approaches.  Responding to the need for these
latter approaches, LaCapra writes, “[o]ne may nonetheless insist on a third sense of
theory related to Freud’s notion of working-through” (193).  A desire for a third way of
theory and practice can be found in the work of various theorists, such as the work of
feminist stand-point theorists Haraway and Sandra Harding, in Deleuze and Guattari, and
in Redding’s reading of Hegelian dialectics — each explored in more detail below.
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LaCapra also identifies this desire for a third way in Jacques Derrida’s notion of
‘generalised displacement’ when he writes that a certain displacement “must accompany
the reversal of hierarchically arranged binary opposites if one is not to remain entirely
within their frame of reference” (Representing the Holocaust 193 fn.18).  Reading
testimonial life-writing’s negotiation of traumatic material requires such displacement
and the psychoanalytic practice of working-through can be such a ‘third’ way of dealing
with it.
Working-Through/Writing-Through Trauma
The above discussion of testimonial life-writing outlined two dominant and flawed
strategies for grappling with traumatic experience: redemptive narratives and impasse-
enacting narratives.  I have also argued that effective post-colonial historicism requires an
ability for both historical specificity and cross-cultural reach.  Such an approach is
necessary to account for the incommensurability between different historical contexts
while maintaining openness to the structural commensurability between cross-cultural
experiences of trauma.  The concepts of structural trauma, historical trauma, redemptive
narratives and impasse-enacting narratives, and historical and cultural
incommensurability were discussed.  While I examined the above three oppositions
separately, they are connected in important ways in testimonial life-writing.  Structural
trauma is complicit with a comparative historicism that argues for the commensurability
between different historical instances of trauma, while historical trauma emphasises the
incommensurability of different historical instances of trauma.  Both strategies are
capable of emphasising either redemptive narratives or impasse-enacting narratives and to
avoid this we must balance the work of historical object-specification with that
comparative work that highlights structural similarities.
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Central to the project of specifying historical objects of trauma that disrupt
cultural agency is the concept of working-through, or as I sometimes term it in the case of
testimonial life-writing, writing-through.  Working-through functions to defetishise the
compulsion towards narrative impasse and aims to establish narrative control over
traumatic material.  Working-through requires a distance between the present and the past
and “involves the attempt to acquire some perspective on experience without denying its
claims or indeed its compulsive force” (LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust 200).
LaCapra writes:
working-through, as it relates both to the rebuilding of lives and to the
elaboration of a critical historiography, requires the effort to achieve
critical distance on experience through a comparison of experiences and
through a reconstruction of larger contexts that help to inform and perhaps
to transform experience.  One’s sense of one’s own problems may change
to the extent one comes to see their relations both to the experience of
others and to a larger set of problems, some components of which may
escape one’s purview.  (200)
Langford Ginibi’s writing is a case in point with regard to the building up of larger
contexts in the process of writing-through post-colonial trauma.  As discussed in Chapter
Two, Langford Ginibi’s writing begins to take on a significantly stronger testimonial style
after the writing and publication of her more autobiographical text Don’t Take Your Love
to Town.  The vicissitudes of her personal life increasingly come to be connected to larger
cultural and racial experiences.  There is a strong sense that the process of working-
through her personal life and its hardships is the cause of the increasing politicisation in
her later books.  The titles of her books suggest a widening out of her concerns.  From a
personal title like Don’t Take Your Love to Town, her later books are titled M y
Bundjalung People and Real Deadly (which deals with Aboriginal specific humour).
Real Deadly aims to highlight the significance of Aboriginal humour in countering the
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corrosive effects of cultural dispossession.  These later titles evoke her place in her
Aboriginal community.  Her writing moves from being distinctly autobiographical to
distinctly testimonial in tone.  A later publication, Haunted by the Past, focuses on her
son’s struggles with crime and the justice system, explicitly connecting his struggles with
cultural dispossession.  In the narrative reconstruction of her life the reader witnesses “the
effort to achieve critical distance on experience through a comparison of experiences and
through a reconstruction of larger contexts that help to inform and perhaps to transform
experience” (LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust 200).
Repetition is central to the process of establishing wider contexts for interpreting
personal experience in writing-through post-colonial trauma.  To illustrate: large textual
chunks in Langford Ginibi’s Don’t Take Your Love to Town, My Bundjalung People and
Haunted By the Past deal with the same material.  A sense of finalisation regarding
particular political and traumatic issues is not comprehensively achieved, rather there are
repeated approaches to deal with the same traumatic events.   LaCapra offers an insight
into why this is the case:
the radical ambivalence of repetition — its ‘undecidability’ if you prefer
— implies the possible role of counter-vailing forces that may not entirely
heal wounds but that allow mediated ways of surviving survival — forces
such as mourning itself, where grief is repeated in reduced, normatively
controlled, and socially supported form.  (Representing the Holocaust 199)
Repeated approaches towards traumatic material allow a space for the person
experiencing traumatic material to gain narrative and affective control over that material.
As I have noted, traumatic material continues to irrupt into the sufferer’s life and is a
destructive force.  Repetition in a “normatively controlled, and socially supported form”
(199), like that of testimonial life-writing narratives, allows greater purchase on traumatic
material.
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Testimonial life-writing becomes progressively more politicised through the
process of repeated confrontation with personally traumatic material, as illustrated in
Langford Ginibi’s life-writing.  Her writing moves from an engagement with the personal
to an engagement with her cultural group to the nation as a whole, and back again, in a
dialectical movement that broadens the stories’ significance.  LaCapra, citing J.
Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, writes: “[i]ndeed, for them ‘working-through might be
defined as that process which is liable to halt the repetitive insistence characteristic of
unconscious formations by bringing these into relation with the subject’s personality as a
whole’” (Representing the Holocaust 209).  Furthermore, as I have been arguing for the
social, rather than strictly personal, significance of psychoanalytic theory, the process of
writing-through trauma in testimonial life-writing not only brings traumatic material
“‘into relation with the subject’s personality as a whole’”, but also brings it into relation
with the nation as a whole (209).35  In a post-colonial context the process of writing-
through trauma is a process of specifying the material that needs to be reinscribed in post-
colonial cultures.  Importantly, it is also effective in countering neo-colonial and racist
practices.
A similar process of repetitive engagement with traumatic material is seen in My
Place in which Sally Morgan’s grandmother initially resists discussing her Aboriginality
because she is ashamed of it but progressively attains a sense of pride in it.  For instance,
the different colours of the grandmother, mother and grandchildren are a source of shame
in the family.  When Morgan’s grandmother first describes herself as black, it is done in
an emotionally pained manner.  The narrator, ostensibly Morgan, writes, “[s]he
[Morgan’s grandmother] lifted up her arm and thumped her clenched fist hard on the
kitchen table.  ‘You bloody kids don’t want me, you want a bloody white grandmother,
                                                 
35 In this instance, I would simply define ‘whole’ as not too strictly demarcated.
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I’m black.  Do you hear, black, black, black!’  With that, Nan pushed back her chair and
hurried out to her room” (97).  And later:
Mum and I had small conversations about the past, but they weren’t really
informative, because we tended to cover the same ground.  Sometimes,
Mum would try and get Nan to talk.  One day, I heard Nan shout, ‘You’re
always goin’ on about the past these days, Glad.  I’m sick of it.  It makes
me sick in here’, she pointed to her chest. ‘My brain’s no good, Glad, I
can’t ’member!’  (145)
Such shame is transferred to the younger generations of the family.  When Morgan
discovers through her sister Jill that she is not Indian but Aboriginal, Morgan identifies
her family’s sense of shame in being Aboriginal.  Jill describes her family in derogatory
and racist terms, a consequence of internalising white racist views, an internalisation that
is at conflict with their Aboriginal identity.  Morgan quotes her sister: “‘You still don’t
understand, do you’, Jill groaned in disbelief.  ‘It’s a terrible thing to be Aboriginal.
Nobody wants to know you [. . .].  You can be Indian, Dutch, Italian, anything, but not
Aboriginal!  I suppose it’s all right for someone like you, you don’t care what people
think.  You don’t need anyone, but I do!’” (98).  Yet, through Morgan’s insistence
throughout the text on confronting and acknowledging the family’s Aboriginality, there
are moments of breakthrough in the process of working-through in which the
acknowledgement of Aboriginality as an act of object specification leads to a sense of
pride in Aboriginal identity:
About this time , Nan’s favourite word became Nyoongah.  She’d heard it
used on a television report and had taken an instant liking to it.  To Nan,
anyone dark was now Nyoongah.  Africans, Burmese, American Negroes
were all Nyoongahs.  She identified with them.  In a sense, they were her
people, because they shared the common bond of blackness and the
oppression that, for so long, that [sic] colour had brought.  It was only a
small change, but it was a beginning.
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In a strange sort of way, my life had new purpose because of
that.  (138)
Likewise, the family’s journey up the West Australian coast to connect with their
Aboriginality is an act of working-through a sense of lost identity.  Morgan recounts the
journey on which she was accompanied by her mother, husband and children.  On
meeting two older Aboriginal women, Topsy and Nancy, it takes some time for these
women to identify the connection between them all.  In fact, they grew up with Morgan’s
grandmother and great aunt.  They tell Morgan about her aunt and their early life at
Corunna Downs.  The discovery of this information about Morgan’s family history is an
instance of working-through important and difficult material connected with Aboriginal
identity.  Morgan writes:
I pointed to the photo containing Nanna as a young girl and got them to
look at it carefully.  Suddenly, there was rapid talking in Balgoo.  I
couldn’t understand a word, but I knew there was excitement in the air.
Topsy and Nancy were now very anxious about the whole thing.
Finally, Gladys turned to me with tears in her eyes and said, ‘If I
had have known Daisy’s sister was Wonguynon, there would have been no
problem’.
‘Who’s Wonguynon?’ I asked.
‘That’s Lilla’s [Morgan’s great aunt] Aboriginal name.  We only
knew her by Wonguynon.  [. . .] She was related to my father.  I am your
relation, too’.
Topsy and Nancy began to cry.  Soon, we were all hugging.
Gladys and I had tears in our eyes, but we managed not to break down.
[.  .  .] ‘They lived as one family unit in those days’, Gladys explained.
‘They lived as a family group with Daisy and Lily and Annie.  This makes
them very close to you.  They are your family.  Daisy was sister to them.
They call her sister, they love her as a sister.’
By this time, we were all just managing to hold ourselves together.
I tried not to look at Gladys as she explained things, because I was trying
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to keep a tight lid on my emotions.  It wasn’t that I would have minded
crying, it was just that I knew if I began, I wouldn’t be able to stop.  It was
the only way to cope.
Later, we retraced our steps back down through the Reserve [. . .].
By the time we reached the other end of the Reserve, we’d been hugged
and patted and cried over, and told not to forget and to come back.
An old full-blood lady whispered to me ‘You don’t know what it
means, no one comes back.  You don’t know what it means that you, with
light skin, want to own us.’
We had lumps in our throats the size of tomatoes, then.  I wanted
desperately to tell her how much it meant to us that they would own us.
My mouth wouldn’t open.  I just hugged her and tried not to sob.
We were all so grateful to Gladys for the kind way she helped us
through.  Without her, we wouldn’t have been able to understand a word.
Our lives had been so enriched in the past few days.  We wondered if we
could contain any more.  (228-29)
Finally, on their return to Perth, a different and more complete sense of their relationship
to their own Aboriginality is experienced:
That afternoon, we reluctantly left for Perth.  None of us wanted to go,
Paul [Morgan’s husband] included.  He’d been raised in the North and
loved it.  We were reluctant to return and pick up the threads of our old
lives.  We were different people, now.  What had begun as a tentative
search for knowledge had grown into a spiritual and emotional pilgrimage.
We had an Aboriginal consciousness now, and were proud of it.
Mum, in particular, had been very deeply affected by the whole
trip.
‘To think I nearly missed all this.  All my life, I’ve only been half a
person.  I don’t think I really realised how much of me was missing until I
came North.  Thank God you’re stubborn, Sally.’
We all laughed and then, settling back, retreated into our own
thoughts.  There was much to think about.  Much to come to terms with.  I
knew Mum, like me, was thinking about Nan.  We viewed her differently,
now.  We had more insight into her bitterness.  And more then anything,
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we wanted her to change, to be proud of what she was.  We’d seen so
much of her and ourselves in the people we’d met.  We belonged, now.
We wanted her to belong, too.  (233-34)
A similar sense of completion is identified when on leaving Morgan’s uncle Arthur’s
wife’s house, Morgan writes, “We felt very full inside when we left.  It was like all the
little pieces of a huge jigsaw were finally fitting together” (232).
Of course, there is always a risk involved in working-through post-colonial
trauma of falling into totalising redemptive narratives or impasse-oriented racial and
cultural divisions.  The failure to work-through racial and cultural conflict is described by
LaCapra in a psychoanalytic sense:
Here deceptive transfiguration is necessarily supplemented if not displaced
by what may be an equally deceptive disfiguration or disarticulation.  This
reaction becomes particularly compelling in a posttraumatic context,
particularly when the object of mourning is concealed or foreclosed and
the process of mourning is arrested by (or even identified with) continual
melancholy and the acting out of a repetition compulsion.  (Representing
the Holocaust 192)
However, writing on the benefits and risks of working-through trauma and by extension
of testimonial life-writing, LaCapra suggests that
the nonfetishistic narrative that resists ideology would involve an active
acknowledgment and to some extent an acting out of trauma with the
irredeemable losses it brings, and it would indicate its own implication in
repetitive processes it cannot entirely transcend.  But it would also attempt
to conjoin trauma with the possibility of retrieval of desirable aspects of
the past that might be of some use in counteracting trauma’s extreme
effects and in rebuilding individual and social life.  (199)
In the language of Holocaust Studies:
One may agree with the view that the Holocaust is, in a manner that would
have to be further differentiated, ‘a communal wound that cannot heal.’
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But does this view entail that countervailing tendencies in the lives of
victims — and by seeming implication in modernity in general — are
merely constitutive of a surface life or murmur that is somehow less
authentic than what is argued to lie beneath?  (196)
Similarly, I argue for a non-totalising view in the manner of LaCapra, one that posits a
mutable array of presences and silences, different Reals for different Symbolics, and is
capable of identifying the different successes and failures involved in working-through
post-colonial trauma.  LaCapra cites Phillip K.’s (a testifier for the Fortunoff Video
Archive of Holocaust Testimonies at Yale) testimony, which argues that there are as
many ways of surviving survival as there have people to survive.36  LaCapra writes that
Phillip K.’s observation “points to the danger of homogenizing or overgeneralizing about
the experience of victims and survivors.  I think one may also argue that it indicates the
danger of massive generalizations about modernity and points instead to the importance
of careful comparative history” (197).  LaCapra further argues that Lawrence Langer (an
important theorist of Holocaust trauma) “may go too far in the opposite yet
complementary direction” towards salvationist, heroic narratives of surviving the
Holocaust (197).37  In place of either extreme, LaCapra argues that
values have to a significant extent been jeopardized by trauma and
evacuated by banalization, and they may be invoked as mere clichés or
rhetorical topoi by those who do not believe in them and may not be
shocked when they are radically distorted or transgressed.  In this respect,
there is a need for a discourse on values that is not purely transcendental or
detached from social and historical inquiry but critically related to
problems of empirical research as well as to the rebuilding of agency,
                                                 
36 Phillip K.’s last name is withheld by the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies to protect
his anonymity.
37 LaCapra criticises Langer for his ‘strategy of reversal’, his ‘opposite yet complementary’ approach to
redemptive narratives.  LaCapra writes: “He [Langer] explicitly states that historical investigation of the
Holocaust ‘cannot promote life’” (Representing the Holocaust 198).  However, on page 202, LaCapra cites
Langer to illustrate that Langer often holds a less absolute position.
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which is required for the situational transcendence of existing relations
toward more desirable possibilities.  (201-202)
As LaCapra argues:
One may nonetheless suggest that certain discursive movements [. . .]
indicate how one might approach the issue of working-through in its
relation to acting-out.  A principal conceptual means would be the relation
of the Imaginary to the Symbolic (with the notion of the Real defetishized
to allow for other possibilities in the response to trauma).  (207-208)
I contend that testimonial life-writing and its theoretical explication in this chapter can be
viewed as such a discursive movement.  Aboriginal testimonial life-writing defetishises
the Real through its faith in the political and therapeutic efficacy of the writing process,
while this study theoretically defetishises the Real by insisting on its specificity and
thereby the potential for it to be leveraged in different ways at different times.  The
relationship between working-through and acting-out in testimony and theory provides
the opportunity to extend vocabularies and imaginaries for responding to post-colonial
trauma.  In the next chapter I explore how the performativity and off-setting of working-
through and acting-out, in relation to working-through episodes of derealisation, may be
therapeutically and intellectually valuable.  However, there is always the risk of re-
traumatising subjects by off-setting working-through with acting-out and by not
providing adequate conceptual tools through which to specify traumatic objects and
establish narrative control over the traumatic material being activated.  Yet, when such
object-specification is achieved, a sense of closure may result.
However, Aboriginal testimonial life-writing and the theory of this study is not
interested in working-through post-colonial trauma simply to close it off.  It is also about
opening out traumatic experiences on to the world and through doing so enriching
Aboriginality and tracing the progressions and regressions of social imaginaries.  Closure,
as employed in this study, does not signify the presentation of a final story.  Indeed,
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testimonial life-writing, rather than partaking in the practice of closure, presents the
disjunctions between what can be phrased now and what is yet to be phrased; a
disjunction that creates a dynamic identity rather than a rigid and illusory authenticity.
The concept of closure is better understood as the increased descriptive and exegetic
power of language whereby what was not phrased but needed to be phrased can now be
phrased.  Closure is concerned with object-specification, not conclusiveness.
The concept of trauma itself is an example of a concept/object that has proved a
useful tool for thinking through the effects of colonial dispossession and has increased the
vocabulary available to Aboriginal peoples for better articulating their experiences.
Trauma is also a useful concept for literary critics who wish to better explicate the
processes involved in testimonials.  What once was not phrased and which now can be
better phrased assists in establishing narrative control and thereby identity.  Such
concepts ought not to be understood as simply prescriptive but rather as useful points
from which to develop important conversations.  The openness, rather than closedness, of
this conception of language-work is also shared by the affective dimensions of trauma-
work because affect is also open to productive rearrangement and rearticulation in ways
that are richer than currently experienced.  One ought not work-through traumatic
material to close it off and finish with it but rather work to better articulate it and in so
doing transform that traumatic material.  Moreover, transforming traumatic material
through better object-specification creates a vocabulary that holds traces of its path to
articulation, its history of linguistic and affective development.  This concept of
specificity is addressed in more detail in Chapter Five.
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Chapter 4
Aboriginal Testimonial Life-Writing and Recognition Theory
The preceding chapter discussed different strategies for writing-through traumatic
material and explored how Aboriginal life-writing is useful for establishing narrative and
affective control over post-colonial traumatic material.  As noted earlier, there are “three
separate, distinct levels of witnessing [. . .]: the level of being a witness to oneself within
the experience; the level of being a witness to the testimonies of others; and the level of
being a witness to the process of witnessing itself” (Laub 75).  The previous chapter
focussed on the first and third of these three levels of witnessing trauma.  This chapter
sets out to further explore these three forms of witnessing through analysing various
recognitive structures, specifically focussing on Laub’s second category of witnessing,
that is, how the reader witnesses Aboriginal testimonial life-writing.
The work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Redding on Hegel’s recognition
theory is helpful for understanding the complexities involved in the patterns of
recognition found in the author/reader, Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations in Aboriginal
testimonial life-writing.  Gadamer, in his essay “Hegel’s Dialectic of Self-
Consciousness”, writes, “we see that the structural identity between the life processes of
what lives and self-consciousness demonstrates that self-consciousness is not at all the
individualized point of ‘I=I,’ but rather, as Hegel says, ‘the I which is we and the we
which is I’” (58).  Central to the analysis of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing’s generic
specificity in Chapter Two was an exploration of the way in which the co-extensivity of
the narrator with his or her cultural group is strongly emphasised through framing the
narrator’s life-story within the broader story of the colonial dispossession of the narrator’s
cultural group.  Whereas Chapter Two explored the ‘I’ at the heart of the ‘we’ in that it
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focused on the narrator’s connection with his or her cultural group, this chapter focuses
on what Hegel terms above “‘the ‘we’ which is ‘I’” (58), that is, the broader social world
within which the testimony is circulated.  Such a distinction is really a matter of
emphasis, but whereas the ‘we’ analysed in Chapter Two was the connection between the
Aboriginal narrator and the broader Aboriginal community, this chapter analyses the
relationship between that collectivity and the broader reading public in order to develop a
better understanding of the complexities of recognition involved in reading Aboriginal
testimonial life-writing.  It argues that understanding the processes of recognition
involved in the relationship between Aboriginal narrators, their cultural collective and the
non-Aboriginal readership is central for understanding the negotiations involved in
achieving the political and therapeutic goals of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing.
The way in which any self comes to self-consciousness through the ‘we’ of the
broader social world involves the operation of a profound ambiguity.  The ambiguity of
the dialectic of recognition of self and other (singular or plural) is of central importance
for understanding author/reader relations.  This is the case because recognitive ambiguity
between the self/author and the other/reader precedes and structures other important
dialectical structures such as the “dualisms [. . .] culture/nature, male/female,
civilized/primitive, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, maker/made,
active/passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion [. . .]” (Haraway 177).  This is the case because
these dualisms can operate only to the extent that they are acknowledged and negotiated
within a recognitive framework.  This study’s interest in Hegelian dialectics and the
maintenance of the ambiguity of recognition is also a point from which to distinguish it
from post-structuralist studies that reject Hegelian dialectics on the basis that they efface
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difference by gathering them up into an absolute monological perspective.38  This chapter
argues that establishing successful ethical relationships between the self and others relies
on maintaining difference in the operations of recognition and argues that Hegelian
thought, as formulated by Redding, provides a sound basis from which to explore these
operations.  Testimonial life-writing is rich in material conducive to exploring the ethical
issues involved in the dialectics of recognition and difference between self and others.
As I have argued previously, the foregrounding of issues of ethical significance in
testimonial life-writing is one feature that distinguishes it from other forms of life-
writing.  It is true that other forms of life-writing involve issues of ethical significance
and function representatively of larger groups: for example, life-writing that addresses
discourses of gender, race, and class.  However, such writing, usually autobiographical,
places stronger emphasis on the individual.  In contrast, testimonial life-writing always
places heavy emphasis on the collective features of the dialectics of recognition due to the
centrality in testimonial life-writing of negotiating discourses of social justice of
relevance to the broader community.
The way in which testimonial life-writing’s ethical material implicates the reader
in a more complex engagement with the dialectics of recognition is the focus of this
chapter.  As has been discussed, testimonial life-writing employs a collective voice that
addresses the ‘I’ of the reader and emphasises the reader’s historical and cultural
constructedness as part of a group implicated in colonial injustice, that is, non-Aboriginal
(white) Australia.  This form of address interpellates difference into the reading subject as
                                                 
38 Some critics of Hegelian dialectics of recognition criticise it because they view the process as one that
negates difference in the resolution of dialectical poles into Absolute Reason or something approximating it
— see Rosalyn Diprose’s Bodies of Women: Ethics, Embodiment and Sexual Difference.  However, I agree
with Redding’s interpretation of Hegel which argues that “when we understand Hegel’s spirit as constituted
by intersubjective relations of recognition, we will see the error of equating spirit with any transcendental
ego or the absolute ego, the error encouraging the view [. . .] that for Hegel intersubjective relations are
ultimately subsumed within a ‘monological’ relation to self which allows no alterity.” (122).  This position
is in line with the general theoretical approach of this study, which focuses on the negotiation of difference
— not merely the assertion or denial of it.
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opposed to the interpellation of identification between author and reader seen in
traditional autobiography (as discussed in Chapter One).  Such traditional
autobiographical texts speak to the ‘I’ of the reader, transforming the subject position of
the ‘I’ from a historically located and specific subject into a transcendent subject position
that is shared by the author and the reader — the position of the abstracted and sovereign
subject — and in so doing, efface the complexities involved in the dialectics of
recognition.
Before exploring different forms of author/reader relations it is important to
recapitulate the notion of the interpellation of author/reader positions in traditional
autobiography in order to understand the narrative techniques by which the addressee is
constructed in testimonial life-writing.  In Chapter One, I argued that the reader of
autobiographical texts is encouraged to identify with the author.  As Paul John Eakin
states:  “I am arguing that this proto-autobiographical tendency — this identification of
reader with autobiographer — constitutes the fundamental motive for the reader’s interest
in autobiography in the first place” (Touching the World 36).  Or as Paul de Man puts it:
“[t]he autobiographical moment happens as an alignment between the two subjects
involved in the process of reading in which they determine each other by mutual reflexive
substitution” (70).  I argued that such identification may be considered a form of
Althusserian interpellation whereby “the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in
order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he
shall (freely) accept his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the gestures and
actions of his subjection ‘all by himself’” (Althusser 182).  In Althusser’s model, the
individual becomes subject[ed] to the Subject — the use of the common proper noun
‘Subject’ indicating the abstracted universality of the category.  Likewise, much life-
writing produces an abstracted and transcendent authorial position that interpellates the
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reader through the proto-autobiographical desire of the reader to identify with the author.
The plurality of perspectives available to authors and readers is gathered up in a unifying
mono-perspective that suspends plurality temporally through retrospective narrative and
spatially through a single viewpoint.  As Lloyd writes, the narrator “see[s] each event in
its fixed relation to a past which has presumably achieved its final form.  The past self
[.  .  .] is seen as having a completeness which it could not attain while present.  The
retrospective narration constitutes the self as a coherent object, grasped from the stance of
immutable truth” (174).  Such an authorial position invites the reader to identify with that
position — an attractive invitation/interpellation because the mastery that the author
maintains over the narrative material is transferred to the reader.  This interpellation of
the reader reinforces the illusion of a sovereign subjectivity and it is from this point that
the reader, like the author, maintains a detached distance from the fate of the protagonist.
Such interpellation creates a space from which the subject can detach itself from ethico-
political historical forces that act upon and form selves and their relationships with each
other.  It is “[i]n this way [that] classic realism constitutes an ideological practice in
addressing itself to readers as subjects, interpellating them in order that they freely accept
their subjectivity and their subjection” (Belsey 69).  The recognitive relationship between
the reader and author as it is figured in this structure means that there is an experience of
subjective mastery over narrative indeterminability that is shared by the reader and
author.  These abstracted forms of subjectivity persist because the privileges of power and
mastery assumed in adopting a transcendent authorial or readerly position are attractive.
However, this mastery is illusory because it is predicated on the exclusion and
ignorance of other subject positions and perspectives.  Such illusion is cause for ethical
concern because it places detrimental restrictions on the expressions of subjectivities that
lie outside this particular author/reader relationship.  New literary forms arise through
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authors’ rejection of such dominant literary figurations of author/reader recognitive
relations as inadequate for the expression of new subjectivities and their experiences.
Furthermore, new subjects and writing practices need to be accompanied by innovative
interpretative frameworks to better understand them and it is to these new literatures,
subjects, and interpretive tools that I now turn.
Recognitive Structures of Testimonial Life-Writing
The complexities of the dialectics of recognition involved in the black/white,
author/reader relations found in Aboriginal life-narratives undermine recourse to
transcendent subject positions like those found in traditional forms of life-writing and
work against simplistic conflation of reader and author.  A philosophical explanation for
the inadequacy of Cartesian-like (transcendent, abstracted) subjectivities in author/reader
relations can be found in Jean-Paul Sartre’s contention that the Cartesian subject/cogito
itself relies on a recognitive basis:
the cogito itself can not be a point of departure for philosophy; in fact it
can be born only in consequence of my appearance for myself as an
individual, and this appearance is conditioned by the recognition of the
Other.  The problem of the Other should not be posited in terms of the
cogito; on the contrary, the existence of the Other renders the cogito
possible as the abstract moment when the self is apprehended as an
object.  (236)
Here we see that the double movement of recognition precedes the establishment of the
Cartesian subject/cogito and consequently discredits discourses that privilege this
subjectivity as foundational.  In the ‘Key to Special Terminology’, the definition of
Cogito reads: “Cogito[:] Sartre claims that the pre-reflective cogito (see ‘consciousness’)
is the pre-cognitive basis for the Cartesian cogito” (630).  If the Cartesian cogito cannot
be defended as a foundation on which to base the dialectic of recognition and yet, as I
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argue, it is the dominant imaginary/subject in traditional forms of life-writing, a problem
exists that needs to be addressed.
The claim that the Cartesian cogito is the dominant vehicle for the epistemological
assumptions found in much traditional life-writing finds support in the notion that there is
a distinctive European cosmology as distinguished from non-European cosmologies.
Th. C. W. Oudemans and A. P. M. H. Lardinois in Tragic Ambiguity define the
differences between separative (European) and interconnected cosmologies:
In Europe we are confronted with a cosmology which is based on
separation of entities and categories and subsequent unification, whereas
in the other cosmology entities and categories are distinguished as well,
but the distinctions are not so absolute: they hide various implicit
connections.  The former type of cosmology is called separative, the latter
interconnected.  (32)
The emphasis in Western cosmology and Cartesian epistemology on the “separation of
entities and categories and subsequent unification” corresponds with author/reader
relations that are disconnected from the profound and dynamic ambiguity of
recognition (32).  Just as the ambiguity of self/other recognitive structures precedes the
Cartesian cogito, so too the ambiguity of recognition precedes separative cosmologies
and their distinctive systems of ordering the world:
To the Cartesian mind, it is almost incomprehensible that pollution and
purification could be identical, that purification may take the shape of
transgression and pollution.  In an interconnected culture, blood that
trickles and clots outside the veins is a source of pollution, but in ritual the
same blood is a salutary force imparting healing.  (55)
This chapter explores forms of author/reader relations other than the Cartesian-like forms
found in traditional forms of life-writing.  It sets out to do this through exploring forms of
post-colonial life-writing that interpolate the text with more complex forms of
author/reader relations.  It analyses the ambiguity involved in recognitive structures and
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aims to provide a theoretical foundation and framework that is capable of articulating the
centrality of recognition in terms other than that found in Cartesian epistemology.
Redding writes:
The intersubjective dimension of recognition [. . .] undermines the
individualistic Cartesian approach to subjectivity while at the same time
not reducing individual intentional beings to mere moments of social
structure.  Furthermore, when we understand Hegel’s spirit as constituted
by intersubjective relations of recognition, we will see the error of
equating spirit with any transcendental ego or the absolute ego, the error
encouraging the view, such as is held by Gadamer and Rosen, that for
Hegel intersubjective relations are ultimately subsumed within a
‘monological’ relation to self which allows no alterity.  (122)
Authorial and reader subjects, according to Redding, fall into error when their relations
assume a shared transcendental or absolute ego like that found in the Cartesian-like
author/reader relations of traditional forms of life-writing.  Such a move fails because
“relations are ultimately subsumed within a ‘monological’ relation to self which allows
no alterity” (122).  Difference is effaced via identification with a transcendental subject
position.  Instead of this, author/reader relations ought to posit subjects “[a]s mutually
presupposing but differently embodied and located self-consciousnesses [. . .] linked by
recognition, a relation that maintains difference as essential; they are not submerged
within some overarching supermind” (125).
Testimonial life-writing can be identified by the special role it constructs for the
addressee — a position that complicates the addressee’s identification with the author in a
Cartesian-like manner because it implicates the addressee in an ethical dilemma.  This is
due, in part, to the presence of ethical issues surrounding injustice and the urgency
expressed by the author to address those issues and communicate them to readers in
public literary and political domains.  Testimonial life-writing challenges the reader to act
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as a witness to issues of injustice.  As Beverley writes, “[t]estimonio [. . .] always
signifies the need for a general social change in which the stability and complacency of
the reader’s world must be brought into question” (Beverley and Zimmerman 178).  As
discussed in Chapter Two, this generic feature of testimonial life-writing distinguishes it
from other forms of life-writing such as autobiography.  The author/reader identification
found in much life-writing — that is, the interpellation of the reader as a transcendent
subject — is much more difficult to sustain when reading texts dealing with injustices
associated with post-colonial trauma, particularly when the reader’s ethical integrity is
addressed.  I intend to show that reading ethically charged material that implicates the
reader in the history of colonial dispossession forces an ethical response from the reader
that can either fail or succeed in working towards providing just outcomes for testifiers.
Testimonial life-writing functions to locate the reader in an ethico-political
historical context via literary techniques that locate, accuse, make demands of and restrict
responses from the reader.  In this way, it works against readers’ desires to escape into the
kind of abstractions discussed above: recourse to abstracted notions of temporality and
viewpoint (as discussed by Lloyd); recourse to an experience of the sublime (negative or
positive); and denial (LaCapra).39  It is necessary to note that ethical reading responses
are not the sole domain of testimonial life-writing and there are many examples in the
literary canon in which ethical issues are addressed and projected on to the reader.
Concerning ethics and literature, Parker writes: “[a]s ever, novels, plays, and poetry
continue to be published, and some of these continue to show why literature is rightly
esteemed as a highly particularised, complex and richly contextualised mode of ethical
reflection [. . .]” (12).  However, in testimonial life-writing, ethical consideration is
                                                 
39 Also see Laub’s list of defensive reading mechanisms discussed below.
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strongly foregrounded because the issues are addressed in a realist literary mode that aims
to implicate the reader in a present-centred ethical dilemma.
Implicating the Non-Aboriginal Audience
Often in testimonial life-writing, the reader is evoked not as an accomplice but rather as
the target of the text’s criticisms of ethical failure. Dalziell writes of the way that
testimonial life-writing mirrors the Judeo-Christian form of testimony:
Consideration of Aboriginal autobiography as testimonio, involving
revelation of shame, raises the issue of reader response.  The reader of
testimonio has been likened to that of a jury in a court room.  But in the
religious tradition from which the genre derives, courtroom scenes where
testimony is given are generally narrated so that the positions of jury and
accused are reversed: the testimony of the accused implicates the hearers
in some form of moral deficiency.  (131-32)
Textual evidence of the way testimonial life-writing implicates the reader in serious
ethical issues can be found throughout the Aboriginal life-writing examined in this study.
For example, in My Bundjalung People, Ruby Langford Ginibi completes the book with
the following remonstration of the white reader:
Finally, I will finish this history of my Bundjalung people with some
words from my first book: ‘That we are here! and [sic] always will be
here!’, with this added bit of information:
Don’t be gobbingh-miggingh [greedy guts] and take everything
from us.  You white people have to learn to give something back.  You
cannot take forever from us, because in the end, you will destroy
yourselves too!  Give back our mother earth.  You’ve desecrated her and
my people long enough!
NINGINAH! STOP!  (212)
Clearly this passage implicates the white non-Aboriginal reader in the history of colonial
injustice.  The white reader is evoked as a desecrating greedy guts and any move on the
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part of the white reader to identify with the author is problematised, if not foreclosed.
However, it does provide a position internal to the reader through which they can
recognise themselves differently, that is, it effects an othering of the self and, thereby,
opens up new positions from which to recognise the Aboriginal narrator.
The same ethical questioning of the reading jury is found in other Aboriginal life-
writings.  Dalziell writes:
The intentionality of [Charlie] Perkins’ narrative is comparable to his
purpose in addressing white audiences about Aboriginal issues, that is, to
lead them to a conviction of their own racism ... [and] Langford Ginibi, in
My Bundjalung People, records her impressions of white audience
response at the Lismore Club after her forthright presentation of white
racism: ‘We looked at their faces and oh!  They were a mournful lot!  So
many sad faces; they looked like stunned mullets!’  (133)
Both Perkins and Langford Ginibi aim to implicate the white audience in Australia’s
history of colonial racism.  As I have argued, such implication works to bar white
audiences from recourse to abstractions that disengage them from their connection to
Australian history — abstractions like the Cartesian cogito examined earlier.  By
foreclosing such disengagement, Aboriginal life-writing locates the white audience within
Australia’s colonial history which, in turn, may force parts of the audience to recognise
themselves differently.  Such writing relativises white readers by implicating them as the
desecrating other and in doing so emphasises their difference from the testifier.  The
dialectics of recognition function not only to demand confrontation with the Other but
also a confrontation with the self as a relative and particular subject.  In addition,
testimonial life-writing implicates the white reader in Australia’s colonial history with the
aim of shaping their response to it by providing an Aboriginal perspective.  For instance,
Langford Ginibi gives her son’s legally appointed parole officer copies of her books in
order to shape the parole officer’s response to her son’s (Nobby Langford) life-story:
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I also presented her with my two books so she could get to know all about
Nobby.  I thought the books would supply her with more information than
the court papers she had about my son’s so-called ‘violent, criminal life’.
Perhaps in readin my book she’d get a more personal view, from our Koori
side, of the situations we are confronted with every day of our lives in this
country.  (Haunted by the Past 102)
This particular strategy is investigated in more detail below in a discussion on modelling
the witness.
Reader Response
Whitlock examines non-Aboriginal reading response through focusing on non-Aboriginal
autobiographical responses to Aboriginal testimony found in Aboriginal life-stories and
The Bringing them Home Report.  Whitlock writes:
this understanding of complicity, this implication of the second person
through response to testimony, is vital to the reconciliation process.  It is at
the heart of self-fashioning in and through the politics of reconciliation.  In
this respect the testimonies are part of a social process which is engaged in
forming an appropriately ethical national citizenry.  [. . .] one of the most
radical outcomes of the stolen generations narratives as a discursive event
is their potency in bringing home to non-indigenous Australians that they
too have a radical identity.  (211)
Elsewhere Whitlock writes:
Stolen Generations stories have been around us for a long time.  We must
ask why and what do we hear now, and what the political effects might be.
It is a misrecognition of these kinds of autobiographical acts to understand
their speaking position in terms of a truth, fullness, and authenticity which
is available to an indigenous first person and constrained by the non-
indigenous editor.  What they can tell in the first person, and what we will
hear as the second person, are always sharply circumscribed, one by the
other.  Both telling and listening are performative.  (209)
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For the reader to acknowledge the reality of the trauma effected by colonialism raises the
issue of how best to recognise it.  LaCapra writes that
[t]estimony is a crucial source for history.  And it is more than a source.  It
poses special challenges to history.  For it raises the issue of the way in
which the historian or other analyst becomes a secondary witness,
undergoes a transferential relation, and must work out an acceptable
subject-position with respect to the witness and his or her testimony.
Transference here implies the tendency to become emotionally implicated
in the witness and his or her testimony with the inclination to act out an
affective response to them.  (History and Memory 11-12)
Related to LaCapra’s and Whitlock’s discussion of reader response, Laub sets out six
defensive responses that are counter-productive to hearing testimony and fail to establish
an acceptable reader-subject position.  I suggest that these are relevant to reading
Aboriginal life-writing:
[1] A sense of total paralysis, brought about by the threat of flooding — by
the fear of merger with the atrocities being recounted.
[2] A sense of outrage and of anger, unwittingly directed at the victim —
the narrator.  [. . .] We are torn apart by the inadequacy of our ability to
properly respond, and inadvertently wish for the illness to be the patient’s
responsibility and wrongdoing.
[3] A sense of total withdrawal and numbness.
[4] A flood of awe and fear; we endow the survivor with a kind of sanctity,
both to pay our tribute to him and to keep him at a distance, to avoid the
intimacy entailed in knowing.
[5] Foreclosure through facts, through an obsession with factfinding; an
absorbing interest in the factual details of the account which serve to
circumvent the human experience.  Another version of this foreclosure, of
this obsession with factfinding is a listener who already ‘knows it all,’
ahead of time, leaving little space for the survivor’s story.
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[6] Hyperemotionally [sic] which superficially looks like compassion and
caring.  The testifier is simply flooded, drowned and lost in the listener’s
defensive affectivity.  (“Bearing Witness” 72-73)
Instances of the above responses can be found in non-Aboriginal reader responses to
Aboriginal testimony.
Brigitta Olubas and Lisa Greenwell analyse an instance of point six in Laub’s list
of defensive reader responses, that is, “hyperemotionally [sic] which superficially looks
like compassion and caring.  The testifier is simply flooded, drowned and lost in the
listener’s defensive affectivity” (Laub 73).  Through a reading of Carmel Bird’s The
Stolen Children: Their Stories, which employs extracts from The Bringing them Home
Report, Olubas and Greenwell argue that Bird’s “publication of the first person narratives
as ‘extracts’ from the Report severs the stories from the public context of representation
and engagement opened up by the Report, and restores them to a narrative of unending
maternal loss” (Re-membering part 2, par. 2).  In this way, it depoliticises these
testimonial narratives and “the field of speech is once again taken up with the voices of
those already privileged, thus overdetermining modes of listening” and “[i]n this way the
text’s affect works as a form of imaginative capture, re-figuring the tellers of the stories
for all time as children” (part 2, pars. 3-4).
A similar, although less worrying, form of imaginative capture is performed by
Kay Schaffer when she criticises Robert Manne for homogenising Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal peoples in a way that effaces differences within and between these groups.
Schaffer writes:
Heterogeneous national subjects evoke varied responses to the Stolen
Generation issue for the nation.  On one side of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide
stand an array of nationally constituted subjects claiming various identities
— as 6th generation descendents from convicts, settlers and colonial
administrators, generations of silenced Afghan and Chinese Australians,
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Jewish survivors of the holocaust, pre- and postwar migrants from Eastern
Europe, post-Vietnam immigrants and refugees from Asia and migrants
from other locations, differently constituted not only as national subjects
but also as mothers and daughters and sons . . . . We all have alternative
histories, different national and personal investments, and differently
constituted subject positions within the nation.  (part 1, par. 7)
While this is an accurate and very important point in debates concerning the
acknowledgment of different subject positions in Australia, it is a point that does not
reflect the concerns of the Aboriginal testimonial texts examined here, in which the
primary object of criticism is white non-Aboriginal Australians.  In this sense, Schaffer’s
comments reflect broader academic debates on difference rather than the views expressed
in Aboriginal testimonies, ironically enacting precisely what she is criticising.  Like Bird,
Schaffer performs a type of imaginative (academic) capture of the testimony that fails to
register the specificity of concerns expressed in the testimonies, one of the most
important being that the white non-Aboriginal reader holds a distinct position as the
primary object of the Aboriginal testimonies’ criticisms.  Her approach draws attention
away from the specific grievances of the testifiers towards the multiplicity of possible
reader responses, and underplays the centrality of colonial discourses of homogeneity that
are the principal target of the testimonies.  Chinese, Afghan, Jewish and Vietnamese
Australian readers are not the addressees of the testimonies examined here.
A matter of concern regarding Manne’s and Clendinnen’s respective discussions
on Aboriginal history is that they might risk too closely connecting Aboriginal
testimonials with Holocaust studies which, while extremely useful (my use of Laub’s
classification of responses to Holocaust testimonies attests to this), might work against
other forms of listening.  As a response to that history, it could risk an imaginative and
theoretical capture of Aboriginal people’s trauma through the tools of Holocaust Studies.
This study has employed many insights from Holocaust Studies as tools for reading
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Aboriginal testimonials, but acknowledges the profound differences between the two
histories while identifying similarities.  It is necessary to be aware of the risk of
imaginative capture when reading testimonies so that differences are not effaced but
rather articulated.
Other responses to The Bringing them Home Report and the discussion of the
Stolen Generations by some Australians demonstrate recourse to Laub’s second and fifth
defensive hearing/reading responses: “[2] A sense of outrage and of anger, unwittingly
directed at the victim — the narrator.  [. . .] We are torn apart by the inadequacy of our
ability to properly respond, and inadvertently wish for the illness to be the patient’s
responsibility and wrongdoing” (“Bearing Witness” 72).  And,
[5] Foreclosure through facts, through an obsession with factfinding; an
absorbing interest in the factual details of the account which serve to
circumvent the human experience.  Another version of this foreclosure, of
this obsession with factfinding is a listener who already ‘knows it all,’
ahead of time, leaving little space for the survivor’s story.  (72)
Andrew Bolt, in a journalistic article that received national attention titled ‘I Wasn’t
Stolen’, responded to Lowitja O’Donoghue’s careful distinction between the word
‘removed’ and ‘stolen’ in describing her specific experience of family separation by
effectively dismissing the trauma involved in her family’s separation.  Her particular
experience of family separation was clearly part of a spectrum of practices associated
with racist, colonialist and assimilationist policies.  Yet, as Manne convincingly
demonstrates in “In Denial: The Stolen Generations and the Right”, such a distinction
was used not only to attempt to disqualify O’Donoghue from speaking about the history
of racist discrimination but also to cast doubt on the truthfulness of Aboriginal testimony
to experiences of dispossession as a whole.
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Manne discusses how Bolt’s article formed part of a campaign undertaken on
several fronts by the ‘punditocracy’ to discredit the traumatic history of Aboriginal family
separation.  As part of the “foreclosure [of traumatic history] through facts” and
factfinding (Laub 72), the same writers reduced the Aboriginal experience of colonial
dispossession to their obsession with determining the exact numbers of Aboriginal people
killed throughout colonial settlement.  As a discursive tactic it is a form of metonymy
whereby discrediting the exact numbers of those killed functions by association to
discredit the history of trauma resulting from colonisation, that is, the “absorbing interest
in the factual details of the account [. . . serves] to circumvent the human experience”
(72).  As a reading response, it undermines the process of working-through trauma,
ethically failing the testifier in a psychoanalytic context by failing to reinforce the reality
of the traumatic event as the first step towards establishing a degree of narrative and
affective control over the traumatic material (see Chapter Three).  In this sense, it works
to reactivate the trauma because how one survives the legacy of trauma is part of the
traumatic experience itself.  As Alan Lawson has argued, such responses to moments of
crisis in the negotiation of national identity often function zeugmatically to “invoke
outmoded colonialist tropes” (2000).  The responses of Bolt and company demonstrate
the importance of being aware of such a discursive tendency in responses to national
crises.
Establishing Truth-Believing Paradigms
The reader of testimonial life-writing repeatedly encounters declarations of the truth of
the narrative and the necessity that the reader respond to the testimonies as true.
Johnston, in her ‘Foreword’ to My Bundjalung People, writes, “[e]ssentially, [. . . My
Bundjalung People] is the only documented history of the Bundjalung people that is made
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up of their views, their feelings, their facts.  So it is true.  It is a story of profound cruelty
and injustice that begs for wrongs to be righted.  It is also a story of hope and laughter
and jokes, survival and love” (Langford Ginibi xiii).  Jean-Francois Lyotard goes so far as
to say in his analysis of how to establish truth-making paradigms that, in hearing a
statement like Johnston’s “So it is true”, the reader must accept testimonial life-writing as
such to avoid divesting “the plaintiff [. . .] of the means to argue and becom[ing] for that
reason a victim” (9).  Shoshana Felman writes, “[t]o testify is thus not merely to narrate
but to commit oneself, and to commit the narrative, to others: to take responsibility —in
speech — for history or for the truth of an occurrence, for something which, by
definition, goes beyond the personal, in having general (nonpersonal) validity and
consequences” (204).  Felman identifies here how testimonial life-writing’s extra-
personal dimension contributes to its claim to truthfulness.  Testimony aims to set the
story straight and thereby presents ethical considerations that demand to be addressed in
the context of providing just responses.  The decision to listen or not must be taken
seriously because it either implicates the reader in continuing to not hear an already
dispossessed group or involves him or her in the work of establishing an ethical citizenry.
The textual construction of the reader in testimonial life-writing presents a choice to the
reader: either fulfil the second criterion for establishing Lyotard’s truth-believing
paradigms, that is, grant the testimony the status of truth or not.
Laub explores the necessity of establishing a truth-believing paradigm in a
psychoanalytic context.  He argues that the relationship between the testifier and the
listener is crucial for the successful articulation and construction of traumatic experience
into narrative.  As I discussed in Chapter Three, traumatic experience involves the
disruption of the capacity to witness the traumatic event as it occurs.  This is the
phenomenon of latency as formulated by Freud.  Laub writes, “the very process of
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bearing witness to massive trauma [. . .] does indeed begin with someone who testifies to
an absence, to an event that has not yet come into existence [. . .]”; it is “a record that has
yet to be made” (“Bearing Witness” 57).  Later, Laub writes that “[t]he traumatic event,
although real, took place outside the parameters of ‘normal’ reality, such as causality,
sequence, place and time.  The trauma is thus an event that has no beginning, no ending,
no before, no during and no after” (69).  The testimony of those who have experienced
trauma, in its function of re-externalising the event, moves to reinstate the lost sense of
temporality and identity described in the above quotation.  Testimony, in constructing a
narrative, is a often a necessary process for the reintegration of the traumatic experience
into the life-history of the subject, be it an individual or collective subject.
The aim of testimonial life-writing that works-through traumatic experience is to
establish a sense of ‘normal’ reality.  As Laub puts it, this work involves establishing a
‘normal’ sense of temporality and thus causality and sequence.  In addition to establishing
a sense of normality in the life of the testifier, testimonial narratives are also a record of
the processes involved in establishing this sense of normality.  Furthermore, when
personal identity is so closely linked with cultural identity, it follows that the
establishment of personal identity is simultaneously embedded in the establishment of
cultural identity.  Testimonial life-writing narratives are part of the process of
reintegrating traumatic experience into the life-history of the testifier and of the testifier’s
cultural group.
However, the establishment of personal and cultural identity cannot occur in a
vacuum.  Laub writes:
re-externalization of the event can occur and take effect only when one can
articulate and transmit the story, literally transfer it to another outside
oneself and then take it back again, inside.  Telling thus entails a
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reassertion of the hegemony of reality and a re-externalisation of the evil
that affected and contaminated the trauma victim.  (69)
Prior to telling the life-story, the testifier works to establish facts that function as the basis
from which the re-externalisation of the traumatic event through the life-story can
begin.40  Laub explains how this consists of establishing non-metaphorical statements that
form the basis of the history that will be developed throughout the testimony.  Such
‘facts’ appeal to the reader to hear them as true in order that the testimony is effective,
and we see in Aboriginal life-writing a large amount of text given to presenting non-
metaphorical facts.  For example, Langford Ginibi begins her testimonial life-story in My
Bundjalung People by establishing when her father and uncle came to northern New
South Wales, who they worked for, as well as detailing the family tree.  Langford Ginibi
lists many of the Aboriginal families that moved to the mission area and the particular
clan groups within the larger Bundjalung group they belonged to.  Facts like the amount
of land allocated to each family are noted, as well as the names of the white mission
managers who dominated the mission.  To establish these facts is a prerequisite for the
project of re-familiarisation and they form a “medium of re-externalization — and thus
historicization — of the [traumatic] event” upon which can be built the testimonial life-
story (Laub, “Bearing Witness” 70).
The reader/listener who appreciates the importance of the truth claims of the
testimonies performs a crucial role in the testifier’s re-externalisation of trauma and,
thereby, a crucial role in the project of re-personalisation and re-culturation.  As I have
argued, to contest such a reality on the grounds that it excludes other perspectives, as do
anti-realists, undermines the process of re-externalisation in a therapeutic context.  The
                                                 
40 I have shifted here from referring to the ‘writer’ of the testimony to the ‘speaker’ of the testimony, from
writing practices to the primacy of the oral in the interviewer/interviewee relationship of psychoanalysis.
This raises an important question about whether the dynamics are the same for oral and written testimony,
for instance, how feedback occurs.  Later in this chapter I explore in detail how the dynamics of oral
testimony are recast within the testimonial text.
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appeal to the reader that the testimony be read as true is one reason why testimonial life-
writing employs a realist literary mode and, thereby, why it is fruitfully explored through
a realist paradigm.  The rejection of the reality of testimony further renders invisible an
already effaced history.  The choice to undermine or reinforce the truth of testimony is the
prerogative of the reader and, thereby, an ethical decision.  Furthermore, the texts
themselves set out to show how appropriate responses can be made.
Modelling the Witness
As we have seen, testimonial life-writing aims to influence reader response in a variety of
ways.  Over and above the ways already discussed, many of the testimonies examined in
this study aim to guide reader response by writing the position of the witness to the
testimony into the text itself.  In this manner, the reader does not solely hold the position
of the witness to the testimonies.  This feature distinguishes testimonial life-writing from
that life-writing which posits a transcendent subject position held by the author and the
reader.  Rather than a transcendent subject position, the testimonies examined in this
study place the position of the witness within the text and thus manipulate the
identificatory and distancing impulses of the reader according to Aboriginal objectives.
Because of the strong presence of a character in the text who acts as the witness to the
testimony, I term this figure the ‘model witness’.
Johnston and Burgos-Debray, who write the ‘Foreword’ and ‘Introduction’ to
Langford Ginibi’s and Menchú’s testimonies respectively, act as models for the reader for
how to witness the testimonies.  Johnston accompanies Langford Ginibi on her journey
back to her ‘belongin’ place’ and describes herself as “Ruby’s driver, companion, sound
recordist, photographer, and general dogsbody [.  .  .]” (My Bundjalung People xi).  As I
have previously shown, Johnston tells the reader that the testimony is as “solid and
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immutable as that word, [always]” (xi).  Not only does this claim demonstrate the strong
sense of Aboriginal agency operating in testimonial life-writing because it constructs
Aboriginal experience as solid and immutable, it also alerts the reader that he or she is
being asked to witness the testimony as true.  Both the testifier and model witness
strategically refuse to acknowledge that the text contains fictional elements.  This applies
not only to the narrative voice of My Bundjalung People but also to the many testimonial
records it incorporates from different northern New South Wales historical archives and
those provided by private sources.  My Bundjalung People is the record of Langford
Ginibi’s journey to record the story of her people and thus of herself.  Its appeal to the
reader to accept that the testimony is a truthful documentation of Bundjalung history
places demands upon the reader to share in the process of bearing witness to the historical
truth of post-colonial trauma.  It is this appeal, made by both the model witness and the
testifier, that gives the testimony much of its ethical force.
In Haunted by the Past, Johnston, as the model witness, writes:
People say Australia is not like Chile or Argentina or South Africa.
They say that we are more civilised.  We Aboriginal people wonder about
that as we look at what has been done in our land and to our own people
by civilised nations.  Nobby Langford has lived this history.  We always
hope for justice and even now as you read his story, we hope that he will
be seen and considered for what he is — a Bundjalung man whose
boyhood, youth, and early manhood have been stolen from him by the
oppressor nation.  (xx-xxi)
In this passage, Johnston invokes an Aboriginal collectivity through her use of the plural
pronoun ‘we’ (a common feature of the testimonial mode), but the non-Aboriginal reader
is not invited to share in that collective.  Instead, Johnston encourages the non-Aboriginal
reader to witness Nobby Langford’s story with empathy for the Aboriginal view of
Australia’s colonial history and, in doing so, encourages an Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal
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coalition in regard to understanding Australia’s colonial legacy.  While Langford Ginibi’s
reader is recurringly personified as white, Johnston’s reader is not specifically cast as
white and the coalition she encourages is not simply one between white and black.  In this
manner, a coalition is encouraged between black and white, Aboriginal and all non-
Aboriginal people, that maintains a complexity of recognitive positions that are not
collapsed into a single viewpoint.41  Yet, regardless of the reader’s position, all readers
are encouraged to empathise with the Aboriginal perspective as it is written in the text.
For instance, throughout Haunted by the Past, Langford Ginibi interprets Nobby
Langford’s testimony with the goal of shaping reader response.  Nobby Langford
recounts:
Darruk was the first boys’ home I went to.  I didn’t last long there, I took
off in the first three minutes, but I was caught again, and later did my
sentence.  The [sic] I got out and, with all the silly Koori mates in Redfern,
it didn’t take me long to get into trouble again.  So I ended up in Mt
Penang at Gosford like me true to form, there for a little till me old legs
got the better of me and I took off again.  (21-22)
Langford Ginibi immediately frames Nobby Langford’s recollection for the reader thus:
Although he’d spent time in the boys’ homes for petty things, Nobby was
not a hardened person.  So he was knocked for a loop by the deaths of his
brother and sister.  They died within eight months of each other in 1969-
1970.  [. . .] Nobby couldn’t accept the fact of their deaths.  It had a
terrible effect on him.  Besides, I was always saying to him, ‘You’re the
eldest son now.  You must be very responsible.’  I sometimes think that
                                                 
41 It is important to note here that the Aboriginal reader of the Aboriginal testimonial text is never addressed
but rather invoked with the plural pronoun ‘we’.  In this sense, the differences within Aboriginal culture are
effaced in a similar way to how difference is in traditional autobiography.  However, as discussed in
Chapter One, in traditional autobiography the reader, as the target of the text, is encouraged to identify with
that transcendent authorial position, whereas in the Aboriginal testimonial text such identification between
the testifier and the non-Aboriginal reader is limited on cultural grounds and difference is maintained and
reinforced.  In this manner, the testimonial mode is a distinctive one because some readers are strongly cast
as the Other of the narrator’s position and the identificatory impulse is strictly circumscribed.
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my telling him that was very frightening to him, making him throw all
caution to the winds, and get into trouble.  (22)
As with Langford Ginibi’s testimonial life-writing, I, Rigoberta Menchú is
introduced by a model witness, in this case, by the first witness of her testimony, Burgos-
Debray, who functions as interlocutor and amanuensis for Menchú.  Burgos-Debray
describes her role thus: “I soon reached the decision to give the manuscript the form of a
monologue: that was how it came back to me as I re-read it.  I therefore decided to delete
all my questions.  By doing so I became what I really was: Rigoberta’s listener (emphasis
added)” (xx).  Burgos-Debray tells us that Menchú is “a privileged witness [. . . who] has
survived the genocide that destroyed her family and community and is stubbornly
determined to break the silence and to confront the systematic extermination of her
people.  She refuses to let us forget” (xi).  Later, identifying herself with the Latin
American reader and guiding him or her in the way in which to experience the testimony,
Burgos-Debray writes:
We [emphasis added] Latin Americans [. . .] tend to forget that we too are
oppressors and that we too are involved in relations that can only be
described as colonial.  [. . .] That is why we have to listen to Rigoberta
Menchú’s appeal and allow ourselves to be guided by a voice whose inner
cadences are so pregnant with meaning that we actually seem to hear her
speaking and can almost hear her breathing.  (xii)
Similarly to Johnston, Burgos-Debray outlines the way the testimony should be read.  Not
only does she encourage the Latin American reader to experience the testifier’s voice as a
presence that is so close that the reader can almost hear her breathing, she also implicates
that reader as oppressor.  In contrast to the interpellation of a transcendent subject
position that was a feature of classic realism, the testimonial text interpolates a more
historically specific and located (even biased) reading subject into the text itself, that is,
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the model witness, and this witnessing subject, in turn, locates some readers in the history
of oppression.
Laub, in addressing issues surrounding the videotaping of oral Holocaust
testimonies in the context of interviews, stresses the importance of the role the listener
plays in the construction of trauma narratives.  His insights are useful for exploring
testimonial life-writing because the role of the interviewer in eliciting oral testimonies is
similar to that of the model witness (companion to the narrator/testifier) in testimonial
life-writing.  The model witness’s relation to the narrator often functions in the manner
Laub attributes to the interviewer/interviewee relationship at work in recording oral
testimonies to the Holocaust.  This is seen in the collaborative role played by Johnston,
Jackie Huggins and Burgos-Debray in constructing the testimonial text.  To illustrate:
when powerful memories affect the narrator of My Bundjalung People, her companion,
Johnston, “has to respond very subtly to cues the narrator is giving that s/he wants to
come back, to resume contact, or that s/he wishes to remain alone [. . .]” (Laub, “Bearing
Witness” 71).  Not only is this sensitivity to the testifier present within the texts, but the
texts also demand, due to their ethical urgency, a similar level of attention from the reader
of testimonial life-writing.
Each interview conducted by Kevin Gilbert in Living Black contains introductory
and/or concluding comments made by Gilbert to orientate the reader to the issues to be
aware of when reading the interviews.  In this way, the interviews’ introductory and
concluding remarks replicate the figure of the model witness found in Langford Ginibi’s,
Huggins’s, Morgan’s and Menchú’s writing.  Issues highlighted for the attention of
readers in Gilbert’s framing remarks include the restrictive legislation that governed the
lives of Aboriginal peoples, incarceration, reserve life, alcohol abuse, the importance of
spirituality (both traditionally Aboriginal and Christian), negative self-image,
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mobilisation of political resistance, tribal law, and urban Aboriginal family and social
issues.  These framing comments further emphasise the strong presence of political
dimensions in Aboriginal testimonial life-writing.
Much of the text in Auntie Rita is derived from the taped testimony of Jackie
Huggins’s mother, Rita Huggins.  Jackie Huggins, like Gilbert, frames her narrative
contributions around these oral testimonies.  Jackie Huggins italicises her contributions to
the text to identify the different speaking/writing subjects.  These italicised sections
comment on, interpret, explain, contextualise, and provide responses to the story provided
by her mother in taped recordings.  The use of recordings, transformed into text, again
shows the close links Aboriginal testimonial life-writing has with oral sources of history.
Jackie Huggins’s italicised responses form a dialogue with her family and cultural history
and the text’s oscillation between taped oral history and written response embodies the
process of working-through that history.  By formatting the witnessing process in such a
way, the text works to interpellate the reader as witness — the reader reads witnessing
rather than simply reading the story.  As a writing device, this strategy models reading
response and works to restrict the multiplicity of responses — a strategy that works
against the grain of reading practices pursued by anti-realists.
Likewise, Haunted by the Past distinguishes between the writer’s/editor’s voice
and the voice of the oral informant through italicising the latter’s testimony.  Langford
Ginibi writes, “[w]riting Nobby’s story I wanted to include his recollections of the past.
So we sat down together and I asked him, ‘Tell me your memories of your childhood,
son; what you remember of me draggin you around from pillar to post with the rest of the
family.  Don’t feel you need to withhold anything’” (9-10).  Like many other Aboriginal
testimonial life-stories, Haunted by the Past is created through inter-generational
dialogue, which again demonstrates testimonial life-writing’s emphasis on the collective
181S. R. J. Gibbons
rather than the individual in generating and negotiating post-colonial Aboriginal history,
while also demonstrating the use of the model witness.
Performing Testimonial Life-Writing
Exploring discursive figures, such as the model witness, through which reader response is
manipulated is important for balancing the interest in the extra-textual operations of
traumatic material and political resistance.  Elzbieta Sklodowska’s work on testimonio
focuses on what she terms testimonio’s ‘discursive armature’ in an effort to achieve this
balance.  Sklodowska’s focus on the discursive construction of testimonio aligns her work
with Colás’s criticism of Yúdice’s desire for what is beyond representation, LaCapra’s
criticism of Lawrence Langer’s claim that the Holocaust is unrepresentable, and
Whitlock’s focus on the performativity of Aboriginal testimonial life-narratives.  The
emphasis by some critics on material in testimonio that is beyond the scope of
representation leads Sklodowska to write critically of Beverley, Zimmerman and Yúdice
that their definitions of “testimonial writing [are] politically principled and strongly
action-oriented, which detracts from exploring its discursive armature” (86).  Sklodowska
addresses this deficit by seeking to “clarify how testimonio’s technique actually works”
in a move that aims to go beyond simply providing “a list of more or less distinct traits
and relations” that characterise the genre (86).  To do this, she employs the concept of the
differend as formulated by Lyotard to explore “the intricate tension between the
indeterminacy of experience and the closure of discourse, between the act of
living/surviving/witnessing and the act of testifying/transcribing” (87).
The concept of the differend (a concept formulated, it is of interest to note for this
study, during Lyotard’s contemplation of the Holocaust) was developed to identify
processes where “the plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and becomes for that
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reason a victim” (Lyotard 9).  To overcome this problem Lyotard posits a testimonial
contract that demands particular criteria be met in the effort to construct any truth-
believing paradigm.  Sklodowska structures her essay by addressing each of the four
criteria (the position of the addresser, the position of the addressee, a language capable of
signifying a referent, and a case that will suffer an injustice if it is not represented) in
turn, with the aim of establishing if testimonio fulfils the criteria.  Through a reading of
Miguel Barnet’s and Esteban Montejo’s The Autobiography of a Runaway Slave,
Sklodowska concludes that testimonio does not fulfil the criteria of Lyotard’s truth-
believing paradigm.  In doing so, she rejects Beverley’s, Zimmerman’s and Yúdice’s
claim that testimonio is a discursive site that can “‘summon truth,’ ‘denounce,’ ‘exorcise’
and ‘set aright’” because, by doing so, they “overcompensate for the internal discord we
may find in specific texts, [. . . directing] our attention away from the problematic
inscription of the differend” (97).  Sklodowska acknowledges “that there is a fine line
between invalidating testimony and acknowledging, self-critically, ‘that what remains to
be phrased exceeds what we can presently phrase’” (98).
Working this fine line to phrase what cannot be presently phrased is the work of
Aboriginal testimonial life-writing and theorisations of that writing, wherein testifiers and
theorists work to re-externalise post-colonial trauma and create vocabularies and
imaginaries that better articulate post-colonial conditions.  It is in tracing the discursive
history of how such vocabularies and imaginaries are developed that we can trace some of
the history of Aboriginality and non-Aboriginal/Aboriginal relations.  Such a practice
accords with LaCapra’s and Colás’s argument that it is important to maintain a vitalising
tension between the representative and the represented (further explored in Chapter Five).
Such an argument is an important one because it is only by identifying the discord we
find in testimonial texts through analysing the fraught inscription of the differend that we
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maintain a form of analysis that works to establish closer links between texts and post-
colonial realities and avoids simplistic narrative closures.
Analysis of discursive construction is useful for understanding performative
aspects of the narrative voice in testimonial texts and the way such performativity works
to guide reader response.  Reader response is a productive site for exploring the
discursive construction of the testimonial text because so much space is given in these
texts to appealing to the reader to bear witness to the legacy of colonial dispossession.
Whitlock, in an analysis compatible with Sklodowska’s project of analysing the
discursive armature of testimonial life-writing, focuses on the question of why testimonial
life-writing is written in the way it is at particular points in cultural history.  Whitlock
writes that testimonial
texts must authorize the narrator, and must offer clear signals on how the
narrative is to be read and what constitutes its truth to be witnessed by a
believing reader in an appropriate way — what I have earlier called an
appropriate ethical responsiveness.  These texts maneuver for their public,
and the story they tell needs to be read in terms of a particular culture and
particular readerships.  What must be told to, and what will be heard by
these readerships is limited, and negotiated with care.  The occasion
requires ‘truth,’ a culturally specific and appropriate presentation of
subjectivity and experience.  This is because in the interracial
autobiographical contract that is made here witnesses are necessarily made
aware of their own racial identity, their own implication in the politics of
race.  (208)
Whitlock views truth as “a culturally specific and appropriate presentation of subjectivity
and experience” because it is a performative act (208).  Like performing for the camera in
cinema verité, Whitlock argues that the author performs the realism of testimonial life-
writing as part of his or her aim to establish a formal recognitive contract between the
addressor and addressee.
184   S. R. J. Gibbons
Performativity is an important concept because it encourages readers to separate
the system of signs that attest to reality from any claims of access to an uncontestable
reality.  It invites the reader to analyse factors that contribute to the production of texts
and subjects, such as contesting ethico-political forces of a changing society.  It allows
the reader to ask how a text is what it is: what is gained and lost in not ordering the text
another way; why is the text sequenced the way it is; what is effaced; and what sub-
textual associations are made.  However, performativity is a concept that resonates with
multiple meanings and, because of this multiplicity, is problematised when deployed.
Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick in Performativity and Performance
identify some of the multiple uses of the concepts ‘performance’ and ‘performativity’:
Given these divergent developments, it makes abundant sense that
performativity's recent history has been marked by cross-purposes.  For
while philosophy and theater now share ‘performative’ as a common
lexical item, the term has hardly come to mean ‘the same thing’ for each.
Indeed, the stretch between theatrical and deconstructive meanings of
‘performative’ seems to span the polarities of, at either extreme, the
extroversion of the actor, the introversion of the signifier.  [. . .] But in
another range of usages, a text like Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition
uses 'performativity' to mean an extreme of something like efficiency —
postmodern representation as a form of capitalist efficiency — while,
again, the deconstructive ‘performativity’ of Paul de Man or J. Hillis
Miller seems to be characterized by the dislinkage precisely of cause and
effect between the signifier and the world. At the same time, it's worth
keeping in mind that even in deconstruction, more can be said of
performative speech-acts than that they are ontologically dislinked or
introversively nonreferential. Following on de Man's demonstration of ‘a
radical estrangement between the meaning and the performance of any
text’ (298), one might want to dwell not so much on the nonreference of
the performative, but rather on (what de Man calls) its necessarily
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‘aberrant’ relation to its own reference — the torsion, the mutual
perversion, as one might say, of reference and performativity.  (2-3)
Other aspects of performativity are analysed in more detail in Chapter Five.  However, I
want to concentrate here on the question of who has access to the privileges of
performativity.  Discussing J. L. Austin’s formulation of performativity, Parker and
Sedgwick note that “Austin tends to treat the speaker as if s/he were all but coextensive
— at least, continuous — with the power by which the individual speech act is initiated
and authorized and may be enforced” (7).  Yet, as I will show, this is not the case.
Performativity can be disaggregated into several types in terms of who has access
to it.  It can refer to consciously manipulated subject roles, or culturally programmed
subject roles that a subject may or may not be aware of, and to the argument that being
itself is necessarily performative.  In the first instance, the subject consciously performs
roles to manipulate the world.  In the second instance, the subject is an unconscious,
passive filter for socially inscribed performative roles such as gender, class and racial
roles.  In the third instance, being itself is necessarily performative.  A useful distinction
can be made between the roles that are performed and the consciousness that one is
performing roles.  Permutations of these two dimensions of performativity are as follows:
the absence of an awareness that one performs socially inscribed roles; the awareness that
one performs socially inscribed roles yet possesses no, or only limited, ability to
manipulate them; and, the awareness of the roles and the freedom to manipulate them.
All the above instances are found in the strategies employed for reading and writing
Aboriginal testimonial life-writing.  Emphasis on and access to one or other of these
positions involves different ethical considerations for theorising performativity.
In a post-colonial context, wherein subaltern agency is at risk of effacement by
colonialist discourses, the notion of performativity is potentially problematic.  Different
subjects’ relationships to performativity are characterised by different levels of access to
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ways in which identity is performed, particularly those ways relating to conscious
manipulation of identity.  Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal agents have been historically
less and more privileged in how they access different performative modes and roles.
White non-Aboriginal access to performative modes and roles is highly privileged and, in
the case of colonialism, is secured through multiple coercive techniques, many of them
violent.  Non-Aboriginal privilege provides greater scope to work with unconscious
aspects of performativity, such as addressing structural gender and class inequities among
non-Aboriginal peoples.  Non-Aboriginality also bestows greater access to modes of
performativity wherein roles are consciously manipulated.  In contrast, colonialist
discourses exclude Aboriginal peoples from performing many roles.  Legislation forbade
Aboriginal people from choosing where to live and whom to marry, voting, and having
the rights of citizenship.  It also strictly prescribed and enforced roles through
segregation, non-culturally specific education, racist persecution, and judicial and police
powers.  Aboriginal resistance to colonially inscribed modes of performativity was
dangerous, as the punitive practices of colonial power have demonstrated.  Because of
such risks, acts of resistance, when undertaken by Aboriginal agents, were often
necessarily more subtle and nuanced than acts of resistance aimed at gaining greater
access to the privileges of performativity undertaken by non-Aboriginal agents.
These considerations show that it is important when using the concept of
performativity to clearly designate its referent.  As a concept, performativity can easily
lend itself to being interpreted too generally because the spectrum of human performance
encapsulates everything from theatrical productions to eating to survive.  One can speak
of the performativity of genocide, racism and dispossession just as one can speak of the
performativity of practices and discourses that oppose them.  The fundamental risk with
analyses that do not adequately distinguish between different modes of performativity is
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that difference is effaced through treating all discourses similarly, that is, such analyses
simply identify the structural biases of discourses that order experience through analysis
of their performativity.  There also exists a risk in some critical analyses of overplaying
the self-unweaving, self-referential threads of ordering discourses and overemphasising
their internal instability.  Such analyses might lose the benefits of criticism that
undertakes comparative analyses of why one way of ordering experience is ethically or
aesthetically better than another one.  As Richard Rorty has argued, the reach of a
discourse’s vocabulary, its power of description and interpretation, is one measure of a
discourse’s worth.  To render over the differences between discourses on the basis that
they are structured unduly limits the scope of analysis.
John Frow, writing on the testimonies in The Bringing them Home Report, states
that “the Report replaces a language of lies and blame, not with praise but with release; it
breaks the hold of a false language, indeed a false reality, a reality which 'should not have
happened'.  Its function is thus performative as well as descriptive, or rather it uses a
description as the basis for a performative act” (Screen 1, par.18).  Performative in this
case carries Austin’s sense of the performative, that is, statements that accomplish, in
their enunciation, an action that generates effects rather than simply describe some state
of affairs (Parker and Sedgwick 3).  Testimony is performative in this sense because it
constructs the text for the purpose of achieving ethico-political goals while
simultaneously reinforcing the reality of traumatic events through its very telling.
Nevertheless, the notion of performance is further complicated in a post-colonial context
because testimony as ethico-political performance can at times conflict with testimony as
therapeutic performance.  The interaction between testimony as post-colonial resistance
and testimony as working-through trauma as discussed in detail in Chapter Three
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produces tensions and conflicts that disrupt the smooth operation of testimonial
performance.
Whitlock correctly argues that the discursive construction of the testimonial life-
story is an important site for critical interest.  Such a focus encourages articulation of the
dynamism of identity instead of getting lost in the task of proving the truth of stable
ahistorical identities.  However, the truth claims of testimonial life-writing themselves do
not have to be understood as simply the presentation of an authentic, ahistorical identity,
but are better understood as the presentation of identity-in-becoming.  The presentation of
Aboriginality in Aboriginal testimonial life-writing need not be understood only in terms
of a strategic and highly constructed response to mainstream culture.  It is not only a
performance of Aboriginality for non-Aboriginal culture, but is also a process of
establishing Aboriginality for Aboriginal authors and people through developing new
vocabularies and imaginaries for creating and articulating it.  Testimonial life-writing is a
performative event that creates new territories for Aboriginal people in post-colonial
history.  In this context, it is important that performativity is understood to be necessary
for identity formation and survival in order that Aboriginal identity-as-becoming is not
viewed as illegitimate because it may not perform itself according to non-Aboriginal
readers’ expectations.  This position argues for an analysis of performativity in terms of
the discursive construction of author and reader, and against the idea that Aboriginal
testimonial life-writing presents an ahistorical Aboriginal identity.  Most importantly, it
argues that performativity is being itself.  Such identity-work is intimately connected to
survival because the reinforcement of Aboriginal reality is an act that works against
traumatic derealisation.  Aboriginal testimony-as-performance is not only directed
towards non-Aboriginal readers, but is also an engagement with post-colonial trauma
within the lives of the testifiers and their communities.  In this sense, testimony-as-
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performativity can be understood to be the working-through of post-colonial trauma in
the project of establishing and reinforcing Aboriginal identity.
It may be asked, if reality reinforcement is performative, why is not derealisation
performative?  The answer seems to be that traumatic derealisation involves a loss of
affective and narrative control that jeopardises the survival of the sufferer of trauma.
Such derealisation undermines performativity of one’s self as an act of agency
establishment because traumatic derealisation is the unconscious, out of control acting-
out of traumatic material that fragments the self rather than establishes it.  Conscious
engagement of derealised states may be, although I believe rarely, an act of identity
establishment geared to access different affective and cognitive functions.  Such a process
can be seen as a sophisticated but risky off-setting of acting-out with working-through.  It
is also true that certain performative patterns can be seen in those undergoing traumatic
derealisation but that is hardly the same thing as highly constructed, conscious, audience-
orientated performativity.  Traumatic derealisation is usually a failure of self-recognition,
and testimonial life-writing’s reinforcement of identity, culture and history, through the
positing of non-metaphorical facts, works against such derealisation.
It must also be remembered that Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is not aimed at
deconstructing and/or derealising identity but rather at establishing and reinforcing the
reality of Aboriginal identity.  This does not mean that there are no Aboriginal testimonial
texts, or texts to come, that aim to do the former.  As I argue, different engagements with
identity and post-colonial trauma have generationally specific determinants.  For instance,
first generation survivors of the Holocaust focus on establishing non-metaphorical facts
while second generation survivors often undertake more complicated, self-reflexive forms
of narrative engagement with trauma.  It seems clear that there are different orders of
narrative engagement with identity construction and trauma, which means that there are
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very different modes of performativity.  Performativity-as-survival may be a first order
function of narrative engagement with trauma that is crucial and prior to more complex
levels of self-recognition.  It is certainly distinguishable from performativity-for-others
and for strategic purposes.  It seems that responses to traumatic material demand certain
kinds and sequences of performative response.  This discussion of performativity as vital
for understanding the processes and challenges facing the establishment of Aboriginal
agency is further explored in a psychoanalytic sense in Chapter Five.  At this point, it is
still necessary to show how Aboriginal testimonial texts negotiate the conflicts between
testimony as the performance of post-colonial resistance and testimony as
psychotherapeutic working-through.
In her ‘Foreword’ to Auntie Rita, Rita Huggins discusses what can and cannot be
spoken of in her testimonial life-story:
There are some parts of my life that I probably didn’t want to have in the
book because to me they are shame jobs.  But they are part of the story and
Jackie tells me, in her loving way, that I don’t need to feel ashamed.  Look
who’s talking!  My story is not rare among Aboriginal women.
There are, though, other things that I just cannot speak about
because they are too painful to remember.  These things I must keep to
myself.  Much has been done to me and my people that we find hard to
talk about.  One of the things that amazes people is that we have managed
to survive without a huge amount of outward bitterness.  Aboriginal
people of all generations, and for very good reasons, withhold their
bitterness about the injustices that have happened and still continue to
happen today.  I’m not sure why I let go of my bitterness.  I certainly
remember those feelings but try to replace them with more positive
feelings.  That is how I have survived, and remain feeling strong.  (2)
A similar self-censorship and self-fashioning is found in Gilbert’s Living Black, which
consists of what Gilbert himself terms the ‘testimonies’ of older Aborigines gathered
from interviews recorded on to tape.  In Living Black, the interviews are organised into
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chapters that form a series of short testimonial narratives that can be usefully contrasted
with the more complex narratives found in longer testimonial texts.  Their small length
facilitates identifying the defining characteristics of testimonial narrative.  The interviews
consist of first person narratives that address issues of racist injustice experienced by the
testifiers.  Within the generic spectrum of life-writing, which contains many generic
features, these interviews clearly display testimonial features more strongly than
autobiographical features.  Gilbert identifies the performative aspects of testimonial life-
writing as follows:
The original aims of this book were to show the actual condition of
Aboriginal people in Australia through their own testimony and from this
to show how they think about themselves and their background.  The
interviews fulfil the second of these aims, but not the first.  Aboriginals
have been acutely aware of their white audiences for a long time now and
the presence of a tape recorder and the knowledge that a book is to be
written causes an automatic self-censorship which is understandable
considering that the majority of Aboriginals are deeply ashamed of what
they know is the truth about their people today.  So, together with many
sympathetic whites, they embrace and propagate a number of myths about
themselves: that Aboriginals share freely; that they have a strong feeling of
community; that they don’t care about money and lack the materialism of
white society; that they care more deeply for their children than do white
parents; and so on.  Such fallacies are generally believed by both black and
white people.  Unbigoted whites believe them because the human
desolation that is Aboriginal Australia is not yet understood in this
country.  The prejudiced lack understanding of, and honesty about, causes
and in consequence they lack compassion, too.  Those who are not
prejudiced, but also not understanding, search for more favourable
stereotypes.  (1)
Gilbert clearly identifies the performative nature of testimony and sources such self-
censorship to the following:
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The reality that I am talking about is only hinted at in these interviews.
So, there are the uneasy musings of Elsie Jones, or Kate Lansborough will
say ‘There were some other things I could tell you but I don’t think I’d
better put them on this tape.  Personal things that happened when I was
little.’  Or as Shirley Smith puts it ‘. . . there’s a loyalty . . . some things
you can’t talk about.’  The experiences hinted at are what have created the
thinking of people who, in the words of Betty Watson, can say of
themselves ‘Actually you was nothing, an Aboriginal.’
The real horror story of Aboriginal Australia today is locked in
police files and child welfare reports.  It is a story of private misery and
degradation, caused by a complex chain of historical circumstance, that
continues into the present.  (1-2)
As Gilbert argues, and Morgan’s grandmother and Rita Huggins demonstrate, there are
some things Aboriginal life-story tellers will not tell.  The declaration that one is speaking
the truth and the practice of maintaining silence on issues that are personally traumatic
alerts the reader to the self-censorship and self-fashioning of the testifiers, that is, to a
performance of the self geared to foster a recognitive contract aimed at establishing an
ethical citizenry.
Self-censorship is more common in older Aboriginal people and it is not
surprising that Gilbert’s interviews were conducted with older Aboriginal people during
the nineteen-seventies.  In the past thirty years, generational differences between older
and younger Aboriginal people have occurred in the patterns of revelation and censorship.
Rita Huggins and Gilbert’s interviewees are older Aboriginal people and their testimonial
style differs from younger Aboriginal writers such as Langford Ginibi.  Morgan identifies
a similar generational difference regarding the censorship of the family’s Aboriginality by
her mother:
‘All those years, Mum’, I said, ‘how could you have lied to us all those
years?’.
‘It was only a little white lie’, she replied sadly.
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I couldn’t help laughing at her unintentional humour.  In no time at all, we
were both giggling uncontrollably.  It was as if a wall that had been
between us suddenly crumbled away.  I felt closer to Mum then than I had
for years.  (135)
This generational difference is explained by Whitlock’s argument that “[w]hat must be
told to, and what will be heard by these readerships is limited, and negotiated with care.
The occasion requires ‘truth,’ a culturally specific and appropriate presentation of
subjectivity and experience” (208).
Generational shifts and the changing political and cultural environment structure
testimonial narratives differently.  In addition to Whitlock’s point, it is important to note,
in the spirit of commensurability, that a similar generational difference is also seen in
responses to the Holocaust, wherein very different strategies are employed by first and
second generation survivors for constructing their testimonies.  It has been suggested that
this is a consequence of a common sequence of response to traumatic events whereby the
first testifiers to a traumatic event concern themselves with establishing non-metaphorical
facts about the traumatic event, while second generation survivors create more complex
narratives of surviving trauma based on these facts.  Jackie Huggins identifies such a shift
in the past twenty-five years to a greater and more creative exploration of Aboriginal
history when she writes:
However, these moves towards cultural genocide failed and instead
Aboriginals have become successively more visible and vocal in the face of
attempted annihilation, and a great store of historical and cultural
knowledge has begun to surface.  Oral histories, storytellings, philosophy,
biography and autobiography are coming to be published.  I feel humble
to be a recipient of this knowledge.  Recording and publishing the
memories of elderly Aboriginals is an especially urgent task, otherwise
important aspects of Australian history that our elders can pass on will be
lost forever.  (Auntie Rita 5-6)
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The urgency associated with recording the testimonies of older Aboriginal people that
Jackie Huggins alerts the reader of Auntie Rita to contributes to the focus found in older
Aboriginal people’s testimonies on establishing non-metaphorical facts.
Generationally specific sources of shame are factors that affect self-censorship
and the focus on non-metaphorical facts.  The move to greater openness in the testimonial
narratives of younger Aboriginal authors, and the publication of more and yet more life-
stories, is a consequence of generational shifts regarding sources of shame.  Writing on
generational differences and the impact they have on the process of constructing a
testimonial narrative, Jackie Huggins writes:
This book is the result of my mother’s and my combined efforts and of our
mutual Aboriginality.  It is born out of so many years of our talking.
During the book’s writing, we have had many arguments (fighting with
our tongues, as Rita calls it) and some of this has not been resolved,
continues and remains evident in these pages.  In our talking are reflected
both the things we have in common and the differences that arise between
two Aboriginal women a generation apart; one born in 1921 and raised on
a mission, the other born ‘free’ in the 50s.  Our differences reflect changed
political groundings.  For instance, for Rita, ‘Black’ is only used among
ourselves and with those non-Aboriginal people we trust, because to use it
publicly raises negative connotations and prejudice, whereas for my
generation Black has been reclaimed with pride.  (Auntie Rita 3)
Auntie Rita and Living Black demonstrate that testimonial narratives employ a
large amount of material obtained from oral mediums like interviews and eye-witness
reports provided by older Aboriginal people who aim to provide historical evidence of
Aboriginal lives.  Langer argues that the style of the oral testimonial narrative is not
designed to make us complicit with the text as do literary narratives and this prohibits
“intellectual or emotional dialogue with the contents [. . .] because the testimonies are not
based on common experience or an imaginable past, real or literary” (16).  Langer points
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out that “[a] written narrative is finished when we begin to read it, its opening, middle,
and end already established between the covers of the book.  This appearance of form is
reassuring [. . . whereas] oral testimony steers a less certain course [. . .]” (17).  An
example of the difference between oral and literary representation is given when Langer
recalls a survivor stopping her oral testimony to read a passage from her autobiography
dealing with the same event (18).  The memory lapses associated with her oral testimony
are countered by reference to a completed narrative.  Langer further writes on the
difference between written and oral testimony: “[w]ritten memoirs, by the very strategies
available to their authors — style, chronology, analogy, imagery, dialogue, a sense of
character, a coherent moral vision — strive to narrow this space [between narrator and
reader], easing us into their unfamiliar world through familiar (and hence comforting?)
literary devices” (19).  Later, Langer provides examples of highly ‘literary’ styles to
contrast oral testimony with written memoirs (41).
In contrast with Langer, I argue that when reading the testimonies of, for example,
Langford Ginibi, Rita and Jackie Huggins and Menchú, the reader encounters powerful
distancing techniques and a ‘non-literary’ style — features that Langer attributes to oral
testimony.  Langford Ginibi’s and Menchú’s testimonial life-stories are highly
constructed while simultaneously preserving patterns of oral speech that are less
constructed, or constructed in such way to give the strong sense of presence characteristic
of oral testimony.
Rivero, writing on testimony, argues that “[t]he ‘intrusive narrator’ [. . .] gives the
text a high degree of intimacy, making the reader get close and turning him or her into an
‘accomplice;’ textual/real distance is eliminated by this process of reader
involvement” (72).  Riverio goes on to write of testimony that “[t]he speech, faithfully
recorded on tape, transcribed and ‘written,’ is punctuated by a repeated series of
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interlocutive signs, mainly interjections or verbal directives which stress for a reader of
the text the sometimes phatic (contact-oriented) function of these markers: ‘You know?’
‘See?’ ‘Get me?’ ‘You follow?’ ‘Look here’ ‘Like I said’” (72).  Such phatic speech-acts
occur throughout Langford Ginibi’s works, for example, with the repetitive use of the
interrogative “aye?”
The resemblance between oral testimony and testimonial life-writing can also be
demonstrated by juxtaposing testimony given in The Bringing them Home Report with
excerpts from Aboriginal testimonial life-writing.  The following quotation is confidential
oral testimony given for the report addressing the inter-generational effects of being
separated from one’s family:
There’s things in my life that I haven’t dealt with and I’ve passed them on
to my children.  Gone to pieces.  Anxiety attacks.  I’ve passed this on to
my kids.  I know for a fact if you go and knock at their door they run and
hide.
I looked at my son today who had to be taken away because he was
going to commit suicide because he can’t handle it; he just can’t take any
more of the anxiety attacks that he and Karen have.  I have passed that on
to my kids because I haven’t dealt with it.  How do you deal with it?  How
do you sit down and go through all those years of abuse?  Somehow I’m
passing down negativity to my kids.  (222)
The following quote is from Langford Ginibi’s written testimonial text:
Nobby sounded so dejected.  He wanted us to come and get him.  When
me and Jeffery arrived at his place, he was like a lost soul.  He had a little
bag packed and he was cuddlin his dog, Pippa.  He was so sad and
distressed.  So hurt.  I could see that he was falling apart.  I can see him
now, sitting in the back seat of Jeffery’s car, holding on to his dog.
(Haunted by the Past 48-49)
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There are numerous examples of the shared generic features between The Bringing them
Home Report, Many Voices: Reflections on Experiences of Indigenous Child Separation
and Aboriginal testimonial life-stories.
Testimonial Life-Writing, Secrets and Difference
Significant tension may arise for the reader of testimonial life-writing who desires to
identify with the author when that reader confronts the presence of secrets.  Doris
Sommer writes of Menchú’s testimonial that “[t]he book [. . .] does not presume any
immediacy between the narrating ‘I’ and the readerly ‘you’” (131).  Menchú’s testimonial
lets readers know that she is keeping information secreted from them and she is aware
that this device might frustrate the desire in the reader to empathise with the narrator.
Sommer observes that such a desire hides a controlling disposition “that amount[s] to
construing the text as a kind of artless ‘confession,’ like the ones that characterized
surveillance techniques of nineteenth-century colonizers [. . .]” (131).  Associated with
empathy is a desire for the presence of, and intimacy with, the narrator of the testimonial
life-story that may be appropriative and prohibitive of the difference between the reader
and the writer.
We have seen that some theorists (Beverley, Rivero, Dalziell) argue that empathy
is a positive effect of the positioning of the reader in the testimonial life-story because it
cultivates solidarity.  However, Sommer is critical of its effects.  Menchú’s thwarting of
empathetic interest through her refusal to reveal her secrets shows a “more active and
strategic [agency] than our essentialist notions of authenticity have allowed” (133).42
Sommer further writes: “[t]he unyielding tropes add up to a rhetoric of particularism that
                                                 
42 While the reader is often asked to empathise with the Aboriginal perspective, the thwarting of empathy in
these texts through the non-disclosure of secrets works against full identification by the reader with the
narrator.  Aboriginal testimonies encourage the reader to identify with the political and therapeutic agenda
presented in the texts but discourage identification with Aboriginality itself.
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cautions privileged readers against easy appropriations of Otherness into manageable
universal categories” (133).  In this way, Menchú’s secrets form part of “organized
resistance as a narrative speech” (139), because Menchú assumes the reader’s desire to
know.  Sommer writes, “[i]f we happen not to be anthropologists, how passionately
interested does she imagine the reader to be in her ancestral secrets?  Yet her narrative
makes this very assumption, and therefore piques a curiosity that may not have preexisted
her resistance” (137).  Her refusal to disclose metaleptically constructs a questioner and
the usual sequence of cause and effect is reversed.  Through the use of this special form
of metonymy (metalepsis), Menchú registers Quiche agency.  Relatedly, Menchú’s
persona depends on her making careful omissions in her representation of herself and her
family, such as her reticence concerning the alcoholism of her father.  To achieve the
powerful representation of Quiche people that I Rigoberta Menchú does, it is necessary
for Menchú to break with that tradition and omit facets of it.  Such artifice is a testament
to subaltern agency rather than a de-legitimation of it and alerts the reader to the technical
devices involved in constructing a successful interventional testimonial.
Sommer distinguishes autobiography from testimonial life-writing by arguing that
the autobiography invites identification with the ‘I’ whereas testimonial life-writing,
through the use of narrative techniques like those outlined above, discourages
identification.  Borrowing from Sacvan Bercovitch, Sommer writes, “[r]ecognizing our
limitations [for empathy and identification] is ‘enabling,’ because such an act has a
double valence: acknowledging what we cannot know and what we can” and this in turn
“defends us from any illusion of complete or stable knowledge, and therefore from the
desire to replace one apparently limited speaker for another more totalizing one” (143).
Such an approach maintains a respect for the differences that exist between the reader and
the narrator and such “distance can be read as a lesson in the condition of possibility for
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coalitional politics” (157).  Menchú’s testimonial text continually evokes a ‘limit
experience’ through her refusal to divulge secrets and in this way the text ensures that
difference is maintained in the recognitive relationship between author and reader.
Limit experiences are also involved in the process of producing testimonial texts
in addition to the process of reading them.  Because of the polyphonic quality of
testimonial texts that results from the multiple sources involved in writing group history,
the information that comprises the life-story has to be carefully negotiated with other
family members.  My Place presents family secrets to create narrative tension and
identifies the types of negotiation involved in writing family history.  Morgan writes:
‘Glad [Morgan’s mother], you’re always goin’ on about the past.
You and Arthur [Morgan’s great uncle] are a good pair, you don’t know
what a secret is.’
‘It’s not a matter of secrets, Nan’, Mum reasoned.  ‘You seem to be
ashamed of your past, I don’t know why.  All my life, you’ve never told
me anything, never let me belong to anyone.  All my life, I’ve wanted a
family, you won’t even tell me about my own grandmother.  You go away
and let Arthur talk, at least he tells me something.’
Nan opened her mouth to reply, but Arthur cut her off with, ‘If you
don’t go, Daisy, I’ll tell them your Aboriginal name’.
Nan was furious.  ‘You wouldn’t!’  she fumed.
‘Too right I will’, said Arthur.  Nan knew when she was beaten,
she stormed off.  (148)
And:
‘Where was Nan born, Mum?’  I asked her one day.
‘Oh, I don’t know.  Up North somewhere.’
‘Has she ever talked to you about her life?’
‘You know she won’t talk about the past.  She says she can’t remember.’
‘Do you think she does remember?’
‘I think so, but she thinks we’re prying, trying to hurt her’.  (138)
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How a reader responds to secrets in reading testimonial texts differs from how secrets are
responded to and negotiated within families producing those texts.  The revelation of
secrets that may be considered vital for the establishment of the testifier’s and family’s
cultural history may not be considered appropriate by the testifier for publication.
To respect the non-disclosure of secrets is an example of basing recognitive
relationships on an appreciation of difference.  Such a recognitive structure between
author and reader is a practical example of the positive forms recognition can take in
contrast to the collapsing of viewpoint found in proto-typical autobiography.  To
recapitulate, using Redding’s description of Hegel’s dialectics of recognition, “Hegel’s
thought [. . .] thematizes precisely that element of recognition, its dimension of
‘releasement,’ which allows subjects to be reconciled by the ‘word of reconciliation’ in
such a way that their singularity is neither eclipsed nor absorbed into a single unified self-
consciousness” (133).  Marcia Langton makes a similar point when she argues that a
model of relationality that takes account of intersubjectivity is “generated when
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people engage in actual dialogue, where the individuals
test and adapt imagined models of each other to find satisfactory forms of mutual
comprehension” (81).  As such, the reading of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing “is the
progressive expansion or development of patterns of theoretical and practical cognition
together with that of the patterns of recognition within which they are able to function”
(Redding 129), that is, deeper and more knowledgeable world-views are dependent on
generous intersubjective recognition.  Even negative and violent forms of relation are
dependent on recognition: “Conflict is one possible shape of intersubjective relation; it
signifies the refusal of recognition.  Conflict may be a type of intersubjective relation, but
how the failure of recognition can be a ‘type’ or ‘shape’ of recognition is far from clear
[.  . .] struggle is both a ‘negation’ of and a type of recognition” (143).  Reading and
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writing Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is the execution of successful and unsuccessful
struggles for recognition.
The work of cultural difference operating between author and reader is also
registered through the subaltern’s use of the coloniser’s language.  Against arguments that
the subaltern cannot speak,43 it can be argued that difference is maintained when the
subaltern uses the coloniser’s language and to some extent it is only by employing the
language of the coloniser that these differences are registered.  Against the essentialising
implications of the notion that the subaltern’s voices cannot be heard, there is the
possibility that subaltern differences are articulated in the coloniser’s language.
Difference, which is essential for ethical recognitive structures and the successful
narrativisation of trauma, is evoked by the discrepancies that result from translation.  For
example, in I, Rigoberta Menchú, the reader can only know that there are Quiche cultural
secrets through Menchú’s attestation to them in Spanish.
Likewise, many of the Aboriginal testimonial life-stories examined in this study
not only interpolate Aboriginal words into the English text, but also highlight the
significance such interpolation has for registering Aboriginal identity.  Jackie Huggins
comments on the text of Auntie Rita:
In the text are some words and expressions that will be unfamiliar to most
non-Aboriginal readers.  There are Pitjara, Wakka Wakka and Aboriginal
English ways of talking.  We made a decision not to differentiate these
words in the text because they are part of our natural way of speech.  This
may cause some unsettling and confusing moments for a white reader.
However, there is a glossary for those unfamiliar with our languages.
After getting many of Rita’s memories on tape, I began, through
naivity, to translate my mother’s voice, trying to do it justice while
knowing that this book would have a predominantly white audience.  This
was my first cardinal sin.  (The second was losing the disk!)  Although Rita
                                                 
43 For instance, as argued by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 1988.
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speaks a standard English, her voice often got lost amid my own as I
attempted to ‘protect’ her from non-Aboriginal critics.  Black writers
grapple with this all the time.  But Aboriginal ways of speaking need to be
maintained and protected, for they are authentic, precious and
irreplaceable.  (3)
Recognition Theory
Testimonial life-writing opens up a space for dialogue and recognition (even if it be
internal to the reader) between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples.  Such writing
works against collapsing the Other’s viewpoint into one’s own viewpoint and, as Redding
notes, this is important for “preserv[ing] the sense that the other cannot be reduced to the
recognizer’s interpretative concept” (122).  Later, writing on Williams, Redding
comments, “Williams glosses entlassen here with ‘granting the other the freedom to
recognize or to withhold recognition . . . the recognition that really counts is the
recognition from the other that is not at the disposal of the self’” (123).  This is precisely
what Aboriginal testimonial life-writing does, that is, recognise non-Aboriginal readers in
a way that they cannot recognise themselves.
Redding’s work on Hegelian dialectics provides a useful framework for
understanding the various ways discussed throughout this chapter in which the non-
Aboriginal reader of testimonial life-writing is relativised in relation to the testifier.
Redding continues:
the realization is forced upon the combatant that the world is not simply as
it appears from its subjective point of view: first, the combatant includes
itself as an object in the world and not just as a knowing subject of the
world; next, it includes its other as more than a cognizable object, and
even more than an intentional subject mirroring its own intentions.  It has
to recognize the other as an intentional subject for whom it is a direct
object, and this is an intentionality it itself could never directly have.  In
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fact, it would seem that if the element of releasement is a structural feature
of acknowledgement per se, then indeed Hegel had described precisely
that ‘third’ form of intersubjectivity that Gadamer attributes to genuine
dialogue.  (123)44
Redding offers insights that are essential for the development of successful recognitive
structures: firstly, the importance of moving from identifying the self solely as a subject
to viewing the self as an object in the world and thus an object for others; and, secondly,
the realisation that the Other embodies an unassimilable difference.  It is crucial that this
“singularity is neither eclipsed nor absorbed into a single unified self-consciousness”
(133).  When reading Aboriginal testimonial life-writing it is vital to not conflate the
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal viewpoints and, if it is the case, to recognise one’s
position as a non-Aboriginal reader, that is, as an object of Aboriginal consciousnesses
implicated in the history of colonialism.
Aboriginal life-writing can be fruitfully read in terms of the recognitive structure
of Hegel’s Phenomenology because “[i]n some sense the Phenomenology has taught us to
see ourselves not as self-sufficient atomic beings but as beings whose existence is, in a
strong sense, dependent on belonging to the recognitive structure of a community”
(Redding 135).  In reading Aboriginal testimonial life-writing there is an opportunity to
take up a position in the recognitive structure of our community rather than dismiss
colonial history through a strategic ignorance that has been fundamental for the execution
of past colonial practices and is implicated in neo-colonial practices.  The opening up of
recognitive structures through the releasement that allows the Other to give or withhold
recognition generates a “recognitive intersubjectivity [. . . which is] a necessary condition
                                                 
44 This third form of intersubjective recognition corresponds with this study’s position on much cultural
theory such as representational theory and ways of working-through trauma, that is, it maintains a vitalising
disjunction between the self and other and between the representative and the represented.
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for self-consciousness (e.g., ‘human reality can be begotten and preserved only as
‘recognized’ reality’) [. . .]” (119).
While there is material in Aboriginal testimonial life-writing that is not fully
known or witnessed because it is in excess of our current vocabularies and imaginaries,
the importance of the quality of attention the model witnesses perform remains.  To
different extents in different contexts through history, the testifier and reader are both
incapable of witnessing the traumatic event completely due to the effects of latency and
the impasses traumatic material fosters.  However, this limit point itself is something that
can be shared between them.  A witness who can say “I know”, claiming to fully
empathise, fails to register the limit experience involved in the encounter with a traumatic
event.  In contrast to performing full empathy, the dialectics of recognition as discussed
in this chapter provides a better framework with which to engage with testimonial texts
because it maintains difference while opening spaces through which Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal peoples may recognise each other æ  it supports a coalitional, relational
intersubjectivity instead of an intersubjectivity characterised by the aim to achieve full
identification between the testifier and the witness to the testimony.  Similarly, it is
through recognising the dialectic of knowing and not knowing, which defines the
traumatic experience, that a link can begin to form between the narrator of testimonial
life-writing and the reader of it.  For the witness of testimony to claim that he or she can
fully know the experience of the other’s trauma is to betray that experience because to say
“I know” or “I saw”, in its “very establishing of a [. . .] referent, erases [. . .] the reality of
an event” (Caruth, Unclaimed Experience 29).  Acknowledging limit experiences is
essential for the process of working-through and re-externalising trauma because such
acknowledgment acts as a point from which to begin to develop narratives that extend our
understanding of traumatic histories.
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Yet, equally, to believe that to hear trauma is categorically impossible risks
pruriently adopting victimhood.  In instances of the valorisation of trauma as the
unrepresentable Other (the negative sublime), the reader risks coopting historical trauma
with structural trauma.  As discussed in Chapter Three, this is a transhistorical move that
collapses specific historical events into examples of transhistorical structures.  By doing
this, the secondary witness to trauma (the reader) assumes the position of the primary
witness to trauma (the author/testifier).  Instead of this, it is preferable that the reader
“attempt to put [. . . him or her self] in the other’s position without taking the other’s
place.  (It does no one any good simply to become a surrogate victim, however
compelling the inclination may at times be)” (LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust 198).
On countering victimisation, LaCapra writes, “the radical ambivalence of repetition — its
‘undecidability’ if you prefer — implies the possible role of counter-vailing forces that
may not entirely heal wounds but that allow mediated ways of surviving survival —
forces such as mourning itself, where grief is repeated in reduced, normatively controlled,
and socially supported form” (199).  As I argued in Chapter Three, Aboriginal testifiers
continue the hard work of working-through traumatic histories in order to establish
narrative and affective control over traumatic material.  Similarly, the reader’s
engagement with these texts as a form of historical reenactment or repetition can also
achieve positive results.  As Dalziell writes:
If these texts have a major part to play in a process of reconciliation
between black and white in Australia, ‘How is this to be done?’  One way,
[Brady] suggests, is by sympathetic re-enactment, by involving others
imaginatively in another’s experience and coming by way of re-enactment
to an understanding of the others, ‘feeling with them’.  (132)
However, as argued above, such imaginative involvement must avoid imaginative
capture, and sympathetic re-enactment must avoid simply acting-out.  It is preferable to
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maintain and continue to negotiate the limit points that exist between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal peoples, between what can be phrased now and what may be phrased in the
future, between the affective and linguistic aspects of traumatic experience, and between
acting-out and working-through, because these limits are equally points of connection and
separation and of identification and difference.  They must not be collapsed into
redemptive narratives that seek full identification between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
peoples or a non-situated transcendence of traumatic experience.  Nor should these limit
points of difference be reinforced as impasses that cannot be successfully negotiated and
productively reconfigured.  This is why the dialectical approach to recognition undertaken
throughout this study is important because it endeavours to register and maintain the
dynamic ambiguity at work in different forms of identity establishment.
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Chapter 5
Aboriginal Testimonial Life-Writing and Schizo-Analytic Theory
Throughout this study I have argued that ways of conceptualising the subject in
psychoanalytic and post-colonial theory provide a better vocabulary for articulating
Aboriginal testimonial life-writing’s practices and goals than post-structuralist
deconstructive method or abstracted formulations of subjectivity and language as found in
Cartesian-like models.  In contrast with the autonomous and sovereign subject discussed
in Chapter One, psychoanalytic and post-colonial theory present a decentred subject
whose sovereignty, in a post-colonial context, is displaced by forces such as post-colonial
trauma and mourning.  The processes involved in working-through these forces
encourage an exploration of pyschoanalytic and post-colonial theory that departs from
post-structuralist theorisations that present subjects who disarticulate themselves in the
very process of establishing themselves.
This chapter explores schizo-analysis’ highly mobile understanding of subjectivity
to assess if it provides tools that are more responsive to post-colonial conditions and texts
than other psychoanalytic, post-structuralist and realist approaches.  For instance, post-
colonial theorists have employed the notion of the rhizome as a metaphor for the post-
colonial condition, but also as a metaphor for the possibilities of resisting colonial and
neo-colonial practices (Ashcroft and Salter).  The concept of the rhizome is used in a
sense that is as much prescriptive as it is descriptive, that is, it describes the post-colonial
condition as well as identifies the practices that may transform it.  The following
examination aims to show that schizo-analysis can be a more sensitive theoretical
instrument for registering the post-colonial condition than the often over-deterministic
theories reviewed elsewhere in this study.  Nevertheless, despite embracing schizo-
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analytic tools, I maintain that schizo-analysis’ understanding of the subject as highly
dynamic and open to possibilities of subjective becoming must be balanced by an
understanding of the ways in which the subject is strongly circumscribed and determined
by the forces of post-colonial traumatic experience as discussed in Chapter Three.  Yet, as
Friedlander notes, it is important to have a dual project which “[i]n a sense [. . .] is the
simultaneous acceptance of two contradictory moves: the search for ever-closer historical
linkages and the avoidance of a naive historical positivism leading to simplistic and self-
assured historical narrations and closure”.  My use of schizo-analysis is compatible with
Friedlander’s search “for ever-closer historical linkages and the avoidance of a naive
historical positivism” because it prescribes a dynamic model of post-colonial subjectivity
(qtd. in LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust 212), yet aims to avoid the tendency to
overplay the possibilities of subjective becoming because such a tendency risks
underplaying the determination of subjects by colonial forces.
The purpose of this chapter is to further draw upon developments in
psychoanalytic models of decentred subjectivity and models of performativity to examine
their usefulness for understanding post-colonial conditions as they are presented in
Aboriginal testimonial life-writing.  It moves from Lacan’s adaptation of Freud’s psychic
typology to Kristeva and on to Deleuze’s and Guattari’s models of the subject to advance
this examination.  It argues that there has been a shift from a strict focus on language in
Lacan and Kristeva towards the development of conceptual frameworks for thinking
about extra-linguistic, affective systems pertinent to the discussion of traumatised
subjects.  It argues that some psychoanalytic theory’s prioritisation of language and of
concepts such as Oedipalisation and other psychic complexes is a universalising,
difference-effacing strategy.  Such an exploration is important for showing that there are
formulations of subjectivity that characterise the subject as more highly dynamic and
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mutable than traditional conceptualisations.  These formulations of the subject are
necessary for thinking about the processes involved in working-through post-colonial
trauma because they can better articulate the complex co-production of social forces and
subjects in specific historical contexts.  They stand in contrast to Cartesian-like models of
the subject as well as redemptive totalisations and impasse-oriented narratives that
unnecessarily restrict the possibilities open to traumatised subjects for working-through
trauma.  This chapter focuses on the need to theorise the specificity of different
subjectivities and their embodied histories, maintaining that psychoanalytic concepts like
working-through and acting-out are useful even though their deployment as mere parts of
larger complexes is outmoded.
Kristeva is used as a link between Lacan and Deleuze and Guattari because she
focuses on pre-linguistic affective systems æ  as do Deleuze and Guattari æ while
remaining committed to Oedipalisation as does Lacan.  Of these theorists, Deleuze’s and
Guattari’s theory most strongly embraces itself as a figurative practice and focuses on the
specificity of the metaphorical clusters that produce subjectivity.  Such theoretical
mobility allows the specificity of different subjects to be better articulated and means that
schizo-analysis avoids the tendency in some theory to adopt the ‘god-tricks’ of relativism
and totalisation which “promise [. . .] vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and
fully” (Haraway 191).  In contrast to schizo-analysis, traditional (Freudian)
psychoanalytic theory argues that systems of representation govern subjectivity, yet
neglects to acknowledge that its modelisation of subjectivity is figurative and generates
subjectivity in the same instance that it claims to reflect it.  In this sense, traditional
psychoanalytic theory, in its guise as a science, effaces itself as a figurative discursive
practice.  Schizo-analysis forgoes the universalising claims of Lacanian and Kristevan
psychoanalysis in order to develop conceptual tools that are capable of discussing the
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specificity of subjectivity and cultural and political conditions.  The specificity of schizo-
analytic theory makes it compatible with LaCapra’s project of recovering agency through
object-specification and the careful balancing of acting-out with working-through in
dealing with traumatic material.
It is important to contextualise Deleuze’s and Guattari’s work within the history
of psychoanalysis, particularly in relation to their development of Lacan’s psychoanalytic
models, to show its continuity with and development of psychoanaysis’ interpretive
schema.  In Chapter Three I discussed how Lacan reinvigorated Freud during the 1950s
and 1960s by reconfiguring Freud’s structure of personality within Saussure’s linguistic
structure.  In the discussion of realism in Chapter One, I showed how Saussurean
linguistics argued that signification has no positive identity but is rather the consequence
of differences within a linguistic system.  Saussure broke up signification into its
constituent parts, the signifier and the signified, and showed “that the elements
composing the sign, as well as the sign itself, can only have identity by virtue of their
pure difference” (Grosz, Jacques Lacan 93).  Yet, where Saussure saw the construction of
the sign as a result of an equal influence by the signifier and the signified, Lacan gave the
signifier the privileged position, arguing that the signified is simply another signifier.
Lacan represents this as S/s where the signified (s) is simply a signifier (S) that has
crossed over the bar (/), “[f]or in so far as it is itself only pure function of the signifier, the
algorithm can reveal only the structure of a signifier in this transfer” and in no way can
the signified be revealed (152).
Though Lacan’s account of the subject has proven valuable for many literary
theorists, this study has argued that there are texts and subjects that exceed his models.45
                                                 
45 In Lacan’s model, subjectivity and the text interrelate in the following way.  A nascent form of
subjectivity arises in the Imaginary stage.  At this stage, the infant begins to develop a basic sense of the
self/Other distinction.  During the Imaginary stage, the child develops a visual image of itself (the imago)
that locates and orders the child in space before it has any physical control over space.  This stage is the first
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Aboriginal testimonial texts are taken to exemplify the return of the repressed, that is, the
emergence of a particular Real into a particular Symbolic.  Furthermore, because these
testimonial texts are characterised by the way in which they foreground issues of
collective significance, it is important to note here that Lacan’s (and traditional
psychoanalysis’) emphasis on the individual is a shortsighted application of
psychoanalytic concepts.  Central to this study is the broadening of the relevance of such
concepts from the individual to communities, societies and nations.  LaCapra writes on
this point that “it may be worth contending that psychoanalysis is misconstrued as a
psychology of the individual: its basic concepts should be understood as undercutting the
binary opposition between the individual and society [. . .]” (Representing the
Holocaust 173).
Lacan argues that the emergence of the repressed produces subjects and texts that
are susceptible to an experience of mental breakdown.  Consequently, some may argue
that those interested in the liberating potential of the breakdown of the Symbolic
glamorise madness and traumatic experience.  While there are obvious reasons why the
experience of mental breakdown should be avoided, the prospect of identifying liberating
processes in the breakdown, or rather reworking, of the Symbolic is attractive.
An inquiry into the effects on thinking about language use and textual production
that a reconfiguration of Lacan’s model offers is a productive exercise in several ways for
examining processes for reworking the Symbolic.  Identifying potential ways of opening
                                                                                                                                                  
movement away from the immediacy of lived experience (the Real) into that of the representational
function of language (the Symbolic).  The separation of these two functions, the Real and the Symbolic, is
effected by the child’s complete entry into the Symbolic via the Oedipal complex.  The Symbolic is the
stage upon and within which the child attains the speaking subject position of ‘I’.  Thus, to understand
Lacan’s schema of the formation of the subject, it is essential to refer to the rules of language that he argues
are central to and coterminous with the three stages through which the subject emerges.  Lastly, as
mentioned elsewhere in this study, the term ‘stage/s’ does not refer solely to temporal stages but also to
‘stage’ in the theatrical sense of a site of performance.
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up Lacan’s model changes the basically repressive structure of language production that
he presents.  On the limits and possibilities of Lacan’s model, LaCapra writes:
Actively disengaged from patriarchal assumptions and related instead to a
transformed notion of normatively regulated interaction, the Symbolic
would mark the entry into language in the specific sense of usage that
would not definitively transcend all blind spots, bring total integration, or
even serve as a ‘cure’ for ‘psychosis’ but would at least enable (while
never ensuring) a viable role for critical judgment and responsible action.
(Representing the Holocaust 208)
Lacan’s conception of the acquisition of the Symbolic implies acquiescence to patriarchy
and other cohorts of the Symbolic and, thereby, forecloses alternative ways of occupying
the Symbolic.  Extending this position in regards to post-colonial agency, Lacan’s
conception of the Symbolic forecloses the possibility of subaltern acquisition of the
dominant Symbolic because such acquisition necessarily suppresses subaltern agency,
just as it suppresses the ‘feminine’ or anything viewed as non-normative.  LaCapra’s
notion of the Symbolic cited above is more useful for thinking about subaltern subjects by
virtue of the fact that it allows the registration and even transformation of suppressed
elements.  In the psychoanalytic theory of Kristeva and Lacan, the disruption of the
Symbolic can only occur through the irruption of the Imaginary or the Real (usually as a
form of madness) and the Symbolic cannot be contested within its own terms.
Kristeva, Deleuze and Guattari have each identified problems with Lacan’s model
of subjectivity.  Guattari writes that “[a]s a Universe of emergence, a sensitive plate
registering all incorporeal becomings, the emergent self can in no way be assimilated to a
psychogenetic phase, such as the oral phase” (Chaosmosis 66), nor to “a maternal-oral
stasis, nor to a language stasis, although they incontestably participate in it” (75).  If the
subject cannot be reduced to discrete psychogenetic phases (individual or social phases)
as Guattari argues, an inquiry into other frameworks of psychogenesis is required.
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Kristeva’s notion of the relations between the semiotic, thetic and symbolic provides one
point of departure from Lacan that allows access to pre-Symbolic material and opens the
possibility of the registration of subaltern experience.
Like Lacan, Kristeva links the development of subjectivity with textual practices.
However, her conception of textuality or systems of signification in general differs from
Lacan’s because she does not view the Real as that which is impossible to signify or as
absolutely repressed.  Rather, Kristeva argues that the Real or, as she terms it, the
‘semiotic’,46 continues to exert an influence after the subject’s entry into the Symbolic.
Kristeva envisions the semiotic as that process through which physical drives and
energies circulate, mapping out a space for the subject to exist in.  It organises the body
within pre-linguistic systems like those Freud termed ‘mnemic’, which are based on
“different associative principles [. . . like] simultaneity [. . .] similarity, homophony,
antipathy, cause and effect [. . .]” (Grosz, Jacques Lacan 86), or “energies, rhythms,
forces and corporeal residues necessary for representation” (Grosz, Sexual
Subversions 43).  These pre-linguistic systems are seen as necessary in any formation of
linguistic representation that occurs in the Symbolic.  They not only foreshadow these
later representational systems but continuously shadow them, acting as disruptive and
vitalising forces, both preconditioning and reconditioning the Symbolic.
Kristeva terms pre-linguistic, affective signifying systems the ‘genotext’, and
linguistic signifying systems the ‘phenotext’.  Later in her work, these terms are replaced
and supplemented by the terms ‘process’ and ‘unity’ respectively (Grosz, Sexual
Subversions 51).  These terms do not operate as a simple dualism wherein when one pole
is active the other is deactivated.  Rather, they function together, although one will be
dominant at any particular time in any subject/text.  Any irruption of the genotext is
                                                 
46 The semiotic or the chora performs a similar role to Lacan’s Real.
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always contained and Kristeva sees this as a result of the repressive forces within the
phenotext that are required to maintain unity.  However, they are never entirely successful
and the genotext continues to act disruptively.  Both exist simultaneously in a dialectical
interchange that is never resolved, and they are as representative of any textual production
as they are of any production of subjectivity.  Because Kristeva provides scope for the
registration of the genotext within the phenotext, her theorisation of the subject is one that
allows for the possibility for subaltern subjects to gain access to and transform the
Symbolic.
The relationship between the subject and the text is an intimately connected one.
The subject cannot precede the text, be it the genotext or the phenotext, because “[t]he
subjectivity to which Kristeva refers is constructed within the text.  This discursive ‘I’ is
not entirely distinct from the living social subject: the latter is to a large extent socially
structured and positioned by the discursive construction of the ‘I’ in the symbolic”
(Grosz, Sexual Subversions 55).  This point is crucial for understanding the profound
nature of representation, for “the original and proper meaning of ‘representation’ is not a
‘second presentation,’ but a ‘presentation to the self’ [. . .]” (Nancy 148).  The subject is
born in the act of presenting itself to itself.  In a post-colonial context, the subaltern is not
represented in the Symbolic mimetically, that is, as a second presentation.  Rather,
because Symbolic representation cannot be separated from the subaltern’s first
presentation of itself to itself and, because in Kristeva’s framework, the repressed
reflexively reorders the Symbolic, Kristeva provides a space for the subaltern element to
reconfigure and transform the Symbolic.  For Kristeva, the subject presents itself doubly
and repeatedly in a play between ‘process’ and ‘unity’.  Unity resorbs process and process
resorbs unity and the two modes of subjectification/textualisation exchange one another.
Unity as repressive, State driven and canonical is subverted by the radical trinity
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“madness, holiness and poetry” (Kristeva qtd. in Grosz, Sexual Subversions 52), in that
they break “the socio-symbolic order, splitting it open, changing vocabulary, syntax, the
word itself and releasing from beneath them the drives borne by vocalic or kinetic
differences, jouissance works its way into the social” (Kristeva qtd. in Grosz, Sexual
Subversions 56).  This is a utopian vision indeed and Kristeva, of necessity, tempers it
with an outline of the way in which the Symbolic contains semiotic disruptions.  She
shows how the Symbolic can never be completely transformed and how the irruptions of
the semiotic are always reformist.
Kristeva develops Lacan by propounding that liberating forces exist within the
subject/text that precede the Symbolic.  By showing the interconnection between
subjectivity and textuality and the relationship between the two foundational textual
modes, the semiotic and Symbolic, Kristeva has developed a conceptual framework and
terminology for pre-Symbolic systems that allows them to be articulated and, thereby,
more easily examined.  This is a crucial step for moving beyond Lacan.  Nevertheless, in
developing concepts of the pre-Symbolic, Kristeva retains a conservative attitude towards
more powerful expressions of the semiotic and, because of this, a more restricted
unconscious that too strictly circumscribes the expression of subaltern agency.  While her
caution regarding this issue is understandable, I think that her account suffers from its
commitment to Lacan’s model and her emphasis on Oedipalisation.  Grosz writes,
“Kristeva remains committed to psychoanalysis as an overarching framework or
theoretical paradigm.  While there are number of details she questions, alters or refuses to
accept, there is no question of the necessity of something like psychoanalytic models of
the unconscious and sexual drives” (Sexual Subversions 103).  In order to address this, I
will give an account of another, more radical, reevaluation of Lacanian psychoanalysis,
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and endeavour to assess its value in terms of its potential to contribute to understanding
post-colonial subjects and texts.
Deleuze’s and Guattari’s Schizo-Analysis
Concepts formulated by Deleuze and Guattari are central to many critiques of
psychoanalysis.  Deleuze and Guattari propose a different way of modeling subjectivity,
termed ‘schizo-analysis’, to reinvigorate traditional psychoanalytic theory.  This model is
first given comprehensive exposition in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia.  The concepts and vocabulary of schizo-analysis are tortuous but
nevertheless provide an important critique of foundational models of psychoanalysis.
Where psychoanalysis (whether Freudian, Lacanian, or Kristevan) models subjectivity on
a relationship between three stages of emergence (the Real/semiotic, the Imaginary/thetic
and the Symbolic/unity), schizo-analysis views such models as reductive figurations of
subjectivity.  For example, Kristeva sees the development of semiotic systems that
influence the character of unconscious irruptions as basically predetermined.  In contrast,
Guattari sees such formations as open to change asserting that it is possible to revitalise
“complexions of alterity and rekindl[e] processes of semiotisation [. . .]”
(Chaosmosis 85).  Thus, Guattari views Lacan’s structural psychoanalysis and Kristeva’s
development of it as no more than possible configurations that have no uncontestable
purchase on truth.  Guattari’s presentation of a dynamic framework for understanding the
construction of identity and social worlds is attractive to the post-colonial theorist
because it provides resources for mobilizing post-colonial forces to transform post-
colonial conditions.  As an imaginary it provides a vocabulary that allows for more
complex figurations of post-colonial conditions and, thereby, more possibilities for
theorising and performing agency.  It is this opening up of the very foundations of
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semiotic ontology that marks Deleuze’s and Guattari’s departure from other forms of
psychoanalytic theory.  Guattari writes:
A long time ago I renounced the Conscious-Unconscious dualism of the
Freudian topoi and all the Manichean oppositions correlative to Oedipal
triangulation and to the castration complex. I opted for an Unconscious
superposing multiple strata of subjectivation, heterogeneous strata of
variable extension and consistency.  Thus a more ‘schizo’ Unconscious,
one liberated from familial shackels, turned more towards actual praxis
than towards fixations on, and regressions to, the past.  An Unconscious of
Flux and of abstract machines rather than an Unconscious of structure and
language.  (Chaosmosis 12)
In this passage we see dissatisfaction with Freudian psychic topography and,
consequently, dissatisfaction with Lacanian psychoanalysis’ reconfiguration of this model
in terms of Saussurean linguistics.  Guattari views psychoanalysis, with its reliance on
universal categories applicable to diverse subjects, as an over-determination of
subjectivity.  Traditional pyschoanalysis’ analysis/reading of the subject/text reduces the
subject into universal categories that fail to take account of the complexity of the social
dynamic.  According to Guattari, there is no universal structure of the mind as
psychoanalytic theory assumes.  To illustrate the differences between traditional
psychoanalytic reading and schizo-analysis, Guattari refers to Franz Kafka’s interest in
photographs:
Photographs are a constant theme of his work.  There are several ways of
looking at it.  We might reduce the theme by interpreting it: photos could
refer to a crystallization of the imaginary, the theme of the double,
narcissicism, whatever.  [.  .  .] But wouldn’t it be much more interesting
to try to find out how photos really function in the work, when they
appear, what networks they modify, etc.  [. . .] Instead of saying, ‘Hey,
things are strangely resolved in identity, there is a duplication, etc.,’
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schizo-analysis will find paths of differentiation which originate there.
(“Psycho-Analysis” 82)
A return to the specificity of the text and the subject through differentiation escapes over-
determinations of the subject and the text that characterise traditional psychoanalytic
reading.
This focus on specificity is the attractive feature of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s
schizo-analytic theory for post-colonial theory.  It is the case that, for example, the father,
rather than being a universal figure for every emerging subject is, in fact, a more specific
character such as an engineer, a bureaucrat, a musician or alcoholic, and thus an element
in a particular formation of the social/Symbolic system.  As discussed in Chapter Three,
there are different Reals for different Symbolics, and therefore different levers for
reconfiguring particular Symbolics.  Schizo-analytic theory accounts for and responds to
this specificity and is useful in the post-colonial context for explicating the particular
networks involved in different identity and social formations.  Such explication is
undertaken below with reference to the forms of identity construction found in Aboriginal
testimonial life-writing and theory.  In the example of Kafka above, the traditional
psychoanalytic view of the father and the Symbolic is dismantled and Oedipalisation is
deuniversalised.  This is the case because the unconscious is highly specific and it “relates
directly to an entire social field, both economic and political, rather than to the mythical
and familial coordinates traditionally invoked by psychoanalysis” (Deleuze, “Three
Group Problems” 100).
After criticising the universalising claims of Oedipalisation and the Symbolic,
Deleuze and Guattari proceed to reformulate the semiotic as a schizo-process.  However,
before outlining this reformulation, it is necessary to further clarify the meaning of the
term schizo-analysis.  While some theorists may criticise the glorification of madness that
they find in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s work, the term schizo-analysis is not used in such a
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sense.  As Guattari writes, “we never said: ‘identification of the analyst and the
schizophrenic.’  We say that the analyst, like the militant, the writer, or whoever it may
be, is more or less involved in a ‘schizo-process’ to be distinguished from the locked-up
schizophrenic whose own ‘schizo-process’ runs aimlessly or is blocked up” (“Psycho-
Analysis” 83).  The schizo-process they refer to is the social/Symbolic order itself and not
merely an effect of an aberrant relationship with it.  Over and above this, the schizo-
process is not confined within the Symbolic but is also characteristic of pre-linguistic,
affective systems.  In fact, when understood as a more pervasive condition, it begins to
break down the traditional structures of subjectivity, because “[t]he dualities
objective/subjective, [Symbolic/Real, linguistic/affective,] infrastructure/superstructure
and production/ideology fade away, giving us access to the strict complementarity of the
desiring subject of the institution and the institutional object” (Deleuze, “Three Group
Problem” 101).  There is a continual movement between the Symbolic and the pre-
Symbolic and, in contrast to Kristeva’s formulation of this dyad, the structures of the pre-
Symbolic and pre-thetic are not permanently set, but are just as open to change as
social/Symbolic structures.47  Therefore, what was a vertical, hierarchical view of
subjectivity in psychoanalysis is a horizontal, rhizomatic one in schizo-analysis.
Given that Deleuze and Guattari have finished with a vertical psychoanalytic
model and instead posit a horizontal form of emergence, how do they describe this
process and with what terms?  Firstly, Guattari states (asks): “[w]e are faced with an
important ethical choice: either we objectify, reify, ‘scientifise’ subjectivity, or, on the
contrary, we try to grasp it in the dimension of its processual creativity” (Chaosmosis 13).
Guattari opts for the latter and employs the concept of the ‘existential refrain’ as a means
                                                 
47 Kristeva’s view of the semiotic process as a set structure is supported by her view that only a male
subject can speak it.  As Grosz writes, “Kristeva seems to accept that phallic subjects alone, only men, can
represent the unrepresented, subversive underside of the chora and the semiotic” (Jacques Lacan 164). This
is a pervasive reduction of the power of the semiotic and suffers because of its commitment to Lacanian
psychoanalysis and Oedipalisation.
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to explore ‘processual creativity’: the becoming of subjectivity.  I also adopt this
approach because of the demands of theorising my particular post-colonial project, that is,
formulating how Aboriginal testimonial life-writing works socially, politically, ethically,
and culturally necessitates exploring more dynamic, interactive and historicised theories
of subject formation.  Guattari uses the concept of the existential refrain to answer the
question of how “certain semiotic segments achieve their autonomy, start to work for
themselves and to secrete new fields of reference?” (13).  If we recall Lacan’s outline of
‘primal repression’ as the basis for a system of linguistic reference, whereby terms that
are connected to the primal repression are pulled into the unconscious, the significance of
Guattari’s model becomes clearer.  Semiotic segments, of which primal repression is an
example, create existential territories.  Guattari gives the following example of an
existential territory:
[w]hen I watch television, I exist at the intersection: 1. of a perceptual
fascination provoked by the screen’s luminous animation which borders on
the hypnotic, 2. of a captive relation with the narrative content of the
program, associated with a lateral awareness of surrounding events (water
boiling on the stove, a child’s cry, the telephone . . .), 3. of a world of
fantasms occupying my daydreams.  My feeling of personal identity is
thus pulled in different directions.  How can I maintain a relative sense of
unicity. despite the diversity of components of subjectivation that pass
through me?  It’s a question of the refrain that fixes me in front of the
screen, henceforth constituted as a projective existential node.  (16-17)
This notion of a refrain that organises an existential territory explains the process through
which subjectivity orders itself and the environment.  It is a process involving more than
ordinary signification because it also functions extra-linguistically in its organisation of
the subject.  The refrain organises a number of discrete elements and while their
heterogeneity is conserved they “are nevertheless captured by a refrain which couples
them to the existential Territory of my self” (17).
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For Guattari, the refrain becomes a tool for analysis and reading, providing an
interpretive key that does not need to refer to universals that have already posited the
structure of subjectivity.48  The key to interpretation lies in the specific conditions of an
event or a text and not in transhistorical structures, which means that there is no universal
measure for understanding and evaluating a subject or text.  Instead it is the event and the
refrain that evokes the subject/text — like the example of Guattari watching television —
that opens up new possibilities of reference and interpretation.  The structures of
subjectivity are created in the processual event, so it is to this that we need to look in any
reading of post-colonial trauma.  This model of subjectivity is one that stresses the praxis
and performance of subjectivity and, in this sense, is extremely pragmatic.  Both neurotic
and psychotic traumatised behaviours may be understood as refrains or performances that
become rigid — petrified representations manifested as obsessive rituals.
The concept of the refrain is useful for analysing testimonies to trauma.  As
discussed in Chapter Three, a diverse set of elements is involved when Langford Ginibi
reads Granny Gomes’s testimony to a massacre of Bundjalung people.  To recapitulate,
Langford Ginibi responds to Gomes’s testimony thus: “[w]e drove for a long while before
we spoke.  I think we were both stunned by the fact that we could be confronted with
people telling us about these massacres as if they had happened only yesterday, even
though I knew the two tribal elders mentioned, Granny Gomes and Granny Cowan, were
dead” (My Bundjalung People 78).  Langford Ginibi is shocked by the force with which a
historic traumatic event is felt in the present.  As I have noted, the distance between the
                                                 
48 Lacan’s concept of the Signifier is an example of Guattari’s view of this tendency to universalise.
Guattari sees it as homogenising because it loses the multi-dimensional character of many semiotic systems.
Guattari views semiotics as more than just the linguistic and significational economy of language to which
Lacan’s concept of the Signifier remains committed.  Instead, Guattari posits “A-signifying semiological
dimensions that trigger informational sign machines, and that function in parallel or independently of the
fact that they produce and convey significations and denotations, and thus escape from strictly linguistic
axiomatics” (Chaosmosis 4).  This space is reminiscent of Kristeva’s concept of ‘process’, nevertheless,
Kristeva still gives these processes a fixed character.  According to Guattari, there is no univocal
ontological plinth beneath the diversity of beings and no universal semiotic ‘process’ or ‘chora’.
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crisis itself and the trauma of surviving the crisis is collapsed, demonstrating temporal
disruption.  Relatedly, the borders between one individual’s experience of trauma and
another individual’s experience of trauma is blurred — Gomes’s story is Langford
Ginibi’s story, and both are part of the collective Bundjalung story.  Furthermore, the
need to testify and the difficulty of doing so is shown — Gomes’s testimony has the
power to evoke the traumatic event for Langford Ginibi, but Langford Ginibi can only
attest to language’s failure to register the event.
In this manner, testifying to trauma breaks down distinctions between the self and
the other, the past and the present, well-being and dysfunction, and speech and silence.
Yet how are these diverse and contradictory elements organised?  It is here that Guattari’s
notion of the existential refrain is useful for explicating the textual organisation of diverse
phenomena in post-colonial contexts.  In the passage on watching television, Guattari
describes how the refrain organises experience, and this passage is relevant to Langford
Ginibi’s experience of hearing Gomes’s testimony.  To repeat, Guattari writes, “[m]y
feeling of personal identity is thus pulled in different directions.  How can I maintain a
relative sense of unicity, despite the diversity of components of subjectivation that pass
through me?  It’s a question of the refrain that fixes me in front of the screen, henceforth
constituted as a projective existential node” (Chaosmosis 16-17).  In Langford Ginibi’s
case, the testimonial life-story establishes unicity from the diverse elements, discussed
above, of her experience of post-colonial trauma.  The testimonial narrative, like the
television screen, functions as a “projective existential node” in that it is a performative
act that collects and organises diverse elements of the post-colonial matrix into a story.
As partly illustrated in Langford Ginibi’s response to Gomes’s testimony, Langford
Ginibi’s testimonial life-story is concerned with organising language, traumatic affects,
temporal disruptions, speech and silence, post-colonial history, ethics, and cross-cultural
223S. R. J. Gibbons
recognition into a coherent narrative, even identity, where identity itself is an existential
refrain ordered as a written text.  Schizo-analytic tools when used in this way have great
scope for articulating the various elements and processes involved in specific events in
post-colonial history.
A refrain establishes territory out of relatively undifferentiated phenomena.
Spatially, it is a unit of discrete elements and, temporally, it is a reiteration of that unit.  It
occurs within a wider context like a repeated phrase at the end of different verses.  In this
sense, it is a looped segment of a larger process.  Traumatic material is a refrain in that it
is a collection of charged elements that is split off from the personality as a whole and
which repeatedly jeopardises that personality as much as it defines it.  To repeat:
LaCapra, citing J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, restates: “‘working-through might be
defined as that process which is liable to halt the repetitive insistence characteristic of
unconscious formations by bringing these into relation with the subject’s personality as a
whole’” (Representing the Holocaust 209).  Testimonial life-stories bring traumatic
elements into relation through the presentation of the personality as a whole.  The refrain
acts as a defence against undifferentiated phenomena, the Real, trauma, the negative
sublime.  It establishes precarious territory in which the subject withstands being further
traumatised by residue traumatic material.  It is a horizon of approach and avoidance that
corresponds with trauma’s demand and defiance to be spoken.  In this way, the refrain is
the off-setting of working-through with acting-out and every iteration is slightly different
and reconfigured to allow for other possible responses to trauma.49  The schizo-analytic
tool of the refrain complements LaCapra’s conceptualisation of working-through and can
identify the various objects involved in off-setting working-through with acting-out.
                                                 
49 This resembles William Harris’s practice of ‘rehearsal’ and may be a useful contribution to theory on this
practice æ see Olubas’s “Wilson Harris’s Essays”, 1993.
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Used together they can support more detailed post-colonial historical research and literary
theory.
A particular refrain is the unique operation of working-through and acting-out in
an individual life-story.  Working-through and acting-out must function together in a
therapeutic context because working-through requires a mediated form of acting-out.
Working-through is the attempt to establish a distance between the present and the past
and “involves the attempt to acquire some perspective on experience without denying its
claims or indeed its compulsive force” (Representing the Holocaust 200).  As discussed,
LaCapra defines acting-out as “a mimetic relation to the past which is re-generated or
relived as if it were fully present rather than represented in memory and inscription”
(History and Memory 45).  In contrast, mourning/working-through is defined as “a
relation to the past that recognizes its difference from the present and enacts a specific
performative relation to it that simultaneously remembers and takes at least partial leave
of it, thereby allowing for critical judgment and a reinvestment in life [. . .]” (45).
Langford Ginibi’s repeated journeys to sites of post-colonial trauma involve instances of
melancholy wherein the past is lived as if it were fully present, but her journeys
progressively become instances of mourning that allow space for critical judgement by
creating distance between past trauma and present experience.  LaCapra writes that
“working-through [. . .] requires the effort to achieve critical distance on experience
through a comparison of experiences and through a reconstruction of larger contexts that
help to inform and perhaps to transform experience”  (Representing the Holocaust 200).
As discussed in Chapter Three, Langford Ginibi’s writing develops to address larger
contexts of Aboriginal history and it is through off-setting acting-out with working-
through that this is achieved.  Langford Ginibi’s journeys are instances of working-
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through and acting-out operating together as a therapeutic refrain unique to Langford
Ginibi’s testimony.
Through employing concepts like the refrain to interpret different subjects’
experiences of the world, schizo-analysis does not reduce itself to universals and views
theoretical approaches that do as necessarily limited.  Models themselves are events that
produce subjectivity.  Models such as psychoanalytic theory produce subjectivity rather
than mirror it and this is why Guattari argues that the theory of schizo-analysis is a ‘meta-
modelisation’ and not simply a modelisation of the production of subjectivity.  It is not a
reinstatement of universal principles but a method “capable of taking into account the
diversity of modelising systems” (Chaosmosis 22).  It articulates a condition in which
subjectivity can be produced again and again without reference to universals, because
“what [Guattari is] aiming at with this concept of [the] refrain [is not] just massive
affects, but hyper-complex refrains [. . .] crystallising the most deterritorialised existential
Territories” (16).  Content is no longer latent, as the unconscious was in Lacan’s model,
but is opened outwards to the world and capable of creating new systems of reference and
new existential territories.
Guattari opposes the notion of the ‘machine’ to that of structure, specifically the
structures of Freud and Lacan.  Structure assumes a degree of foundational stability for
subjectivity while Guattari’s use of the concept of the ‘machine’ focuses on
precariousness, finitude, uncertainty and deep mobility.  To model the machinic nature of
subjectivity, Guattari employs four ontological categories.  He sees this number as
significant because it breaks the traditional tri-partite systems that he believes always
collapse into binary oppositions.  These four ontological categories are called Flux,
Territory, machinic Phylum and Universe.  Guattari never explicitly defines these terms
and a sense of their meaning only emerges through that with which he contrasts them.
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These categories transfer the epistemological openness effected by post-structuralism into
ontological openness.
The four categories are used as ‘meta-modelisers’, which means that their
“primary purpose is to take account of the way in which the diverse existing systems of
modelisation (religious, meta-physical, scientific, psychoanalytic, animistic, neurotic . . .)
nearly always skirt around the problem of self-referential enunciation” (60).  I take refusal
to engage with the problem of ‘self-referential enunciation’ to mean the way the above
meta-narratives efface the fact that they produce the objects they claim to reflect.  As
Cathy Vasseleau writes, “[the] very manufacture of metaphors, images, models, diagrams
and analogies, and their simultaneous dismissal as just substitutes for or illustrations of
the essential thing, [. . .] effaces itself as a figurative practice.  It is avoiding the problem
of how their ‘figurative strategies are constitutive of the objects whose essence they
describe’” (59).50  Traditional modeling systems effect a violent ‘making equal’ in their
representations of subjectivity and “there is no language (langue) in existence for which
there is any question of its inability to cover the whole field of the signified, it being an
effect of its existence as a language (langue) that it necessarily answers all needs”
(Lacan 150).
Such a position maintains that signification generates subjectivity while appearing
to reflect it and it is this violent rendering of subjectivity that schizo-analysis attempts to
avoid.  Guattari’s project is to no longer show the “[u]niversals or mathemes, nor [. . .]
pre-established structures of subjectivity, but rather [. . . to show] domains of entities we
detect at the same time that we produce them, and which appear to have been always
there, from the moment we engender them” (Chaosmosis 17).  Guattari is attempting to
                                                 
50 Spivak argues that the same insight is provided by Nietzsche, stating that “[i]n its simplest outline,
Nietzsche’s definition of metaphor seems to be the establishing of an identity between dissimilar things.
Nietzsche’s phrase is ‘Gleich Machen’ (make equal), calling to mind the German word ‘Gleichnis’ —
image, simile, similitude, comparison, allegory, parable — an unmistakable pointer to figurative practice in
general” (Translator’s Preface xxii).
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give an ontological account of how subjectivities are produced, one that complements the
current interest in how subjectivity is created linguistically but which does not privilege
the linguistic and is not solely epistemological.  Therefore, the term ‘meta-modelisation’
with its ring of ‘meta-narrative’ does not seek to move into reductionist accounts that
simplify the complex conditions of subjectivity, but instead “work[s] towards [. . .
subjectivity’s] complexification, its processual enrichment, towards the consistency of its
virtual lines of bifurcation and differentiation, in short towards its ontological
heterogeneity” (61).  An emphasis on ontological complexity rejects that psychoanalytic
theory which sought to exclude the complexities of the signified and the thetic (the
Imaginary) in favour of syntagmatic systems.  Schizo-analysis does not seek to overthrow
the insights of such psychoanalytic theory but seeks to broaden them by applying them to
context-specific pre-verbal existential territories and, thereby, reanimate them and make
them more relevant to the needs of diverse subjects and social worlds.
Schizo-analysis is part of a more general move in contemporary cultural theory
towards using conceptual frameworks that reject universals, be they the positing of
transcendental categories or universal abandonment of them.  As I have argued
throughout this study, both these tactics ultimately effect what Haraway calls the ‘god-
trick’ of complete dislocation and are for this reason ‘mirror-like’ twins.  Schizo-analysis
manages to preserve an awesome mobility for theorising and practising identity and
textual construction, more so than its antecedents.  The conception of an unconscious that
is opened out on to the world and its political and cultural structures is fundamental for
the continuing relevance of the concept of the unconscious.  Such a model provides a
more dynamic and far-reaching vocabulary/imaginary with which to figure subjectivity.
It encourages one
to envisage the work of cartography and psychological modelisation in a
dialectical relation with the individuals and groups concerned; the crucial
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thing is to move in the direction of co-management in the production of
subjectivity, to distrust suggestion and the attitudes of authority which
occupy such a large place in psychoanalysis, in spite of the fact that it
claims to have escaped them.  (Chaosmosis 12)
Haraway writes, “[t]he alternative to relativism is partial, locatable, critical knowledges
sustaining the possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared
conversations in epistemology” (191).  Guattari and Haraway are responding to the
universality of scientific and psychoanalytic discourse, but rather than moving into
radical relativism, they propose “co-management in the production of subjectivity”
(Chaosmosis 12) and welding “personal preferences and cultural tendencies [. . .] into
progressive politics [. . .]” (Haraway 169).  They resist claims to truth and radical
relativism because “[r]elativism and totalization are both ‘god-tricks’ promising vision
from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully [. . .]” (191).  Guattari’s focus on the
event and existential refrains shows him to be concerned with developing a method for
theorising subjectivity in a way that avoids god-tricks; that is more dynamic than the
operation of the universal categories of psychoanalysis, and yet remains an accountable
framework that is supportive of detailed historical analysis.
Haraway describes the schizoid character of social processes as potentially
liberating, writing in a tone reminiscent of Guattari: “It is the simultaneity of breakdowns
that cracks the matrices of domination and opens geometric possibilities.  What might be
learned from personal and political ‘technological’ pollution?” (174).  Haraway identifies
the schizo-process as potentially liberating but also warns against “epistemological
electro-shock therapy, which far from ushering us into the high stakes tables of the game
of contesting public truths, lays us out on the table with self-induced multiple personality
disorder” (186).  Guattari also makes this point (cited above) when he stresses the need
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for the reader to understand that schizo-analysis is not about being clinically
schizophrenic.  Talking of the schizoid condition of late-capitalism, Haraway writes:
I prefer a network ideological image, suggesting the profusion of spaces
and identities and the permeability of boundaries in the personal body and
in the body politic.  ‘Networking’ is both a feminist practice and a
multinational corporate strategy — weaving is for oppositional cyborgs.
[.  .  .] If we learn how to read these webs of power and social life, we
might learn new couplings, new coalitions.  (170)
This stands in contrast to Kristeva’s modelisation of subjectivity and politics that
maintains the silence of women because it disembodies femininity and removes it from
women.51  Kristeva’s commitment to psychoanalysis places her in a plot where women
“have less selfhood, weaker individuation, more fusion to the oral, to Mother, less at
stake in masculine autonomy.  But there is another route to having less at stake in
masculine autonomy, a route that does not pass through Woman, Primitive, Zero, the
Mirror Stage and its imaginary” (Haraway 176).  There is a strong compatibility between
Haraway and Guattari in their rejection of universalising models of subjectivity and in
their proposal for a theory of subjectivity that “passes through women and other present-
tense, illegitimate cyborgs, not of Woman born, who refuse the ideological resources of
victimization so as to have a real life” (Haraway 176).  Such a theory is proposed
because, as Haraway writes, “subjectivity is not a natural given any more than air and
water.  How do we produce it, capture it, enrich it, and permanently reinvent it in a way
that renders it compatible with Universes of mutant value?  How do we work for its
liberation, that is, for its resingularisation” (135).  Schizo-analysis offers a conceptual
framework that supports post-colonial theory’s rejection of positions that efface the
specificity of difference because of their commitment to relativistic or totalising theories.
Schizo-analysis can support the post-colonial project undertaken in this study of
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articulating the specific figurative networks that characterise the presentation of
Aboriginality in Aboriginal testimonial life-writing.
The history of psychoanalytic models of subjectivity shows that psychoanalytic
theory began by decentring the traditional Cartesian subject.  Psychoanalytic theory
posited a model of fragmented agency in its theorisation of subjectivity wherein the
subject is never fully self-present but rather deferred in psychic processes.  Nevertheless,
although psychoanalytic theory figures the subject as consisting of multiple forces, its
model of subjectivity remains rigid.  It universalises the process of the subject’s
emergence, and ignores the profoundly different ways subjects become who they are and,
thereby, limits the theoretical tools available for conceiving historical specificity.
Although Kristeva adapts psychoanalytic theory in productive ways through her interest
in pre-linguistic systems, she remains committed to the rigidity of Oedipalisation and the
belief that women cannot speak themselves.  The result is a model of the pre-Symbolic
and pre-Imaginary that is inadequate for the conceptualisation of different subjectivities.
In contrast, schizo-analysis offers an attractive extension of psychoanalysis, formulating a
more schizo-unconscious that escapes the reductive universalisations of subjectivity that
traditional psychoanalytic theory posits.  It acknowledges that models themselves produce
subjectivity and embraces itself as a figurative and metaphorical practice.  By doing so, it
shows itself to be a powerful figurative resource for theorising different post-colonial
contexts.  By acknowledging itself as a figurative and metaphorical practice it
distinguishes itself from totalising theories, but this does not mean that it is a form of
radical relativism.  Rather, it offers itself as a resource for explicating the present-tense
existential refrains that order the multiplicity of racial, gender, familial and economic
forces that generate subjectivity.  It is because of this specificity that it escapes both
totalizing and radical relativist positions.  Only with this degree of specificity can one
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develop potential lines of resistance, therapeutic breakthroughs and new coalitions in the
post-colonial Australian context.  Of particular interest is the way schizo-analytic theory
is suitable for identifying the figurative practices of Aboriginal theory and life-writing
that are involved in dealing with post-colonial trauma and the way such theory and life-
writing off-sets working-through with acting-out.
Schizo-Analysis and Post-Colonial Trauma
As discussed earlier in this study, LaCapra presents two concepts that assist in the process
of better specifying the ways in which different subjects live and deal with traumatic
experiences: working-through and acting-out.  As stated, LaCapra opposes working-
through/mourning to acting-out/melancholia and describes acting-out as “a mimetic
relation to the past which is re-generated or relived as if it were fully present rather than
represented in memory and inscription” (History and Memory 45).  In contrast, mourning
is described as “a relation to the past that recognizes its difference from the present and [.
. .] simultaneously remembers and takes at least partial leave of it, thereby allowing for
critical judgment [. . .]” (45).  LaCapra argues that the concept of mourning is opposed to
positivist historical accounts of total mastery and accounts “fixated on failed
transcendence or irremediable loss in which any mode of reconstruction or renewal is
seen as objectionably recuperative or naive” (46).
In the context of post-colonial Aboriginal testimonial life-writing, adopting the
position of total mastery focuses on redeeming traumatic experience “through a
teleological story that projectively presents values and wishes as viably realized in the
facts, typically through a progressive, developmental process” (Representing the
Holocaust 192).  A position that focuses on irremediable loss is an inversion of
redemptive totalisation and insists “that there is no alternative to symptomatic acting-out
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and the repetition compulsion other than an imaginary, illusory hope for totalization, full-
closure, and redemptive meaning” (193).  LaCapra argues that these two responses to
traumatic experience correspond with two different ways of construing theory: firstly,
totalising narratives; and, secondly, those discursive symptoms that repeatedly move
“toward the paradox, aporia, or impasse that ‘sublimely’ brings language to a halt and
renders impossible (or situates as helplessly naive) any form of recovery or viable
agency” (192).  In terms of contemporary theory and its application to Aboriginal
testimonial life-writing, these two positions correspond to the two models of
representation I outlined in Chapter One; what Santiago Colás termed “the false
dichoto[my] of realism and modernism” (164).
LaCapra presents another way of theorising trauma that “involve[s] a tense
interaction between seeming opposites such as stability and the risk of trauma [. . .]”, and
argues for a strategy that
resist[s] redemptive totalization [and . . .] becoming compulsively fixated
on or symptomatically reinforcing impasses, [but rather] engage[s in] a
process of mourning that would attempt, however self-questioningly and
haltingly, to specify its haunting objects and (even if only symbolically) to
give them a ‘proper’ burial. (Representing the Holocaust 193-94)
Such a strategy is termed working-through or, better still in the context of literature,
writing-through trauma, a phrase that emphasises this study’s dual focus on writing
practices and theories of post-colonial traumatic experience.52
Guattari’s, Haraway’s and LaCapra’s insights into the need for interpretative and
generative figurative systems that are highly specific, mobile and avoid straight realist or
radical relativist approaches are useful for exploring Aboriginal testimonial life-writing,
and for analysing theories of representation employed to read that life-writing.  They
                                                 
52 LaCapra writes that “[t]his third sense of theory may also be related to what Jacques Derrida terms
‘generalised displacement,’ which must accompany the reversal of hierarchically arranged binary opposites
if one is not to remain entirely within their frame of reference” (Representing the Holocaust 193).
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encourage theorists to discuss representation in a way that does not simply view it as
being either completely generative or completely reflective of reality.  This is important
because the synergetic entwinement of representation, trauma and subjectivity means that
affective, non-linguistic forces have to be taken into account in any theory of
representation.  It is also important to reconsider ways in which testimonial life-writing
has been conceived within realist/anti-realist debates and explore other ways of
conceiving of it that are compatible with the above presentation of schizo-analysis.
Colás, in response to Yúdice’s positing of an opposition between practice and
representation, asks “[w]hat’s wrong with representation?  Why does the construction of
the testimonio as radical political object require its placement ‘beyond representation’?”
(168).  To answer the first question, Colás outlines what have been traditionally opposed
models of representation — realist versus anti-realist — as they are presented by two
theorists of testimonio, Miguel Barnet and Roberto González Echevarría.  Colás presents
the opposition thus: González Echevarría, “in the first of a series of ‘De Manian’
deconstructions [. . .] challenges the testimonio’s self-constituting extraliterary
positioning” (161-62), whereas “[f]or Barnet, representation implies transparency, an
open door offering access to the represented [. . .]” (162).53  Colás argues against both the
realist view (Barnet) and the modernist/relativist view (González Echevarría) — and the
list of theorists who rank in one position or the other is extensive — while proposing
another way of conceiving of representation.  He borrows from Arac to do so, citing him
thus: “‘Current advanced theory,’ Arac writes, ‘crosses these lines [between ‘an anti-
representational antihumanism’ and ‘humanist defenders of representation’] [Colás’s
clarification]: it is anti-humanist, but it acknowledges — critically — our enmeshment in
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representation’” (Colás 163).  He borrows from Ernesto Laclau to further demonstrate
this point:
‘[a]bsolute representation, the total transparency between the
representative and the represented, means the extinction of the relationship
of representation.  [. . .] Representation can therefore only exist to the
extent that the transparency entailed by the concept is never achieved; and
that a permanent dislocation exists between the representative and the
represented’. (qtd. in Colás 169)
This model of representation argues for maintaining a vitalising disjunction between the
representative and the represented because such disjunction maintains the dynamism of
dialectic by not collapsing it into either dialectical pole.  The maintenance of the
ambiguity of dialectic is the primary theoretical concern of this study.  As I have set out
to address in each chapter, opposite but ultimately complementary strategies fail to
account for the complexities involved in the dialectical movement between traumatic
memory and narrative memory, cognitive and affective systems, the testifier and the
collective, realism and anti-realism, redemptive totalisations and impasse narratives, truth
and non-truth, and relativism and absolutism.  In this manner, I have sought to
demonstrate that Colás’s and Laclau’s position on maintaining the disjunction between
the representative and the represented corresponds with the rejection of the false
opposition of realism and anti-realism discussed in Chapter One; with the maintenance of
the disjunction between the representative of a collective and the collective itself
discussed in Chapter Two; with LaCapra’s position on working-through trauma discussed
in Chapter Three; and with maintaining difference in self/other and Aboriginal/non-
Aboriginal recognitive relations discussed in Chapter Four.  By not collapsing the above
dialectical poles into one another in an effort to understand the post-colonial situation in
Australia, this study distinguishes itself from how the post-colonial situation would be
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conceived of in what Yúdice terms ‘hegemonic postmodernism’, which is characterised
by its use of blunt deconstructive method of the A equals not A kind.
In hegemonic postmodernist readings, the dispossessed Other of colonialism is not
seen as possessing an active agency within the post-colonial matrix but is defined as
having negative valence — its character solely determined by that which is suppressed in
the privileged discourse — that is the specific effaced Real of a specific colonialist
Australian Symbolic.  In hegemonic postmodernism, the violence privileged discourse
does to the dispossessed Other of colonialism is only identified to highlight the
contradictions within privileged discourse itself, and is too often not explicitly equated
with the violence committed against the dispossessed Other.  Subaltern agency is viewed
as a consequence of fissures within the dominant discourse and, thus, hegemonic
postmodernism does not reveal that the dispossessed Other also has an other, namely, the
collective traumatic material of colonial dispossession that resists integration into its
cultural history.  Such a position “do[es] not provide the marginalized elements with their
own specificity outside of hegemonic discourse; they exist as the hidden fuel on which
that discourse reproduces itself” (Yúdice 22).  However, the interpolation of subaltern
agency into hegemonic discourse in order to transform that discourse, as witnessed in
Aboriginal testimonial life-writing, means that such writing cannot be reduced to the
hegemonic postmodernist position, which argues that the Other does not exist other than
as the repressed material of the Symbolic.
Unlike hegemonic postmodernism and realist/anti-realist views of representation,
this study argues that Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is better understood as
embodying a dialectical movement between the representative and the represented.  It
does not characterise the subaltern as the unrepresentable Other, but rather argues that the
position of the subaltern is contested through maintaining a dynamic dialectical
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interchange.  Post-colonial traumatic memory defies signification but demands to be
signified in order to ensure the survival of the subject.  This dialectic generates others: the
temporal gap (latency) between the experience of trauma and its successful narration; the
gap between a sense of humanity and the inhuman material conditions resulting from
colonialism; and the disjunction between the testifier and the collective consciousness she
or he represents.  Reading Aboriginal testimonial life-writing, it becomes clear that it is
sometimes successful in creating new vocabularies, identities and affectivities that result
from mobilising the dialectics of the post-colonial condition.  In doing so, it shows itself
to be a presentation of agency that is neither “‘an antirepresentational antihumanism’ [nor
a] humanist [. . . defence] of representation’” (Arac qtd. in Colás 163).
It is more valuable to discuss not absolute otherness or absolute ineffability, but
the specific dialectical movements that constitute particular identities.  The post-colonial
subject, singular and collective, is constantly changing and is made up of successful
articulations of traumatic otherness as well as continuing and ever-new alterities.  There is
no teleological completeness like that which characterises traditional realist
autobiography.  The post-colonial condition is better described as, to use Deleuze’s and
Guattari’s schizo-analytic terminology, a series of de-territorialisations and re-
territorialisations.  Agency is generated in the specificity of conditions and is not affirmed
or denied in the sweeping generalisations of realism or hegemonic postmodernism.
C. L. R. James cautions theorists that “one of the chief errors of thought is to continue to
think in one set of forms, categories, ideas, etc., when the object, the content, has moved
on, has created premises for an extension, a development of thought” (15).  Testimonial
life-writing is such an ‘object’ and the model of dialectical movement I have proposed is
a welcome extension of the two dominant theories of representation and agency explored
throughout this study.  The dialectical movements that comprise the relationship between
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the testifier and the reader and between affective and cognitive modalities are equally
points of connection and separation and of identification and difference.  They are
mutable rather than stable points and Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is both the
execution and record of their history (Gibbons 70).
Yúdice, writing on I, Rigoberta Menchú, argues that testimonio’s engagement
with traumatic material that resists representation does not create “‘representation’ [. . .]
born of the exclusion of the ‘limiting otherness’ — in [Menchú's] case, the nahual — but,
rather, by dialogue and interaction with it” (27).  As previously stated, Yúdice further
defines the difference between testimonio and that of hegemonic postmodernism, writing:
Again, in contrast with the hegemonic postmodern text, in which the ‘I’ is
expelled as vomit, in which the body transforms into vomit, that which is
expelled, separating it from nature (mother and father), thus making
dialogue impossible — ‘I abject myself within the same motion through
which ‘I’ claim to establish myself’ (Kristeva, 1982: 3) — Menchú’s text
is, rather, a testimonial of incorporation, embodiment.  (27)
Much Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is such a process of incorporation and
embodiment, effected through a dialogue with the trauma of colonialism that, rather than
expelling the I, creates it out of the material of the dialectical struggle.  Likewise,
Aboriginal testimonial life-writing, through emphasising the racial difference of the
addressee of the testimony (the non-Aboriginal reader), provides an opportunity for that
reader to engage in a process of incorporation and embodiment with regard to his or her
colonial history.
Aboriginal testimonial life-writing implicitly challenges hegemonic
postmodernism's theorisation of agency.  Johnston, in her ‘Foreword’ to My Bundjalung
People, writes, “[a]lways is a solid word.  It is stable and immutable, as this journey into
Bundjalung country is, encompassing as it does the history, culture and an abiding
spirituality.  The people, the roads, the houses, the conversations and the thousands of
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minute detail are solid and immutable as that word” (Langford Ginibi, My Bundjalung
People xi).  Johnston and Langford Ginibi will not concede that the truth and reality of
Aboriginal culture and history is defaced by the narratives that attest to them.  In
opposition to the hegemonic postmodernist position, Aboriginal testifiers insist that the
unnarrativised traumatic history of Aboriginal people can be represented in written and
spoken form.  In doing so, they affirm the power of subaltern agency and of
representation, and perform an integration and narrativisation of their and their people’s
traumatic memory into social history.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, a correlation between Haraway and Deleuze
and Guattari is their focus on the ‘event’.  An event consists of the particular
manifestations of politics, technologies and economies that generate specific subjects.  To
understand the subject as event, it is best not to employ over-generalised interpretative
tools or dreams of a common language or common ontology.  Rather, the subaltern
subject as a living culturally specific affective and narrative event and the technologies
and economies of particular events in history mutually constitute one another.  Haraway’s
and schizo-analysis’ theoretical tools can assist in developing unclichéd interpretations of
the post-colonial condition because they are capable of articulating historically specific
formations of contesting forces.  To be able to theorise with greater and greater specificity
is important for such theorists.  For example, Haraway sees a need for “[a]n adequate
socialist-feminist politics [. . . that addresses] women in the privileged occupational
categories, and particularly in the production of science and technology that constructs
scientific-technical discourses, processes, and objects” (169).  In this way, she speaks
neither of archetypal subjects nor simple political allegiances but of subjects and
allegiances that change and cross traditional boundaries.
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Aboriginal-Specific Trauma-Work
The specificity of the feminisms of privileged white women in privileged occupations
that Haraway is interested in theorising is precisely what some Aboriginal feminist
theorists see as a problem of difference.  Aileen Moreton-Robinson in Talkin’ Up to the
White Woman, argues:
Indigenous women’s experiences are grounded in a different history from
that which is celebrated and known by those who deploy the subject
position middle-class white woman.  We know and understand the
practical, political and personal effects of being ‘Other’ through a
consciousness forged from our experiences and oral traditions.  The self-
presentation in Indigenous women’s life writings, and the strategic
deployment of different subject positions to resist white cultural
domination, is evidence of this consciousness.  (179)
Moreton-Robinson stresses the specificity of the history and material conditions of the
dispossessed Aboriginal Other to highlight the failures of some feminist theory to take
account of the differences between Aboriginal and middle-class white women.  Moreton-
Robinson’s call for the differences between white feminisms and Aboriginality to be
better acknowledged requires developing vocabularies that can articulate the spectrum of
post-colonial conditions with a high level of specificity.  As such it is appropriate to
complement the high theory of this study (theory that argues for the importance of
culturally specific approaches to trauma work) with some examples of therapeutic
programs that have sought to respond to the specificity of Aboriginal cultures and
Aboriginal trauma.  Throughout Australia Aboriginal people such as Judy Atkinson and
local community initiatives such as Derby’s Family Violence Intervention Program and
the New South Wales’s Northern Rivers Men’s Violence Program have developed
specific Aboriginal therapeutic vocabularies and programs.  Such endeavours are
important because the affective and narrative refrains that characterise traumatic material
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are culturally specific and, therefore, the therapeutic tools for working-through them must
address this cultural specificity.
Atkinson, writing on her engagement with Aboriginal post-colonial trauma and
her wish to extend feminist theory to address Aboriginal cultural need, recounts:
I found I had to extend my reading beyond feminist explanations of
violence against women and children, to explore disaster/trauma theory.
The violence I was seeing and hearing was much more than ‘domestic
violence’.  In the context of colonisation, there are, I began to understand,
human trauma experiences, implicit in human acts of violence, which
result in trauma behaviours.  Violent outbursts, on others and on self, are
one manifestation of traumatisation.  Alcohol and drug misuse appeared to
fit the same self-medicating needs of those who are traumatised. (Working
with Adolescents Screen 1, par. 6)
Like this study, Atkinson focuses on narrativising trauma as a therapeutic approach, yet
does so within an Aboriginal-specific, workshop-oriented therapeutic framework rather
than a text-based literary one.  Atkinson developed the We Al-li (Fire and Water)
program as an Aboriginal-specific practice for working-through Aboriginal trauma, which
she argues directly stems from colonialisation.  Atkinson describes We Al-li as a
program that evolved from the participatory action focus of my research
project.  A series of workshops was developed and delivered to promote
the exploration of personal and collective stories in a safe environment.
The program was built around a number of considerations.  Firstly, it was
informed by the work of Alice Miller (1983), who has listed what she
believes are the five interactive ingredients into the construction of a truly
violent person [. . .] Secondly, it was considered that a culturally safe
environment had to be established, so that the stories of violence could be
told in self-other relationships, during which each person could experience
and express the pain of past abuse, and have others in the group witness
the truth of those experiences.  At the same time the purpose and structure
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of the workshops was to allow the group to work together to
‘intellectualise’, or ‘make sense’ of the abuse.
Finally, all the work we did would be based on the integrity of
Indigenous cultural and spiritual practices.  The name We Al-li was part of
that cultural integrity.  (Trauma Trails 93-94)
A core part of developing this therapeutic program was the employment of an Aboriginal-
specific therapeutic tool æ dadirri æ defined by Atkinson as
[a] word from the language of the Ngangikurungkurr people of the Daly
River area of the Northern Territory.  Ngangi means word or sound.  Kuri
means water and kurr means deep.  Deep water sound or sounds of the
deep, also explains the word dadirri — inner deep listening and quiet still
awareness.  Dadirri can only be experienced over a period of time in the
practice or activity: ‘When I experience dadirri I am made whole again’.
(Trauma Trails ix)
Atkinson is a descendent of the Jiman and Bundjalung people as well as having Celtic-
German heritage and is not related to the Daly River community.  Therefore, Atkinson is
quick to address the potential criticism of intra-Aboriginal cultural appropriation:
It could be inferred that my use of dadirri is a form of cultural
appropriation.  On the contrary, I approached both the author of the paper
‘Dadirri: Listening to One Another’ (Ungunmerr 1993a), and the
Aboriginal people of Central Queensland, who helped inform the early
design of the research approach, before the choice was made.  Dadirri, as
both an Indigenous philosophy informing investigative processes, and
ethical cultural behaviour (in research), ensured cultural safety in the
research design.  (15)
Atkinson is establishing for the reader that her use of Central Queensland Aboriginal
therapeutic methodologies has been approved by the traditional owners of the practice
and is thereby ethical.  As colonialism impacted on all Aboriginal people at different
times in different ways throughout Australia, it seems reasonable that resistive responses
to that offensive will be informed by the culturally specific tools of different Aboriginal
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nations.  As an Aboriginal-specific therapeutic methodology, dadirri establishes a
recognitive process based on listening to someone attesting to traumatic material in an
open and empathetic way.  Some risks of not listening appropriately were examined
within the context of literary and psychoanalytic models of recognition in Chapter Four of
this study and, like Atkinson, the importance of listening in a way that does not capture
and co-opt another’s experience was stressed.
Interestingly, Atkinson’s development of Aboriginal-specific therapeutic tools for
dealing with cultural incommensurabilities emphasises similar structures and processes
for dealing with trauma to those found in contemporary trauma theory, indicating the
potential for comparative cultural studies to draw ever closer historical links while
simultaneously underlining difference.  Indeed, Atkinson not only employs therapeutic
tools from Aboriginal nations other than her own, but also borrows from Western
therapeutic frameworks such as psychoanalysis.  Being a hybrid therapeutic practice, We
Al-li is suited to a schizo-analytic reading that would seek to identify the specific
territorialisations and refrains it performs.  We Al-li, as an Aboriginal-specific therapeutic
practice, is constructed from diverse sources and partly mirrors the complexity of late
twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century Aboriginality.  The use of both
traditional Aboriginal therapeutic and contemporary psychotherapeutic techniques
demonstrates the way in which diverse cultural sources are employed in the present-
centred performance of Aboriginal identity.  Yet, there are some elements of Atkinson’s
analysis that are at odds with the positions on contemporary trauma theory argued for in
this study.  Atkinson writes:
Participants demonstrated through their testimonies that healing is a
process of transformation and transcendence.  It is the ever-unfolding
expression of knowledge of the Self.  In the processes of transformation
the Self is viewed with acceptance and compassion and a curiosity towards
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the change process.  With the knowledge that change is possible must
come the knowledge of choices and an access to services relevant to the
transformation process.  The desire for change can then be met.  (206)
Of concern here is the suggestion that the healing process is about revealing the true
common proper noun ‘Self’, that is, something already always there — an abstracted
formulation of Self like that examined in the discussion of traditional autobiography in
Chapter One.  Yet, as Atkinson’s use of diverse theoretical sources for working-through
Aboriginal trauma implicitly acknowledges, Aboriginality itself is multiple and is to a
significant extent characterised by the present-centred presentation of itself.
Nevertheless, as with Aboriginal testimonial life-writing, Atkinson’s emphasis on the
‘real’ Self is tied to the therapeutic and political goal of establishing non-metaphorical
facts that form the basis of the project of re-externalising Aboriginal trauma.  Atkinson
writes:
A healing relationship between people who are working to listen to each
other in dadirri is important because it holds the potential for
reacquainting people with their own self-healing abilities.  For people who
have been colonised this is doubly important, so that they begin to feel and
reclaim the power within themselves to change who they have been made
by the colonising processes and who they have tried to be to counter this
colonisation.  The ‘real self’ only emerges once people have been able to
name and know the ‘constructed self’ (how we have been constructed by
others) and the ‘ideal self’ (behaving in the way we think people want us
to behave.  (213-14)
This passage touches on the central theme of this study, that is, testimonial life-writing, as
a therapeutic and political process concerned with establishing Aboriginal agency, is a
paradoxical process of reclaiming Aboriginal identity through the present-centred
performance of Aboriginal identity.  Atkinson’s and Aboriginal testimonial life-writers’
emphasis on the ‘real self’ is intended to counter denial of Aboriginal people’s
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experience.  Such denial may be sourced to colonialist imaginaries or to the over-
emphasis on Aboriginal identity as ‘constructed’, that is, as ‘not real’ or as nothing other
than the repressed other of the ‘idealisations’ of dominant discourses.  This reinforcement
of Aboriginal reality is an important strategy for countering the negation of Aboriginal
agency in both political and therapeutic contexts; negations of agency that have historical
precedence.  Furthermore, Atkinson’s use of the term transcendence need not necessarily
mean an escape into ahistoricism but could rather mean situational transcendence in the
sense that LaCapra uses it.
Yet, in countering these dangers, such essentialism may overlook that the
construction and performance of Aboriginal identity is living Aboriginal culture itself.
Aboriginality is not an ahistorical essential object to be reclaimed in political and
therapeutic actions.  Rather, what is profoundly important is who has the power to
construct Aboriginality for whom; who has the power to determine the nature of the
performativity of Aboriginality.  Aboriginal testimonial life-writing and programs like
We Al-li publicly take the power and privileges of identity construction into Aboriginal
hands, in contrast to the history of coercive colonial prescriptions of Aboriginality and the
surveillance and enforcement of those prescriptions.  As argued in this chapter,
subjectivity is a highly dynamic process so, rather than positing restrictive
universalisations of Aboriginality, it is it important that the dynamism of Aboriginal
subjectivity is mobilised and Aboriginal access to privileged discourses is strengthened.
Aboriginal testimonial life-writing and Aboriginal cultural theory work towards this, and
schizo-analytic theory provides conceptual tools that can help articulate and support this
post-colonial endeavour.
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Conclusion
One of the crucial projects of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is to establish and
reinforce Aboriginal realities.  This project has been underway for some time and it has
produced a foundational body of work that new forms of Aboriginal life-writing will
borrow from and to some extent be compared with.  I speculate that in contrast to the
testimonial texts examined in this study, there will be a growth in life-stories produced by
new Aboriginal writers that participate in the sophisticated self-reflexivity of
postmodernist autobiography.  For example, Fabienne Bayet-Charlton, in her
“Introductory Author’s” note to Finding Ullagundahi Island, writes:
Can I point out that, although this book is strongly autobiographical, it is
not an autobiography.  To be an autobiography everything in this book
would have to historically precise and that’s not the case.  I can say that
just about every conversation recounted in the text happened.  It’s more
the timing of events that have been adjusted.
And to be fair to my family, past work colleagues, friends and
assorted characters I’ve met along the way I also need to say this book is
from my own perspective and I have written only what I have been able to
see and say.  I’m sure just about everybody in my family remembers my
Nana differently as our own experiences, personalities and relationships
with this wonderful woman differed.  This book is not a claim to
favouritism, special information or highly evolved wisdom.  I’m biased
and human.  It’s a story of dispossession if anything.
Such an acknowledgement of historical relativism and perspectivism is not generally a
feature of the Aboriginal testimonial life-writing examined in his study.  While I believe
that future Aboriginal life-writing will employ devices more characteristic of the narrative
games of postmodernist autobiography, this study suggests that there will also be a strong
tendency in Aboriginal writers for a long time to come to emphasise the power of
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material conditions to limit those games.  The Aboriginal testimonial life-writing
examined in this study provides a base for such future texts because it is concerned with
establishing, as do testimonies to the Holocaust, non-metaphorical facts — thus the
emphasis on truth in such texts — upon and through which more complex narratives can
produce and contest Aboriginal realities.  This study argues that this emphasis on non-
metaphorical facts is generationally specific and that new writing by younger generations
of Aboriginal authors will reveal different areas of focus — a topic for future study.  It
also suggests that Aboriginal writers will progressively become more focused on how
they produce their Others, how they organise Aboriginality within their communities, and
what they wish to accept and reject of non-Aboriginal values and practices.
This study has demonstrated that positions that critique testimonial life-writing’s
claims to establish non-metaphorical facts and to extra-textual reach are important
because they focus attention on the discursive construction of testimonial texts.
However, by arguing that there is nothing other than metaphorical facts and intra-
textuality, these positions fail to emphasise strongly enough that Aboriginal people have
been historically denied the right to access the material and symbolic privileges of certain
discourses and imaginaries that generate metaphorical facts by virtue of their
Aboriginality.  This impeding of Aboriginal access to privileges that allow the production
and expression of identity, in addition to the material bases of racist marginalisation, are
the facts addressed in the testimonial life-writing examined here.  This is why, when
introducing this study, it was argued that Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is a distinct
literary genre generated out of the material conditions of a certain stage in post-colonial
Australian history.  Aboriginal testimony’s object is post-colonial history and as an
intervention in that history it signals a change in the material and symbolic conditions of
that history — at the very least a change in the pattern of engaging with Australian
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English literary modes.  Yet, they are engaged with more than just the literary: these texts
are involved in the establishment and strengthening of Aboriginal agency in political and
therapeutic contexts.  They perform a reinforcement of Aboriginality while also working
towards Aboriginality’s “complexification, its processual enrichment, towards the
consistency of its virtual lines of bifurcation and differentiation, in short towards its
ontological heterogeneity” (Guattari, Chaosmosis 61).
Yet, it must be remembered that the legacy of traumatic events works against
subjectivity’s processual enrichment; more specifically, post-colonial Aboriginal trauma
works against the processual enrichment of Aboriginality.  This is the core therapeutic
and political tension being worked-through in the testimonials and it manifests itself as a
crisis of representation for the literary theorist who is torn between reinforcing and
deconstructing the establishment and presentation of agency therein.  ‘Presentation’ is
used here in Jean-Luc Nancy’s sense, cited in Chapter Five, that is, “[t]he subject
becomes what it is (its own essence) by representing itself to itself (as you know, the
original and proper meaning of ‘representation’ is not a ‘second presentation,’ but a
‘presentation to the self’) [. . .]” (148).  Reinforcing or deconstructing subjects’ power
over this first presentation of the self to the self is prior to other reinforcements or
deconstructions.  Aboriginal testimonial life-writing’s therapeutic and political agenda is
primarily aimed at strengthening Aboriginal people’s material and symbolic power to
control this first presentation of Aboriginality to itself.  As such, the representation (in
this sense of a first presentation) of Aboriginality in testimonial life-writing is profoundly
performative and the tension between the establishment and process of Aboriginality
characteristic of all performances of subjectivity propels the creation of
Aboriginality/subjectivity.  Because this tension drives Aboriginality/subjectivity, it is
important to maintain it and not collapse it into absolute impasse or redemption
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narratives, full or deferred presence, affective paralysis or transcendence, and
representational opacity or transparency.
To reinforce or deconstruct Aboriginal agency through one’s critical response to
Aboriginal testimony is to confront one’s ethical foundation or anti-foundationalism.
Yet, the practice of working-through as writing-through trauma is a processual one that
simultaneously performs both reinforcement and deconstruction, and theoretical
responses ought to reflect this.  It seems theoretically and ethically short-sighted to
collapse unique subjectivity events into instances of dialectical opposition.  Post-colonial
material conditions determine subjectivity events (often traumatic in nature) and working-
through them for processual subjective enrichment requires different levers for different
contexts.  Postmodern theories and language games may not be the best lever for reading
historically specific Aboriginal testimonial texts; realist affirmation of Aboriginal
subjectivity, history and culture is a useful lever; and theoretical responses that are neither
realist nor anti-realist are better.  One should recall C. L. R. James’s warning to theorists:
“one of the chief errors of thought is to continue to think in one set of forms, categories,
ideas, etc., when the object, the content, has moved on, has created premises for an
extension, a development of thought” (15).  Equally, supersession of others’ concerns is
as incongruent as lagging behind them and this study has set out to identify the
incongruities and affinities between contemporary theory and post-colonial Australian
conditions.  It has sought to articulate those incongruities and affinities by off-setting
Aboriginal testimonial life-writing and contemporary theory with one another through
their different language and concerns.  It has sought to problematise their engagement
with one another and to align mutual concerns where considered relevant.
This study has directed attention to the figurativeness of different imaginaries and
the clusters of metaphors, symbols and concepts that characterise them.  It has explored
249S. R. J. Gibbons
theoretical resources that can assist in showing how different imaginaries are central in
the establishment of different historical stages and social worlds.  Acknowledging the
figurativeness of imaginaries and discourses opens them to reconfiguration.  This study
has explored those figurative practices associated with different forms of self-
representation found in life-writing practices and with the contemporary theory that aims
to explicate those practices.  It has examined life-writing and contemporary theory to
establish the different ways in which they can assist in better figuring post-colonial
realities; to identify where they too strictly prescribe and where they open up what can be
addressed within post-colonial studies.  It has explored various imaginaries and their
associated metaphors to demonstrate their links to post-colonial theory, history and
subjects and to identify their connections with different stages æ stages in the temporal
and theatrical senses æ of post-colonial history.
It was argued that the Cartesian imaginary is characterised by metaphors of non-
situated transcendence, abstraction and mastery, and by the way it posits a split within the
subject between an abstracted (metaphysical) subjectivity and the historically located
person.  In a post-colonial context, this imaginary corresponds with the colonialist
imaginary in that each restricts the recognitive structures available for relationships
between the self and others — the coloniser and the colonised — by maintaining a
transcendent subject position that does not acknowledge its own historical locatedness,
relativity, or the difference of others.  I argued (for a number reasons discussed in Chapter
One) that a Cartesian-like imaginary is presented in classic realist autobiographical life-
writing and that the split it creates is adopted by readers who identify with the narrator.
This, in turn, forecloses more complex forms of recognitive engagement that maintain
difference between the narrator and the author.  Such writing was contrasted with
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Aboriginal testimonial life-writing which was seen to maintain more dynamic recognitive
structures between Aboriginal narrators and non-Aboriginal readers.
Traditional psychoanalytic theory provides useful conceptual tools for thinking
about traumatic experience such as mourning/working-through and melancholy/acting-
out which, in the case of trauma theory, are employed to better articulate and, thereby,
establish narrative control over, traumatic material.  However, such concepts are
diminished when used to further a psychoanalytic agenda that too closely connects the
living subject with the operations of language and restricts the use of such concepts to the
analysis of notions like Oedipal and Electra complexes to interpret very different subjects.
Unlike schizo-analysis, traditional psychoanalysis presents itself as a science that
faithfully represents the reality of the subject, rather than as a figurative practice that
constructs subjectivity as it claims to reflect it.  In doing so, it establishes universal
psychic categories that overdetermine subjects and fail to take account of the specificity
of psychic imaginaries in different individuals, groups and societies.  Nevertheless,
traditional psychoanalysis provides resources for theorising the traumatic and therapeutic
dimensions involved in working-through post-colonial trauma in addition to providing an
understanding of the connections between subjects and language.
Schizo-analysis avoids these limitations of psychoanalysis by registering the role
and complexity of affective dimensions in the living subject, and by not exclusively tying
the subject to the operations of language.  It was shown that schizo-analysis neither
commits itself to a Manichean split between the conscious and unconscious nor to
complexes such as the Oedipal complex.  Rather, it presents a model of psychic processes
that shows them as deeply mutable and co-extensive with specific social contexts.  It
acknowledges that subjectivity is never given, always produced, and actively maps (rather
than traces over) the unconscious.  As such, it is a highly useful resource for thinking
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through the way Aboriginal testimonial life-writing presents Aboriginality in-becoming
because it highlights the way performativity is being itself.  However, any theory that
emphasises the dynamic nature of the subject and possibilities for subjective becoming
must be balanced by a position that explores the role of forces that shape and
circumscribe subjectivity, such as post-colonial trauma.
Trauma theory provides just such a counterweight because it assists in
understanding the various ways in which traumatic experience disrupts and impairs the
subject.  Trauma theory offers a rich vocabulary/imaginary for thinking about post-
colonial traumatic material by providing a set of conceptual tools that can articulate and
specify traumatic objects.  In doing so, it provides a means by which the sufferer of
trauma can establish narrative and affective control over traumatic material.  Trauma
theory has cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary significance and has been employed by
Aboriginal theorists and activists themselves to explicate post-colonial Aboriginal
trauma.  However, like responses to traumatic experience itself, trauma theory can
enshrine traumatic experience by either fetishistically maintaining impasses or
redemptive totalisations.  Just as there is a close relationship between writing
autobiographical theory and autobiography itself, how we theorise trauma is closely
connected with how subjects may negotiate lived traumatic experiences.  Nevertheless,
and to a greater degree than traditional psychoanalysis, contemporary trauma theory
assists in more dynamically figuring the traumatic legacy of colonial dispossession and
processes available for working-through it.  As such, it is a valuable theoretical resource
for dealing with the therapeutic stages of negotiating post-colonial trauma.
Theory of written resistance (in its realist mode rather than anti-realist mode) is
important because it identifies various strategies that oppressed subjects can employ to
wrest power for themselves, such as strengthening their own identity positions or
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questioning those of their oppressors.  However, like schizo-analysis, it needs to take to
greater account the difficulty involved in performing such resistance.  For instance,
written resistance may not be successful when it is undermined by the disruptions to the
subject created by traumatic material.  Nevertheless, it is the tensions and concordances
between the therapeutic and political goals of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing that so
well characterises the post-colonial Australian context.  Furthermore, resistance theory, in
a post-colonial context, emphasises the complex differences and co-production of
colonising and colonised cultures as well as the complexity of intra-racial relations.
However, with regard to post-colonial theory generally, there is currently a tendency to
too strongly stress the incommensurabilty of different cultures at the expense of looking
for useful cross-cultural comparisons.
This study has demonstrated that deconstructive method is valuable because it
provides tools for identifying the violent Othering and exclusion involved in acts of
establishing identity.  Nevertheless, deconstructive method risks rendering the Other as
merely the residue of the operations of privileged discourses and identities and its
criticism is thereby often introspective and insular.  It fails to register strongly enough
that that which is Other to privileged discourses has character of its own beyond merely
being the repressed Other of privileged discourses; the Other also has its Others.  In
addition, some deployments of deconstructive analysis risk becoming a simplistic method
that fails to register difference because they respond to very different phenomena with the
same operation, that is, A equals not A.  Furthermore, as a method, it may at times
confuse the processes involved in constructing identity with the power and privilege to do
so.
The realist imaginary examined in this study is characterised by a monological
perspective rather than a multi-perspectival one, although it does not necessitate a split
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between an abstracted metaphysical subjectivity and historical persons as the Cartesian
imaginary does.  The realist imaginary is evoked by metaphors associated with truth, the
subject’s embeddedness in and determination by the material conditions of history, and
transparency.  It posits that gaps between the representative and the represented can be
spanned to give a true mimetic representation of the world.  In a post-colonial context, the
realist position as practised in Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is not concerned with
resisting colonialism through anti-realist deconstructive practice, but rather accepts the
material effects of colonialist imaginaries as a reality that can be contested in a realist
framework through recourse to notions of right and wrong, justice, and humanism.  The
realist contestation of colonialism is a vital stage in post-colonial history and helps
reconfigure Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations for a variety of reasons: it challenges the
colonialist discourse through adopting concepts that characterise colonialist rhetoric
itself, such as humaneness, justice, and morality; it helps establish non-metaphorical facts
that form the basis for the historicisation of the Aboriginal experience of colonial history
and, thereby, works to strengthen Aboriginal agency; and it helps to register an
Aboriginal-specific reality as perceived by themselves for themselves and for others.
The realist affirmation of Aboriginal reality found in Aboriginal testimony is
underpinned by a political and therapeutic agenda that is closely bound to negotiating
specific stages in the historical movement of post-colonial material conditions.
Contemporary theory can articulate these stages beyond the language and concerns of
realism and anti-realism but it can also fail to do so.  Identity in general and Aboriginality
in particular are performative but performativity itself is circumscribed by post-colonial
material conditions that have limited the possibilities for Aboriginal self-expression.
Post-colonial trauma complicates performativity as the establishment of Aboriginality.
Yet, post-colonial traumatic material contains the levers that can mobilise performativity
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for the processual enrichment of Aboriginality.  Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is the
transformation and record of the history of post-colonial traumatic conditions.  To
improve vocabularies and imaginaries to better hear its claims is to further that history.
These are joint projects in the ethical performance of Australian history.  This study is an
instance of how such writing and theory produce one another.  As such, it has hopefully
clarified the performance and inherent symbolic and material possibilities of post-colonial
Australian conditions.
This study has demonstrated some ways in which Aboriginal life-writing and
contemporary theory can inform each other.  As such, it expresses my literary concerns
and history in exploring different forms of self-representation.  It might be a useful lever
for different people for different reasons through which their understanding is aided.
Because Aboriginal testimonial life-writing is a multi-dimensional, hybrid genre it holds
the potential to generate a large body of multi-disciplinary work of which this study is a
specialised literary contribution.  Nevertheless, this study should also prove useful for
those interested in the political and/or psychotherapeutic disciplines.  If so, the multi-
dimensionality of Aboriginal testimonial life-writing will have been reflected and the
eclectic use of contemporary theory justified.
It is important to remember that testimonial life-writing as a literary mode has no
political allegiances.  It can be used as a medium for oppressive neo-colonialist practices
just as it can be used to challenge such practices.  However, Aboriginal testimonial life-
writing does have an allegiance: to the articulation and advancement of Aboriginal
cultural identity.  That allegiance has engendered positive results in that the presentation
of cultural identity in Aboriginal testimonial life-writing has provided an opportunity to
advance awareness, appreciation and understanding of Aboriginal cultures.  It has also
provided the opportunity for non-Aboriginal Australians to recognise themselves
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differently due to its presentation of the complex dialogical relations that exist between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples.  From an initial interest in theories of
autobiography, this study moved into the broader field of life-writing and Aboriginal life-
writing in particular.  The move provided numerous benefits: texts that highlighted the
excesses, deficits, utility and creativity of contemporary cultural theory; a wider focus due
to the greater emphasis on the co-extensivity of society and individuals than found in
autobiography; suitability to multi-disciplinary approaches due to the multi-
dimensionality of the texts; insight into the complex operations of traumatic material in
the construction of texts and subjects; and an improved understanding of literatures of
political resistance and of post-colonial Australian history.
Aboriginal Studies has great value as a multi-disciplinary field of study and I look
forward to the work of others committed to its processual enrichment.  As a uniquely
Australian discipline, its development will strengthen Australia’s very particular identity
in the global context and may pay desirable material and symbolic dividends.  It will also
refine the dialectic underpinning discussions on Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations and
Australia’s national identity.  To reinforce impasses or escape into redemptive
totalisations in discussions about Australia’s identity are decisions with serious
consequences for establishing an ethical citizenry.  To take either path is an important
ethical decision because both destructively impact upon the establishment and volition of
Aboriginal agency and exacerbate post-colonial trauma.  Thereby, there is an ethical
obligation to conceptualise identity and Aboriginality in a way that acknowledges its
processual movements.  Consider the dual movement that David Parker points to, which I
cited at the beginning of Chapter One:
even the most linguistically focused recovery of the marginalised Other of
a logocentric philosophical or literary text at least implicitly links itself
with the defence of those who have been Other to Western imperialism, to
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patriarchy or to bourgeois interests. [. . .] It is hard to see how a concern
with such evils as ‘subordination and domination’ is not at least implicitly
oriented towards a conception of a good life centring around goods such as
freedom, self-expression, and self-realisation.  (3)
This study argues that the theoretical way forward is to simultaneously affirm dual
dialectical directions: claim the privileges of essentialism and of non-essentialism;
reinforce traditional Aboriginality and work towards its processual enrichment; locate and
abstract; establish and deconstruct; claim truth and retain the right to conceal secrets; be
transparent and opaque; and be an agent of and representative for a collective.  However,
this simultaneous dual affirmation must be balanced by a simultaneous dual resistance to
absolutism and radical relativism, complete redemptive totalisation and complete impasse
enforcement, complete locatedness and complete abstractedness, complete transparency
and complete opacity, complete establishment and complete deconstruction, and complete
truth or complete non-truth.  This position could be described as a theory and practice of
how to have it both ways but not too much.  It affirms dynamic dialectic as the human,
post-humanist condition.  It acknowledges that with regard to subaltern/coloniser
relations, agency is the power to adopt and adapt identity positions as one chooses; it is
about who can perform what and access the dynamism central to identity construction.
This position acknowledges that the split between the representative and the represented
in its many forms is what sustains the relationships of representation and avoids the
violence of making equal.  It is also, as Friedlander puts it, “the simultaneous acceptance
of two contradictory moves: the search for ever-closer historical linkages and the
avoidance of a naive historical positivism leading to simplistic and self-assured historical
narrations and closure” (Friedlander qtd. in La Capra 212).  The challenge remains to
better formulate protocols for how this ambiguity might function more clearly and for an
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